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ABSTRACT 
 
The Legal-Military Dilemma 
in the Response to International Terrorism. (December 2009) 
Matthew Wesley Allan, B.A., Carleton College; 
J.D., The University of Texas at Austin 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
 Historically, the US appears to have responded inconsistently to similar acts of 
terrorism in two different ways, using either a law enforcement or military response.  
These legal and military responses can be either unilateral or multilateral.  This study 
attempts to determine when each type of response is preferred by decisionmakers, both 
political leaders and their citizens.  The hypotheses suggesting that a response is 
preferred depending upon terrorist attack success, location, and the terrorists’ socio-
cultural similarities are tested in three experiments and examined in a case study.  These 
three variables are believed, as suggested by the Cognitive Calculus concept, to cause an 
emotional reaction amongst the respondents resulting in them having a higher preference 
for the military and unilateral options.  Whether or not the respondents were 
experiencing an emotional reaction was studied in each experiment as well as being 
tested in the third experiment by examining the respondents’ selection of options based 
upon their success rates.  The case study examined US government responses to the First 
World Trade Center bombing, the Bojinka Plot, the Khobar Towers bombing, and the 
 iv
September 11, 2001 attacks.  The results of the experiments and case study suggest a 
calm and deliberative response by the respondents to acts of terrorism, with a greater 
preference for legal and multilateral responses to terrorism. 
 v
 
 
…to the brave and noble men and women (and their families) who 
have sacrificed, and continue to sacrifice, in service to the pursuit 
of freedom, justice, integrity, equality, liberty, and truth.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In his speech, responding to the September 11 attacks, made before the combined 
houses of the US Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush asserted that the US 
and its allies would do whatever was necessary to bring all terrorists within global reach 
to justice, a theme which has been repeated in many of his speeches since then (Bush, 
2001).  What, however, entails bringing a terrorist to justice?  The US went on to wage a 
full scale war in Afghanistan against those responsible and those supporting the 9/11 
attacks while vocally stating an intention to kill them (thus not necessarily following the 
traditional definition of justice: arresting and putting the perpetrators on trial).  President 
Clinton issued the same statement (almost word-per-word), as President Bush, about all 
terrorists following the bombings of the US Embassies in Africa in 1998, in response to 
which Clinton ordered the US military to launch missiles against al-Qaeda in an attempt 
to kill them.  One year later, however, Clinton pardoned 11 men, members of a group 
dedicated to Puerto Rican independence and its alliance to communist Fidel Castro, who 
were convicted of several terrorist bombings conducted in New York City which 
seriously injured three New York City police officers and detectives (Esposito and 
Gerstein, 2007).   
 
 
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of International Studies Quarterly. 
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Ergo, a puzzle appears to exist as to why people want to respond militarily 
towards some acts of terrorism but legally towards others, even when the acts are 
seemingly similar.  The US has implemented a variety of different policies against 
terrorism: doing nothing (anti-Castro actors residing in Southern Florida, whom Cuba 
argues are terrorists), launching massive international investigations using the nation’s 
various law enforcement agencies (after the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen), and 
conducting full-scale war (in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks).  Alternatively 
(and admittedly ignoring important political and historical factors), Spain, after a series 
of bombings conducted by “Islamic” terrorists (assumed related to those who committed 
the September 11 attacks), decreased the amount of military force it was using against 
those terrorists, even while it continues to aggressively pursue the Basque terrorists 
using domestic law enforcement and military assets (Siqueira and Sandler, 2007; and, 
Kern, 2007).   
A review of literature written about terrorism reveals it, not surprisingly, to be an 
event, to which governments almost always respond, initially, with legal/law 
enforcement policy strategies: the terrorist acts are treated as crimes and the terrorists are 
pursued by police forces (either unilaterally or multilaterally with the help of agencies in 
other countries if necessary) as criminals.  This investigative response intuitively follows 
the consistent pattern of reaction to terrorism on the part of most of the targets and/or 
victims: first they want to know what happened, then where it happened, and finally, 
who did it.  However, in response to a few exceptional acts of terrorism (which appear to 
evoke a more emotional reaction) governments then seem to modify or change their 
 3
response to using more drastic policies of military force (including unilateral-military 
raids against, and aerial bombardment of, the suspected terrorists and their bases) instead 
of waiting, or excluding the need, for the police agencies to complete their investigations 
and arrest the suspected terrorists (usually making these later legal/law enforcement 
actions irrelevant if the terrorists are killed in the military attacks). (Miller et al., 2003)  
Academic analyses of terrorism so far do not appear to explain how and when a terrorist 
act triggers a more emotional response causing people to prefer this more drastic policy-
strategy response of military action to the exclusion of the completion of the usual 
legal/law enforcement policy-strategies.   
Previous research on terrorism has focused on describing (the political policy 
literature) or measuring (the political science literature) the policy responses in relation 
to terrorism, but none has identified the difference between the two alternate and distinct 
responses of legal versus military action governments have used against terrorism.  The 
difference is further characterized by an interesting dilemma as to which response of the 
two is chosen since the legal response may have the greatest success in stopping 
terrorism long-term, but a military response is more efficient and politically popular.  
Thus, this study will attempt an explanation of the varied reactions of populations to 
international terrorism by defining those factors of international terrorism events which 
determine or influence ones’ preferences for the more drastic military policies to the 
exclusion of legal/law enforcement policies to fight the terrorists.   
This project analyzes a political decisionmakers’ binary choice, either the usual 
legal/law enforcement or the more drastic military policies, preferred in response to 
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varying displays of terrorism events perpetrated by foreign terrorists, the preference 
being tested experimentally and analyzed using a case study.   
Experiments allow one to manipulate the various elements or variables of a 
terrorist attack in repeated experiments, providing enough evidence to understand which 
elements are particularly salient for the respondents in choosing a particular policy over 
another.   
A case study allows for a detailed analysis of the variables’ influence on the 
course of events during salient historical periods.  This method can give examples of 
how the variables affect consistent patterns of human responses.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Reacting to Terrorism: The Legal Military Response Dilemma 
Reaction to an Attack 
Terrorism appears to have become an increasingly prevalent concern among 
many societies in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.  Academic research would 
suggest that, although cyclical, there has been an increasing amount of violence from 
terrorism occurring in the past half century. (Enders and Sandler, 1993 and 2005)  “Left 
alone, terrorism always comes back only more violently (Miller et al., 2003).”   
Perhaps the most relevant group of “terrorism” literature focuses on analysis of 
counter-terrorism policy implementation in recent and past history.  The analyses tend to 
focus on the failures of governments in dealing with terrorism, usually by “overreacting” 
and using too much violence against civilians, or in failing to stop terrorist groups and 
their acts, both of which do nothing to stop terrorism. (Hutchinson, 1972)  As Mueller 
(2007) notes, populations generally exhibit more emotionally irrational behaviour in 
response to terrorist attacks even when there is a smaller threat to their own safety than 
from other dangers, such as being killed or injured in an automobile accident.   
 Recent research on the emotional reactions of people to terror events (Geva and 
Mosher 2005; Geva et al., 2004; Mosher, 2005; Mosher and Geva, 2006) shows that 
emotional reactions to a terror incident specifically include: anger, fear, and, sadness.  
The cognitive calculus model posits that strong emotions make decisionmakers less 
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sensitive towards, and thus less willing to consider, further information important and 
relevant for deciding which option to choose in response to the attack.  Strong emotions, 
specifically anger, generated by various factors will lower the thresholds of the 
decisionmakers and place them closer to choosing the more violent military action 
option, with less capability for considering information about the terrorist attacks on 
their cognitive calculus.  (Geva, Redd, and Mosher, 2004) 
Politicians and policymakers themselves might want to respond to a terrorist 
attack based not only upon their own reaction, understanding, calculations, training, 
knowledge and decisions regarding the attack, but also in response to what they sense 
their constituencies, the citizens, want them to do.  The common assumption is thus that 
politicians consider public preferences when making policy decisions. (de Mesquita et 
al., 1999; Nincic and Nincic, 1995; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Hermann et al., 1991)  
Foreign policy decision-makers have to do something in response to a terrorist attack 
when it is perceived as a crisis.  Public outcry and opinion demand it.  When thousands 
of people were killed in the September 11 attacks, simply arresting a small number of 
people could probably not satisfy public anger over the attacks.   
Response Type 
The policy actions which policy makers can take in response to an international 
terrorist attack can be designated into two categories of military or legal/law 
enforcement tools (Clarke, 2004; Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Barnett, 
2004; Richelson and Evans, 2001).  The government has pursued law enforcement 
actions after terrorist attacks, including multilateral cooperation with foreign authorities 
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in regions from whence terrorists came in an effort to learn more about them (allowing 
authorities to determine how to prevent more attacks) as well as seeking the extradition 
of guilty parties and/or sending, military and intelligence personnel into foreign 
countries to capture alleged terrorists who are then turned over to law enforcement 
personnel in “international” territory (air/water) for return to the US to stand trial.  These 
actions are taken primarily by law enforcement personnel, but military and para-military 
assets and agencies (e.g. the CIA and/or NSA (a branch of the US military which 
collects visual and audio intelligence)) are involved in the process if the terrorists are 
operating outside of the US (Clarke, 2004; US DHS, 2003; Barnett, 2004; Perl, 2003; 
Smith, 2002). 
Alternatively, in response to terrorist attacks, or attempted attacks, the US (as 
well as the governments of other nations, such as Israel in response to the PLO and 
others) has sometimes launched unilateral-military attacks against the suspected bases of 
the terrorists and their host nations who were believed responsible for attacks.  This is in 
an effort to destroy those thought responsible along with their capability for carrying out 
future attacks (examples include the US air-strike on Libya after its alleged involvement 
in the bombing of nightclubs in Germany frequented by US service personnel, as well as 
US airstrikes on terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan after the attempted 
assassination of President George H.W. Bush and after the bombing of the US 
Embassies in Africa, respectively). (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994; Arce and 
Sandler, 2005)  These actions are used exclusively under the military category of 
responses when chosen (although law enforcement officials might assist in an advisory 
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capacity, or in taking custody of criminals captured alive by military officials during a 
military operation). (Clarke, 2004; US DHS, 2003; Barnett, 2004; Richelson and Evans, 
2001; Perl, 2003; Smith, 2002) 
 Complicating the above discussion is the problem of determining the legal/law 
enforcement policy to use against terrorists.  Western legal systems demand certain legal 
protections be given to those accused of criminal activity, including speedy trials and 
rules of evidence to ensure the innocent are protected.   
Terrorism, however, includes such violent, relatively well organized and 
politically motivated criminal behaviour on an international scale, that clandestine and 
military force are considered the only ones with the ability to stop the terrorists.  Military 
forces do not usually have the time or resources to meticulously collect evidence (with 
enough precision to be deemed admissible in court) during a pitched and fluid battle; 
and, clandestine services must protect their limited and scarce, thus precious, “methods 
and sources” from ever being revealed to the enemy.  The standard procedures of these 
two entities (military and clandestine) contradict basic criminal law procedural 
protections which allow the accused to challenge all of the evidence against them.   
Alternatively, the rules and protections of war (the Geneva Conventions) cannot 
be used because the terrorists are criminals who do not follow the rules of war.  Since 
terrorists do not follow the rules of war, such as wearing uniforms, applying the Geneva 
Convention against them would mean that innocent civilians could be unfairly detained 
simply by being labeled terrorists.  Thus, legal scholars have been desperately struggling 
to find an appropriate legal policy between these two, further complicating and 
 9
frustrating the efforts of political decisionmakers in determining how to effectively and 
properly respond to acts of terrorism. (Franck, 2004)   
Response Orientation 
 The legal versus military types of actions a government can take in response to a 
terrorist attack can be further defined as being either unilateral or multilateral.  Terrorism 
by its very definition could now be considered an international event in today’s current 
environment.  Terrorists in this day and age appear to regularly attack the citizens of 
another country either in the victims’ homeland or abroad, with the terrorists themselves 
usually being based in yet a third country.  This element of international/foreign 
terrorism requires a state responding to a terrorist attack to consider whether or not to 
involve or co-operate with one or more of the involved foreign governments in a 
multilateral response to the terrorists; but this is not usually considered the most 
expedient response.  Many politicians and citizens believe that governments can act 
faster and more efficiently unilaterally because they do not have to take the time to stop 
and consult with the other state, and because they can take all of the steps they believe 
necessary to stop a terrorist threat especially when it seems imminent and has the 
potential to be particularly threatening and devastating.  A country suffering from the 
fear and anxiety of an imminent terrorist attack which promises to be devastating, has a 
powerful motivation to act unilaterally especially when the other countries with whom it 
would have to cooperate appear slow, inefficient, dispassionate, uninterested and more 
concerned with the maintenance of their own principles. (Steyn, 2004) 
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 Those advocating a unilateral response to a terrorist attack also believe this is 
necessary when there is a perception that the culture of the other country does not share 
the same values or traditions and thus will not act effectively to hold the guilty 
accountable, or to eliminate or prevent the threat of future terrorism.  Some authors even 
fear that another country will, in an effort to stymie judicious and legitimate counter-
terrorism efforts, deliberately appear, for various reasons, to cooperate while at the same 
time support the terrorists by secretly reneging on their pledges made to the victims to 
fight those terrorists. (Steyn, 2004)  Other scholars posit that cooperating with other 
countries on counter-terrorism policy may simply never work (especially for some 
certain specific threats to ones’ national security) either because there are simply no 
shared interests or because the other country cannot do so publicly for political reasons 
(even though privately expressing a strong desire to so do) (Nye, 2001, and Dumbrell, 
2006).  
 Alternatively, other scholars argue that terrorism always requires a multilateral 
and/or bilateral response for several reasons, the first being that of availability of 
resources: no one county (no matter how powerful) has enough resources to eliminate 
the threat of terrorism posed by a large number of well-hidden terrorists spread across 
the entire world.  Furthermore, anti-terrorism forces and policies must be implemented 
evenly and consistently throughout the world in order to prevent the terrorists from 
finding any sanctuary.  Bi- or multilateral agreements and cooperation are the most 
efficient manner, through orchestrated planning and organization, in which to define 
standard terms for the uniform implementation counter-terrorism policy by several 
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countries. (Sandler, 2004; Bertele and May. 1998; Kogan, 2004; and Brooks and 
Wholforth, 2005)   
 More importantly, most terrorism experts and scholars agree that terrorists will 
not survive unless they have bases of support (money and sanctuary) amongst large 
sectors of a population otherwise uninvolved but sympathetic (perhaps due to naïveté 
and misinformation or lack of education) with the terrorists’ actions.  Multilateral 
cooperation and agreement amongst several countries against a group of terrorists, or 
against terrorism, lends credibility and legitimacy to the country executing a counter-
terrorism response which helps to reverse or prevent the sympathy and support amongst 
a population for the terrorists. (Nye, 2002; Anderson, 2003; Leffler, 2004; Rees and 
Aldrich, 2005; and, Gambari, 2006)  Alternatively, if a country chooses not to act 
multilaterally, it may provide justification for other countries (with less respectable 
morals) to act unilaterally in committing acts which may not be morally justifiable 
according to international norms. (Pomerance, 2002) 
Attempted versus Successful Crime and Terrorism 
 Using the substitution concept from economics and deterrence from political 
science, international relations scholars have argued that terrorists adapt their tactics in 
relation to the counter-terrorism policies enacted.  When security is increased at one 
potential target, terrorists will shift their attacks to another less heavily defended target 
which is easier for them to attack.  Government officials must then continue to modify 
their counter-terrorism policies to defeat the terrorists.  The pattern of adaptation is one 
of increasing countermeasures when the threat or severity of the terrorism increases, in 
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an effort to stop the terrorism; as the threats decrease or are stopped, so too do the 
counter-measures.  The threat and severity of the terrorism is defined as the size and 
proximity of the terrorism to the victims.  (Landes, 1978; Cauley and Im, 1988; Enders 
and Sandler, 2005, 1993, 2000, and 2002; Sandler and Enders, 2002)  As the threat or 
amount of terrorism increases, concomitantly governments increase the intensity and 
tempo of their actions, regardless of the effectiveness or reasonableness of the 
countermeasures (Barros and Proenca, 2005; Li, 2005; Midlarsky, Crenshaw and 
Yoshida, 1980).   
 Many scholars and government officials believe terrorists can be deterred, a 
concept which one might argue stems from the legal system.  The rationale of 
punishment in the legal system is predicated on the goals of deterrence, retribution and 
rehabilitation (Meyer, 1968, Samuel and Moulds, 1986).  However, if one considers an 
assertion made by some scholars that terrorism cannot be “deterred” (merely channeled), 
then research on terrorism, perhaps, should focus instead on the nature of retribution.  
Scholars, assessing the various degrees of the different types of rationality amongst the 
rank and file members (opposed to their sociopathic leadership) of the “new extremist” 
terrorist groups, have discovered an unusual willingness to die in their attacks due in part 
to what researchers believe is a damaged emotional rationality which suppresses 
cognitive and procedurally rational abilities, causing psychopathology usually too severe 
for rehabilitation. (Kruglanski and Golec, 2004; Pape, 2003, Golman, 1995, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, and, Douglass et al. 1992) 
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The nature and/or severity of the retribution in the criminal justice system rest on 
the distinction between the actus reus (the physical act of committing a crime) and the 
mens rea (the “psychological” intent to commit a crime).  An attempted murder, 
generally speaking, is punished less severely than one that is successful, even if the 
attempt failed simply but for a weapon malfunctioning.  The actus reus of the criminal is 
more important for the punishment of this crime than the mens rea which actually would 
have been the same in this case.  While that may seem simple, attempted crime is one of 
the biggest puzzles in criminal law.  It is often a very difficult issue for juries and judges 
to consider (whether a crime was not committed simply because of some non-event, or 
because the defendant did not intend to carry through the actual crime, only the attempt 
of it). (Kadish and Schulhofer, 1995:581; Oehler, 1976).  Based upon this foundation 
from the legal system, one might expect people to respond more severely towards a 
successful terrorist attack versus a failed or attempted attack.  While this discussion 
illustrates the complexity of defining the “act,” it also seems that once the act is defined 
as illegal, the intensity of the punishment is linked to the extremity of the consequences 
of that act.   
Location of Terrorism 
 Historical descriptions of acts of terrorism appear to note a difference in the 
reaction of populations towards terrorism depending upon whether it occurred on 
domestic soil, or whether it occurred abroad: scholars note an increased amount of 
counter-terrorism policies when the terrorism occurs domestically. (Enders and Sandler, 
1993 and 2005; Mickolus, 2002; Jenkins, 1986)  Scholars analyzing counter-terrorism 
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policy often seem to decry the lack of support for significant counter-terrorism policies 
until the time is “too late” and acts of terrorism begin to be committed domestically.  
Some authors appear to argue that there was less enthusiasm among Americans to attack 
or to counter terrorists responsible for attacks overseas such as the bombing of the US 
Embassies in Africa, the USS Cole and Pan Am 103, in contrast to the September 11 
attacks and the skyjackings of airliners by Communist Cuban terrorists in the US during 
the 1970s.  Terrorism overseas, even though against fellow American citizens, was not 
deemed close enough to “home” to warrant an overwhelming response.  Americans 
simply could not fathom how these acts of terrorism would affect their lives here in 
America, until that threat was physically demonstrated for them. (Miller et al., 2003; 
Landes, 1978)  Furthermore, the closer the victims are to the source of the disaster (or 
attack), the higher will be the level of anxiety, stress, and other reactions exhibited in the 
population (Diggory, 1956).  Thus, the level of the psychological response depends upon 
the proximity to the density/intensity of the damage inflicted by the attack (Goleman, 
1995).   
Socio-cultural Identity of Terrorists 
In the days following the terrorist attacks of September 11, several acts of alleged 
hate crimes were committed against American citizens and lawful residents perceived as 
being Arabic or Muslims, and thus “the same” as the terrorists who committed the 
attacks.  Civil libertarians further decried what they saw as deliberate targeting by 
government authorities of those minority populations simply because of their ethnicity 
(Freyd, 2002; and Savage, 2002). 
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Terrorism usually has been viewed as being triggered by socio-economic 
differences manifested in political differences which broke down into violence.  This 
terrorism was usually confined within one country, as was the case of political terrorism 
within Russia in the early part of the Twentieth Century.  Trans-national terrorism 
between groups in one country against the government of another, which sprung up in 
the later half of the same century, has added the element of socio-cultural difference to 
the phenomenon.  The terrorists view themselves as the minority oppressed by a 
powerful and different socio-cultural enemy (Wilkinson, 2003; and Rubenstein, 2003).  
All terrorists at this point in time, who have expressed anger towards the US, have done 
so citing socio-cultural differences.  The Islamic terrorists seem to be representing the 
most disparate socio-cultural views to Americans.  The US has been said to be imposing 
its views and its will upon them, destroying their own culture and beliefs which are in 
opposition to the American views.  It is this increasing globalization and development 
which has been angering the Islamic terrorists (Klare, 2003; Jurgenmeyer, 2003; and 
Lewis, 2003). 
While the terrorists cite the socio-cultural differences between themselves and 
the US, the US leadership also has been encouraging the comparison on these terms.  
The US Government’s National Strategy on Terrorism (Office of the President of the 
United States, 2003), which sets out how America is going to fight the war on terrorism, 
describes the difference between America and its enemies as a difference of values.  The 
rest of the world needs to share American values if there is to be an end to terrorism 
against America.  Terrorism has become a battle of “us versus them” because the best 
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way to have a clear strategy to defeat terrorism is to identify the differences between 
one’s own self and the terrorists (Howell, 2003).  Even though there is no history of any 
cultural clash between Islam and America, the American media and government help to 
perpetuate the notion that there is a cultural distinction between them by describing the 
conflict in these terms (Gerges, 1997).  How one defines a terrorist versus someone 
fighting for a good cause, depends, Ash (2003) argues, upon whether or not that terrorist 
shares the same socio-cultural values as that person. 
 The above assertions correspond to many of the implications of social identity 
theory in international relations, as Hudson (1995; and Sande et al., 1989; Hogg et al. 
1995; and, Stets and Burke, 2000) argues that most foreign policy is made upon the basis 
of a foreign policy decision maker’s perception of whether or not the foreigner is similar 
(in-group) or dissimilar (out-group).  One develops perceptions of other countries not 
being similar to one’s own country because of these perceived differences in society and 
culture (Cottam, 1977; Druckman, 1994; and Hirshberg, 1993).  Furthermore, people 
tend to create an ethnocentric bias between their enemies and allies. (Druckman, 1968)  
As an example, Owen (1994) argued that Britain and the United States did not fight over 
the Venezuelan border in 1895 because of their recognition of shared cultural values.  
Geva and Hanson (1999) demonstrated experimentally that perceived socio-cultural 
similarity may underlie some of the democratic peace findings.  
 This literature corresponds to vast literature in social psychology that 
demonstrates that ‘similarity breeds attraction’ (Berscheid and Hatfield, 1978, 
Berscheid, 1985; and, Condon and Crano, 1988)  The similarity that one finds in some 
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and not in others then creates “in-groups” of people who are similar to that person, and 
“out-groups” of people who are dissimilar (Neimeyer and Mitchell, 1988).  Simply the 
act of categorizing another is enough to cause one to treat that person as being in an in-
group or out-group (Messick and Mackie, 1989).  Hunter, Stringer and Watson (1991) 
then argue that one does not want harm to come to those in one’s in-group.   
 Tying the notion of differential reactions to similar and dissimilar targets with the 
previous analysis of punishment in the legal system, we observe that sentences handed 
down for criminal convictions suggest that criminals who are members of a socio-
cultural minority in the US are more likely to receive longer and harsher sentences that 
those from the socio-economic majorities.  The implication is that society as a whole is 
likely to punish those socio-culturally different groups more than those who are similar. 
(Rankin, 1979; Gomez, 1994; Lee, 1998; Fernandez and Bowman, 2004)1  Thus, one 
would expect to find that same pattern magnified with respect to preference of policy 
options addressed to socio-culturally different terrorists rather than to those who are 
similar.   
 Further complicating matters is the lack of domestic support for counter-terrorist 
operations against foreign terrorists with whom there is no perceived “grievance,” 
resulting in a relatively unenthusiastic legal/law enforcement response.   In the US there 
traditionally has been little domestic support for the governments to prosecute members 
of Palestinian terrorist group members located in the US because they do not and have 
                                                 
1 This relationship between race and punishment is sophisticated and dependent upon a number of 
different factors, which have been developed in recent research, deserving much more study.  (Daly and 
Tonry, 1997). 
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not purposely targeted Americans; an opposite reaction would occur were the same 
scenarios to occur in Israel.  A similar situation exists with members of the Irish 
Republican Army in the US because, unlike Great Britain, the IRA does not have a 
grievance with Americans (especially when most American Catholics openly and 
enthusiastically support the IRA and its objectives). (Miller et al., 2003; Moloney, 2002)  
In Canada, there has been little enthusiasm for the prosecution of Sri Lankan and Sikh 
terrorists because they limit their large attacks upon Sri Lankan, Indian, and Indo-
Canadian targets outside the borders of Canada, but limit their attacks within Canada to 
small groups or individuals only.  This remains true even though Sikh terrorists blew up 
an Air India plane loaded with Canadian citizens, and at the same time planted a bomb 
on a Canadian owned Canadian Pacific Airliner which (probably inconsequentially in 
the minds of most Canadians) exploded in Narita Airport in Tokyo killing a Japanese 
baggage handler as he unloaded it.  Canadians, for some reason, do not view these 
terrorists as a threat to their government or country, although evidence exists that they so 
will eventually become. (Bolan, 2005) 
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CHAPTER III 
MODEL 
 
 As the literature in the previous chapters would suggest, in response to a terrorist 
attack the victim’s reaction appears to follow a consistent pattern: first he or she wants to 
know what happened (there was a terrorist attack or attempted attack), next where it was, 
and then who did it.  The responses of people to terrorism affect their political 
decisionmaking, causing them to desire more extreme policies in response to certain 
terrorist attacks depending upon the status of three particular ingredients of the attack: 
success of the attack, location of the attack (“how close to home”), and identity of the 
terrorists (socio-cultural similarity).  The configuration of the incident based upon these 
three factors will affect the emergence, or lack, of a negative emotion (mainly anger, and 
maybe fear and/or anxiety of future attacks).  These, in turn, will affect the interpretation 
(use) of the information regarding, and thus influencing, the choice between the utility of 
two possible options for responding to the attacks.   
The main categories of actions a government can take in response to an 
international terrorist attack consist of essentially two: a law enforcement policy intent 
on apprehending and punishing the terrorists, or a military response with a more violent, 
but definitive outcome.  The goal of any response to terrorism is to stop any further 
terrorism; but, what is the preferred political means to use to achieve this objective?  A 
government has to decide whether to use legal/law enforcement procedures, such as are 
used against criminals (arrest and incarceration), or whether to use military action 
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against the terrorists, such as one would use against other international threats (death and 
destruction of the terrorists and destruction of their physical infrastructure)2.   
These law enforcement and military options can be implemented either 
unilaterally or multilaterally (cooperating with other countries), for a total of four 
distinct possible actions (multilateral or unilateral and military or legal action).  A 
government can use diplomatic means to request the host country of the terrorists 
extradite those terrorists so they can be tried (multilateral-legal); or, a government can 
use force (predominantly covert) to capture the terrorists in their host country to bring 
them back to face trial (unilateral-legal, or what others might call “extra-legal”).  A 
military response can entail the use of asking, diplomatically, the terrorists’ host country 
to use military force to liquidate them (multilateral-military); or, it can entreat a targeted 
country using its own military force to attack the terrorists in their host territory 
(unilateral-military).   
 Which one of the four policy responses is preferred by people is influenced by 
three characteristics of the terrorist attack: what happened (attempted or successful 
attack), where did it happen (here or abroad), and who carried out the attack (socio-
culturally similar or dissimilar).  These three characteristics affect peoples’ preferences 
through the interaction of two psychological mechanisms: emotions/affect and cognition.  
Certain configurations of the characteristics trigger stronger emotions of revenge and 
anger amongst the people and therefore more support for a stronger, and more violent 
                                                 
2 Practically speaking there is always a target for a military attack against a terrorist, even if it is the 
apartment of a single terrorist in a friendly country.  Realistically speaking, however, there may be 
diplomatic repercussions from carrying out the destruction of that apartment making it prohibitive, should 
the involvement of the responsible government be discovered. 
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military response to the act of terrorism.  These strong emotions, as the cognitive 
psychology literature suggested in the previous chapter, influence the cognitive 
functioning of the targets or victims of the terrorism by prompting them to make 
decisions faster and with less consideration of important and relevant information which 
normally would influence a rational choice, such as the probabilities of success for 
various choices.  This altered cognitive ability causes decisionmakers to choose the 
stronger, more violent military responses faster, with less consideration of other relevant 
information such as the probability of success for the various options.  In other words, 
decisionmakers might choose a response which is less likely to succeed than another, but 
which has a violent and apparently distinctive outcome and is more emotionally 
satisfying to the decisionmaker.   
 Alternatively, opposite combinations of the factors might produce no emotional 
reaction at all amongst the targets.  If those making political decisions feel little or no 
amount of these emotions, or they are otherwise unaffected by them (because of training 
to suppress them or due to personality type), then they will consider their preferences for 
how to respond to the attack more thoughtfully and carefully.  These decisionmakers 
probably will consider the utility of the various possible responses with care, indicating a 
higher preference for those they believe will be more successful.   
 The first factor is the success or failure of the attack; if successful, it most likely 
will have caused death and destruction resulting in the perception on the part of the 
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victimized population that they have been terrorized and the terrorists are victorious. 3  
The success of the terrorists suggests to the victimized population that they are 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks and thus their security is threatened.  Conversely, an 
unsuccessful terrorist attack would indicate to the victimized subjects two possibilities 
(causing them to respond less emotionally towards the attempts than a successful attack 
resulting in less desire for a stronger military attack): the attack was (and future attacks 
will be) foiled by competent officials, and/or the terrorists were/are too incompetent to 
successfully launch an attack.  Thus, analogous to an attempted but unsuccessful crime, 
the targeted population and decisionmakers would perceive less of a need to pursue 
unilateral-military action contrasted with multilateral-legal action. 
 The second variable affecting an individual’s response to a terrorist event and his 
or her preference for a particular policy would be the location of the attack, that is, 
whether or not it occurred at home or abroad.  The closer that the attack or attempt is 
deemed to be to the victimized population, then the greater is the perceived threat to the 
victimized population’s home, living environment, and sense of personal security.  This 
triggers more emotion (fear and anger).  Conversely, the further removed a person is 
from an attack, the less likely he or she will identify with the victims because those 
victims accepted the risk to their safety by traveling overseas or joining the military, or, 
perhaps, because they are perceived as foreigners (regardless of the fact that all of the 
“victims” portrayed in this study were Americans on vacation at home and abroad).  
Additionally, it is less likely he or she will consider himself or herself to be close to the 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, as used here, success is a vague and relative variable, depending upon the general 
interpretation of the attack by a victimized population as to whether or not the attack was a success.   
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previous target, thus leading to a reduced emotional reaction.  The closer the proximity 
of the attacks, the greater the urgency the person will feel to maintain his or her security, 
and the greater the likelihood he or she will support more extreme counter-terrorism 
policies to prevent further attacks. 
 Thirdly, as the psychology literature suggests, the more socio-culturally different 
the terrorists, the stronger will be the emotional response of the respondents.  The more 
different a stranger is from a person and the further away the stranger’s out-group is 
located from that person’s in-group, the greater the likelihood the stranger poses a threat 
because he or she does not share the same in-group characteristics.  The stronger the 
emotional reaction towards that socio-cultural stranger, then the more extreme will be 
the person’s physical behaviour (comparable to the punishment meted out by a jury in a 
domestic criminal trial).  In addition, the respondent will advocate for stronger policies 
to counter the stranger’s criminal and threatening behaviour.  Thus, the more socio-
culturally different the terrorists are, the more likely the respondent will advocate 
increasingly stronger and more violent counter-terrorism policies.  The more closely a 
person believes he or she is related to the terrorists socio-culturally, the more likely the 
respondent will believe he or she relates to the terrorists’ desires and the greater the 
likelihood the respondents will simply perceive the terrorists as comparable to “regular 
criminals;” this means there is less of a need for more drastic counter-terrorism policies, 
if they are needed at all. 
 Thus, the following general effects in these hypotheses should occur: 
H1. Success and failure of the terrorist attack and policy preferences:  
 (actus reus vs. mens rea)  
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1.a.i A successful terrorist attack, contrasted with one which 
failed, will generate more of a preference for a military 
policy response. 
1.a.ii A successful terrorist attack will generate a preference for 
a response with a unilateral orientation. 
1.b.i. A failed terrorist attack will generate a preference for a 
legal policy response. 
1.b.ii. A failed terrorist attack will generate a preference for a 
response with a multilateral orientation. 
 
H2. Location of terrorist attack. 
2.a.i. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring 
domestically will generate a preference for a military 
policy response. 
2.a.ii. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring 
domestically will generate a preference for a response with 
a unilateral orientation. 
2.b.i. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring overseas 
against Americans will generate a preference for a legal 
policy response 
2.b.ii. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring overseas 
against Americans will generate a preference for a 
response with a multilateral orientation. 
 
H3. Identity of the group of terrorist and policy preferences 
3.a.i. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally dissimilar terrorists 
(successful or failed, occurring domestically or abroad) 
will generate a preference for a military policy response. 
3.a.ii. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally dissimilar terrorists 
(successful or failed, occurring domestically or abroad) 
will generate a preference for a response with a unilateral 
orientation. 
3.b.i. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally similar terrorists 
(successful or failed, occurring domestically or abroad) 
will generate a preference for a legal policy response. 
3.b.ii. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally similar terrorists 
(successful or failed, occurring domestically or abroad) 
will generate a preference for a response with a 
multilateral orientation. 
 
H4. Effects of probability of response success 
4.a.i. The preference for a military option will be influenced by 
a strong negative emotion generating a disregard for the 
options’ chance of success. 
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4.a.ii. The preference for options with a unilateral orientation 
will be influenced by a strong negative emotion generating 
a disregard for the option’s chance of success. 
4.b.i. The preference for a legal option will be made based upon 
the options’ chance of success and will not be influenced 
by emotion. 
4.b.ii. The preference for options with a multilateral orientation 
will be made based upon the options’ chance of success 
and will not be influenced by emotion. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
 
 This dissertation utilizes the experimental method, supplemented with a case 
study, to test the aforementioned effects of success, location and socio-cultural similarity 
of terrorism on respondents’ preferences for a set of distinct counter-terrorism responses.  
The experimental portion consisted of a series of three separate experiments that 
assessed the impact of specific configurations of the three suggested factors 
(independent variables).   
Experiments 
 The experimental method allows one to gather information on the respondents’ 
response specifically to the three independent variables, a process less complicated than 
analyzing information from previous terrorist attacks in history which are too infrequent 
and too complex.  Alternatively, testing the behavioural, or emotional, responses of 
subjects in an experiment can be equally difficult and complex given the sophistication 
of human psychology.  Human expression of emotion is a complicated process which 
may not be accurately measured in a universal manner using relatively simple 
experiments. 
In this project, attempting to understand the role of emotion in possibly triggering 
preferences for certain counter-terrorism responses is complicated by the fact that it is 
part of a young body of science that is attempting to study a concept not yet defined; if 
and how emotions are involved in specific decisionmaking is still not yet understood.  
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The experimental method of testing the hypotheses in this project is not intended to 
provide results readily applicable to help either explain or predict our comprehensive 
reaction to previous or future terrorist attacks; but rather to provide insight into limited 
and specific reactions of respondents to terrorist attacks providing just one element to 
help explain that comprehensive reaction (see Mook,1983; McDermott, 2002a; and, 
McDermott, 2002b).  While many scholars might dismiss the use of this experimental 
research because of their belief of its lack of external validity, many scholars would 
argue that other methods of political research have just as many, if not more, problems 
with their own internal and external validity (Morton and Williams, 2008). 
Participants 
The number of subjects who participated in this study consisting of three 
experiments totaled 125 undergraduate students at Texas A&M University (64 in the 
first experiment, 61 in the second and 60 in the third)4.  They were randomly assigned to 
one of the four experimental conditions which were consistently present in each 
experiment.  
Design 
All three experiments were structured as configurations of a 2x2 between groups 
factorial design.  The factors were: (a) the consequence of the act of terror (success vs. 
failure); (b) the proximity of the act (at home vs. abroad); (c) the identity of the terror 
group (cultural similar vs. dissimilar to “Americans”).  The main dependent variables 
were preferences (ratings) of the respondents for four response/policy options pertinent 
                                                 
4 Based upon my own informal observations of the subjects, approximately 60% were Caucasian, 15% 
were Hispanic, 15% were Asian, and 10% were African-American.   
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to the act of terror and terrorism: military-unilateral, military-multilateral, legal-
unilateral, and legal-multilateral.  The third experiment included varying probabilities of 
success for each of the four options designed to determine how carefully the respondents 
considered the four options in a rational manner given their possible emotional reaction 
to the terrorist attack.  The responses divided amongst these categories were treated in 
the statistical analyses as repeated measures.   
Each group of respondents, in addition to being randomly assigned to each 
condition, was evenly divided, with each group being given opposing conditions without 
knowledge of the other groups’ (i.e. between-groups design).  Each subject was given 
each question individually without knowledge of the next question.  In the final 
experiment the subjects were given identical questions with reversed probabilities 
(discussed later in detail).  All of these measures were implemented in the experiment to 
maximize the reliability and validity of the experimental conditions and ensuing 
questions, thereby attempting to limit the respondents from providing unintuitive 
answers (how he or she believes the researcher wanted him or her to respond) (Orne, 
1962). 
In addition, the participants recorded their emotional responses (self-report of 
various emotions including fear, anger and sadness) to the terror incident.  These 
questions were designed primarily to serve as manipulation checks or confirmation to 
assure that the experiment was operating as designed.   
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The Research Material and the Manipulation of the Variables 
The participants were instructed to read an internet news report that described a 
hypothetical terrorist incident, and were then asked to rate policy-options the 
government could pursue in response to the information they had just read. 
Consequences of the Act of Terror  
The attempted terrorist attack condition described the location of an attempted 
bombing by terrorists including details about the unexploded ordnance, the possible 
outcome if the attack were successful, as well as information about the group which 
claimed responsibility for the attempted attack.   
The successful terrorist attack story provided the same information above, but 
instead described a successful bomb explosion and the effects of the attack, including the 
number of people killed and injured in the attacks. 
The Proximity of the Attack to the Respondents 
The location of the attack was divided between having the attack occurring on 
either domestic US soil in Miami, Florida, or abroad in Rome, Italy.  The specific 
locations were described as being heavily populated by tourists, specifically American in 
the Italian scenario. 
The Identity of the Terrorist Group 
The cultural-political similarity of the terrorist group was manipulated by varying 
the political structure and dominant religion in the country from whence the terrorists 
originated making it either similar to the US or dissimilar. 
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Reaction Measurement 
Following their exposure to the story, the respondents were asked to rate their 
preference of four possible policy responses (as illustrated in Table 1) which were 
designed to operationalize the dependent variable supporting either legal or military 
policies, both of which could be either multilateral or unilateral.  The four options were: 
1. a unilateral-military strike by the US against the terrorists, 2. a unilateral-legal 
response of sending special operations forces into the terrorists’ host country to capture 
the terrorists and bring them back to trial in the US5, 3. the use of diplomacy 
(multilateral) to have the host country liquidate the terrorists using military force, and 4. 
the use of diplomacy (multilateral) to have the terrorists extradited to stand trial for the 
attack).   
 
TABLE 1.  The Four Options Available to the Respondents 
Type: 
Orientation: Legal Military 
Unilateral 
Order a raid against the terrorist 
camps to capture and forcibly 
extract the terrorists to stand 
trial here in the US for their 
attack. 
Order a military assault upon 
the base camps of the terrorists 
using missiles launched from 
US naval ships in the region as 
well as bombing raids by B-2 
Stealth Bombers. 
Multilateral 
Order our officials to conduct 
comprehensive meetings with 
the [foreign] Government to 
request they arrest the members 
of the terrorist organization 
responsible for the attacks and 
allow them to be extradited to 
the US to stand trial for the 
attacks. 
Order our officials to conduct 
comprehensive meetings with 
the [foreign] Government to 
request military action to 
destroy the base camps of the 
terrorists and kill as many of 
them as possible. 
 
 
                                                 
5 While this may appear similar to a military response, the scenario was written to be historically accurate 
(see page 7-8) for the sake of the military savvy of the respondents.  The penultimate theme of this option 
was to bring the terrorists to trial, contrasted with the military options which were to kill the terrorists. 
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Ratings were made on an eleven point scale (0-10) where higher numbers 
represent more support for a given policy.  Upon completing these segments, 
participants were asked to express their feelings in response to the incident about which 
they had read using the following scales of: anger, fear, sadness; as well as shock.6  
These ratings were also made on an eleven point scale.   
The above paragraphs constitute the exact makeup of the first two experiments 
which were designed primarily to confirm an emotional response on the part of the 
respondents to the variation of the independent variables.  The first experiment tested the 
effect of the first two variables of attack outcome and location of the attack, while 
holding the identity of the terrorists constant.   
 The second experiment tested the effect of the second and third independent 
variables of location of the attack and sociocultural similarity of the terrorists, holding 
the attack outcome variable constant.   
The third experiment, while virtually identical to the first two, included the 
addition of probabilities of success for each of the policy options in stopping or 
preventing further terrorism.  The addition of the probability of success of the options 
serves to confirm the emotional response of the respondents to the independent variables 
if they consistently rank their preferences for the policy options while ignoring the 
chances for success.  Attack outcome and sociocultural identity of the terrorists were 
held constant, while location of the attack was varied.  Thus, the four conditions in this 
experiment consisted of two groups who were exposed to an attack occurring either in 
                                                 
6 Previous research has found the self-report of emotions by respondents to be a valid and reliable method 
to obtain this information (Skorick, 2005). 
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the US or in Italy, both of which were further subdivided into groups given the four 
options with “historically-based probabilities of success and those given the four options 
with probabilities of success which were reversed.   
Procedure 
The participants worked individually (self-paced) on networked computer 
workstations using a program which presented the information and tracked his or her 
responses. 
Case Study 
 The case study compared and contrasted the various responses of the US to acts 
of foreign terrorism.  The cases selected for study were chosen based upon the presence 
or absence of the various combinations of the independent variables.  The analysis 
provides some basic historical background on the events, focusing on evidence of the 
presence or absence of the independent variables and the outcomes compared with those 
four provided to the respondents in the surveys (legal-multilateral, legal-unilateral, 
military-multilateral, military-unilateral) which represent the operationalization of the 
dependent variables.  Case studies are uniquely suited to this process because they allow 
for the examination of the presence or absence of specific elements and factors of 
historical events within their complex context, thereby providing insight into the 
explanation of past and outcome prediction in similar events (George and Bennett, 
2005). 
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 Given the previously stated assertion that victims of terrorism tend to desire 
information regarding a terrorist attack in a somewhat standardized order (first what 
happened, then where was it, and then who did it), the first test to determine the effect of 
the qualities of a terrorist event on a person’s preference of counter-terrorism response 
thus might start logically with the first two variables of attack outcome and location.   
The quality of those two variables affects respondents’ preference for the 
responses which have alternating levels of force type and orientation.  As mentioned 
previously, historically one has essentially four categories of possible counter-terrorism 
policies available to use in response to an attack alternating between multilateral-legal, 
unilateral-legal, multilateral-military, and unilateral-military options. 
 The first variable presumed to be influencing one’s preference for a policy is the 
success or failure of the attack; if successful, an attack most likely will have caused 
death and destruction resulting in the perception on the part of the victimized population 
that they have been terrorized and the terrorists are victorious.   An unsuccessful terrorist 
attack conversely would make the victimized population feel less vulnerable and thus 
less inclined to support a response using “stronger” tactics.  As noted previously, the 
legal community would define this as the difference between an attempted versus 
successful crime.  Perpetrators of a crime are often punished less severely for an 
attempted crime because the act (or “actus reus”) was not complete; and, thus the 
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criminal should not be punished as much for attempting to do something, which 
unbeknownst to him was not possible.  However, even though the act may not have been 
complete, the perpetrator still had the requisite mental state or desire (“mens rea”) to 
conduct the criminal act regardless, and should thus be punished for that desire to pursue 
anti-social behaviour. 
 The second variable of attack-location will trigger a more emotional and 
dramatic response from victims the closer it is to their “home,” and the greater the threat 
to their security from the terrorists.  Thus, the first two hypotheses of this dissertation are 
tested in this chapter: 
H1. Success and failure of the terrorist attack and policy preferences 
 (actus reus vs. mens rea)  
1.a.i A successful terrorist attack, contrasted with one which 
failed, will generate more of a preference for a military 
policy response. 
1.a.ii A successful terrorist attack will generate a preference for 
a response with a unilateral orientation. 
1.b.i. A failed terrorist attack will generate a preference for a 
legal policy response. 
1.b.ii. A failed terrorist attack will generate a preference for a 
response with a multilateral orientation. 
 
H2. Location of terrorist attack 
2.a.i. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring 
domestically will generate a preference for a military 
policy response. 
2.a.ii. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring 
domestically will generate a preference for a response with 
a unilateral orientation. 
2.b.i. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring overseas 
against Americans will generate a preference for a legal 
policy response 
2.b.ii. A terrorist attack, successful or failed, occurring overseas 
against Americans will generate a preference for a 
response with a multilateral orientation. 
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Method 
This first experiment tests the effects of attack success and location by presenting 
the subjects, through computer internet pages, with a hypothetical news story about a 
terrorist attack (or attack attempt), immediately followed with questions asking them 
how they would prefer to respond.   
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students at Texas A&M University participated in the 
study.  They were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.  
Design 
The experiment was structured as configurations of a 2x2 between groups 
factorial design.  The factors were: the consequence of the act of terror (success vs. 
failure), and the proximity of the act (at home vs. abroad).  The main dependent 
variables were preferences (ratings) for four policy options pertinent to the act of terror 
and terrorism: unilateral-military, multilateral-military, unilateral-legal, and multilateral-
legal action.  In addition, the participants recorded their emotional responses (fear, anger 
and sadness) to the terror incident. 
The Research Material and the Manipulation of the Variables 
The participants were instructed to read an internet news report that described a 
hypothetical terrorist incident and were then asked to rate policy-options the government 
could pursue in response to the information they had just read. 
The news report was formatted along the conventional layout of news items that 
appear in the electronic, “web-based” versions of major newspapers.  The main skeleton 
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of the story in the news is inspired by the “Bali nightclub bombings” of 2002, a terror 
event which, arguably, created an emotional response and a desire for a response 
amongst many large populations, especially in Australia (where most of the victims 
originated).  The main script of the story deals with a terrorist attack consisting of a 
nighttime bombing of a resort/leisure area/citywide-block/common-area/city-centre of 
restaurants, nightclubs and shops crowded with several thousand tourists/vacationers.  
As illustrated in Table 1 on page 29, four different versions of the script reflect the 
manipulated variables (see full scripts in Appendices).   
In the “success” version the headline of the story (Terrorist Attack in Miami, 
Florida/ Rome, Italy), as well as the body of the news item describe an explosion in the 
tourist section (clubs, restaurants and shops) of the downtown area with an estimated 
casualty number of 2000 people7. The explosion is attributed to an act of international 
terror and a certain terrorist group assumed responsibility for the act.  The text is 
accompanied by a picture of partially demolished buildings, with some flames visible 
and smoke hovering above it.  
In the “failure” condition the headline of the story (Attempted Terrorist Attack in 
Miami, Florida/Rome, Italy) and the following text describes how an unexploded bomb 
is discovered in a nightclub, located in a downtown area full of restaurants and shops 
and very popular with tourists, as part of a foiled terrorist attempt that could have 
yielded approximately 2000 casualties. Once again a certain terrorist group claims 
                                                 
7 A casualty figure of approximately 2000 was chosen because it was similar to the number killed in the 
September 11 attacks: a distinctly large terrorist attack. 
 37
responsibility for the attempt. This story is accompanied by the picture of the 
untarnished group of buildings.  
The location of the attack is divided between having the attack occurring on 
either domestic US soil in Miami, Florida, or abroad in Rome, Italy.  The “attack” in 
Miami simply takes place in an area where large numbers of people are participating in 
recreation.  The same occurred in the Rome scenario, with the added element that it was 
known as an area popular with Americans living in and visiting Rome.   
Following the exposure to the story, the respondents were asked to rate their 
preference of four possible policy responses (see Table 1 on page 29) which were 
designed to operationalize the dependent variable of supporting either legal or military 
policies, both of which could be either unilateral or multilateral.  The four options were: 
1. a unilateral-military strike by the US against the terrorists, 2. a unilateral-legal 
response of sending special operations forces into the terrorists’ host country to capture 
the terrorists and bring them back to trial in the US, 3. the use of diplomacy 
(multilateral) to have the host country liquidate the terrorists using military force, and 4, 
the use of diplomacy (multilateral) to have the terrorists extradited to stand trial for the 
attack.   
Ratings were made on an eleven point scale (0-10) where higher numbers 
represent more support for a given policy.   
In all four experimental conditions the terrorists were labeled as dissimilar.  
Given the initial assumption among many Americans that the terrorists are dissimilar, 
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the focus is to gauge the preferences of the respondents in reaction to the severity and 
proximity of the attack.   
Upon completing these segments, participants were asked to express their 
feelings in response to the incident about which they had read using the following scales 
(from 0-10) of: fear; anger and sadness; .8  These questions were intended to assess the 
mediating role of emotional responses to the policy responses. 
Procedure 
The participants worked individually (self-paced) on networked computer 
workstations. The DecTracer program served as a computerized platform for 
presentation of the terror incident and as the recording device for the participants’ 
responses.  An experimental session lasted about 20 minutes.  The sessions were 
concluded with a debriefing phase where the participants were introduced to the research 
rationale and context. 
Results 
Unilateral-Military 
 The results of this experiment examining the respondents’ reactions to the four 
combinations of terrorist attacks (according to the two independent variables of outcome 
and location) are examined first with univariate analyses of each of the four options 
available to the participants for responding to the attacks.  The results shown in Table 2 
suggest that if the attack occurred in the US compared to Italy, the respondents were 
more likely to prefer military force with a mean response of 4.20 compared with 3.64, 
                                                 
8 Previous research has found the self-report of emotions by respondents to be a valid and reliable method 
to obtain this information (Skorick, 2005). 
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the higher number indicating more support for the policy, but the results were not 
significant (see Table 3).  The analysis of the respondents’ preference for the unilateral-
military option (summarized in Table 3) suggests no significant effect on the preference 
for this option as a function of attack outcome or location, although the directionality of 
the preferences is as hypothesized.  The same trend occurs in response to a successful 
attack versus an attempt, where the direction of preference suggests an overall increase 
in response to a successful attack (M=4.24) than an attempted attack (M=3.60).  Again 
these results are not significant. 
 
 
TABLE 2.  Mean Preferences for a Unilateral-Military Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 3.40 
(2.97) 
3.80 
(3.51) 
3.60 
 Success 5.00 
(2.42) 
3.47 
(3.54) 
4.24 
Overall Mean:  4.20 3.64  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Preferences for a Unilateral-Military Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 5.08 5.08 .52 .48 
Attack Outcome: 1 6.43 6.43 .65 .42 
Attack Outcome and 
Location: 
1 14.83 14.83 1.51 .22 
Residual: 60 590.24 9.84   
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Multilateral-Military 
 As shown in Table 4, when the attack occurred in the US, the respondents were 
more likely to support the use of multilateral-military force (M=6.54) than when the 
attack occurred in Italy (M=5.26).  These levels of support to use multilateral-military 
force appear to be somewhat significant, F(1,64)=2.96 p<.099 (see Table 5).  Whether 
the attack was successful did not have any influence upon the respondents’ preferences 
for multilateral-military action.   
 
TABLE 4.  Mean Preferences for a Multilateral-Military Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 6.13 
(2.70) 
5.47 
(3.23) 
5.80 
 Success 6.94 
(2,63) 
5,06 
(3.23) 
6.00 
Overall Mean:  6.54 5.26  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Preferences for a Multilateral-Military Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 25.88 25.88 2.96 .09 
Attack Outcome: 1 .64 .64 .07 .79 
Attack Outcome and 
Location: 
1 5.89 5.89 .07 .42 
Residual: 60 525.35 8.76   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Two tailed. 
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Unilateral-Legal 
 Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the location of the attack did have a significant 
influence (F(1, 64)=3.92, p<.05) upon the respondents’ desire to take unilateral-legal 
action against the terrorists.  When the attack occurred in the US, the respondents were 
more likely to support the use of unilateral-legal action (M=6.10) than when the attack 
occurred in Italy (M=4.54) (see Table 6).  The success of the attack did not have a 
significant influence upon their preference to use unilateral-legal force, although the 
direction of the preferences would suggest it did with an increased preference in 
response to a successful attack (M=5.75) rather than an attempt (M=4.90).   
 
TABLE 6.  Mean Preferences for a Unilateral-Legal Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 5.67 
(2.58) 
4.13 
(3.38) 
4.90 
 Success 6.53 
(3.09) 
4.94 
(3.44) 
5.75 
Overall Mean:  6.10 4.54  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 7.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Preferences for a Unilateral-Legal Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 38.83 38.83 3.92 .05 
Attack Outcome: 1 11.12 11.12 1.12 .29 
Attack Outcome and 
Location: 
1 .01 .01 <.01 .97 
Residual: 60 594.24 9.90   
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Multilateral-Legal 
Tables 8 and 9 illustrate that attack outcome and location had no significant 
effect on participants’ preference for the multilateral-legal option.  Furthermore, the 
results have no apparent directionality in the pattern of the responses which would 
indicate an increased desire to use this counter-terrorism policy depending upon the 
success or location of the attack.   
 
 
TABLE 8.  Mean Preferences for a Multilateral-Legal Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 6.27 
(2.96) 
5.53 
(3.58) 
5.90 
 Success 5.94 
(3.34) 
5.65 
(2.89) 
5.79 
Overall Mean:  6.10 5.59  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 9.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Preferences for a Multilateral-Legal Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 4.21 4.21 .41 .52 
Attack Outcome: 1 .18 .18 .02 .90 
Attack Outcome and 
Location: 
1 .77 .77 .08 .79 
Residual: 60 615.49 10.26   
 
 
 
Military versus Legal 
 After having examined the respondents’ preferences for each of the possible 
responses separately in univariate analyses, the examination of the preferences for the 
responses combined by type and orientation helps to uncover overall or general trends in 
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the preferences of the respondents to the varying types of terrorist attacks.  The 
univariate analysis indicated greater preferences for each of the options when the attacks 
occurred in the US.  There was a significant preference for the US taking unilateral-legal 
action by going to the host country and capturing the terrorists to bring them to justice. 
As mentioned earlier, there were four possible responses to the attack for which 
the subjects could indicate their preference: two military and two legal, both of which 
could be either unilateral or multilateral.  The repeated measures analysis allows for the 
examination of the four responses combined according to their grouping by type 
(military versus legal) or by orientation (unilateral versus multilateral). 
Looking first at the respondents’ preferences for option type (the two military 
options combined versus their combined preference for the two legal options), the results 
in Tables 10 and 11 indicate their overall support for legal responses (M=5.59) over 
military (M=4.92) in reaction to the terrorist attack regardless of attack outcome or 
location (F(1,64)=3.51, p<.07).  The respondents’ relative preference for the legal 
options did not change (did not statistically interact) as a function of the two independent 
variables in this experiment.  This is counter to the result hypothesized, that there would 
be a greater preference for the military options when the attack was successful and 
located in the US.  The respondents instead appear to prefer the legal options regardless 
of the success and location of the attack.   
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TABLE 10.  Mean Preferences for Military and Legal Options as a Function of Attack 
Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Location: 
 US Italy 
Policy Type: Military Legal Military Legal 
Attack Outcome:     
Attempt 4.77 (2.62) 
5.97 
(2.01) 
4.63 
(3.20) 
4.83 
(3.27)  
Success 5.98 (1.86) 
6.24 
(2.45) 
4.27 
(2.69) 
5.29 
(2.41) 
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations.   
 
 
 
TABLE 11. ANOVA Summary Table for Preferences for Options (as a Repeated 
Measure) and the Consequence and Location of the Terror Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 30.52 3.28 3.28 .08 
Attack Outcome: 1 4.88 .52 ..52 .47 
Attack Location and 
Outcome: 
1 3.80 .41 .41 .53 
Residual: 60 559.07    
Military vs. Legal: 1 14.46 14.46 3.51 .07 
Military vs. Legal and Attack 
Outcome: 
1 .11 .11 .03 .87 
Military vs. Legal and Attack 
Location: 
1 .02 .02 .01 .94 
Military vs. Legal, Attack 
Outcome and Location: 
1 6.2 6.20 1.51 .22 
Residual: 60 247.05 4.12   
 
 
 
Unilateral versus Multilateral 
 Alternatively, the participants’ preferences for the four options compared by 
orientation (the two unilateral variables versus the two multilateral), as illustrated in 
Tables 12 and 13, indicate a preference amongst the respondents for the multilateral 
options over unilateral, regardless of the terrorist attack outcome or location.  Again, the 
multilateral option is defined as the cooperation or involvement with another country in 
responding to the terrorists; and, the unilateral option is defined as the US acting 
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independently to apprehend or attack the terrorists.  This preference for the multilateral 
over unilateral options was significant (F(1,64)=11.29, p<.01).  Again, these results were 
not what was hypothesized would occur, and the independent variables did not appear to 
be having any affect on influencing the respondents’ preferences for the two counter-
terrorism policy orientations.  The respondents instead wanted to respond to the 
terrorism consistently with the multilateral options of involving another country 
regardless of the success or location of the attack.   
 
TABLE 12.  Mean Preferences for Unilateral and Multilateral Options as a Function of 
Attack Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Location: 
 US Italy 
Policy Type: Unilateral Multilateral Unilateral Multilateral 
Attack Outcome:     
Attempt 4.53 (2.51) 
6.20 
(2.31) 
3.97 
(2.88) 
5.50 
(3.07)  
Success 5.77 (1.99) 
5.44 
(2.34) 
4.21 
(3.13) 
5.35 
(2.61) 
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations.   
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TABLE 13. ANOVA Summary Table for Preferences for Orientation (as a Repeated 
Measure) and the Consequence and Location of the Terror Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 30.52 30.52 3.28 .08 
Attack Outcome: 1 4.88 4.88 .52 .47 
Attack Location and 
Outcome: 
1 3.80 3.80 .41 .53 
Residual: 60 559.07 9.32   
Unilateral vs. 
Multilateral 
1 50.26 50.28 11.29 <.01 
Unilateral vs. 
Multilateral and  
Attack Outcome: 
1 .23 .23 .05 .82 
Unilateral vs. 
Multilateral and  
Attack Location: 
1 3.78 3.78 .85 .36 
Unilateral vs. 
Multilateral, Attack 
Outcome and Location: 
1 .73 .73 .16 .69 
Residual: 60 267.21 4.45   
 
 
 
Emotions 
 The respondents were asked if and by how much they experienced a certain set 
of emotions (fear, anger and sadness) in response to the attacks.  This was done to 
confirm that the independent variables were triggering an emotional response which 
would then mediate their preferences of the options between the various conditions to 
which they were exposed.  The respondents did indicate significant differences in the 
emotions experienced depending upon the different conditions to which they were 
exposed.  This suggests the experimental conditions were creating different perceptions 
amongst the respondents to create legitimate differences between the conditions, 
accurately gauging their desires for the different policies.  Furthermore, it is interesting 
to note that the location of the terrorist attack was more influential in altering the 
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emotions of fear and anger experienced by the respondents, than was the outcome of the 
attack, whereas the reverse was true regarding the report of the emotion of sadness. 
Specifically in Tables 14 and 15, the respondents indicated a significantly higher 
(F(1,64)=7.63, p<.01) sense of fear when told of a terrorist attack occurring in the US 
(M=4.39) than in Italy (M=2.68).  Whether or not the attack was successful, however, 
had no effect. 
 
 
TABLE 14.  Mean Self-Report of Fear in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 4.07 
(2.69) 
3.13 
(2.67) 
3.60 
 Success 4.71 
(2.73) 
2.24 
(1.64) 
3.47 
Overall Mean:  4.39 2.68  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 15.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Self-Report of Fear in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 46.17 46.17 7.63 .01 
Attack Outcome: 1 .27 .27 .04 .83 
Attack Outcome and 
Location: 
1 9.42 9.42 1.56 .22 
Residual: 60 363.26 6.05   
 
 
 
In Tables 16 and 17, the respondents reported a significantly (F(1,64)=5.60, 
p<.02) increased level of anger when the attacks occurred in the US (M=6.59) than in 
Italy (M=5.00).  Their level of anger also was not significantly influenced by whether or 
not the attack was successful; however, it was significant in conjunction with the 
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location of the attack, resulting in higher levels of reported anger when the attack 
occurred in the US and when it was successful.  Terrorist attacks at home did, as might 
be expected, cause more anger on the part of the respondents. 
 
 
TABLE 16.  Mean Self-Report of Anger in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 5.53 
(2.83) 
5.53 
(2.67) 
5.53 
 Success 7.53 
(1.74) 
4.53 
(2.79) 
6.03 
Overall Mean:  6.53 5.03  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 17.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Self-Report of Anger in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 35.86 35.86 5.60 .02 
Attack Outcome: 1 3.92 3.92 .61 .44 
Attack Outcome and Location: 1 35.86 35.86 5.60 .02 
Residual: 60 383.94 6.40   
 
 
 
 Unlike the above reports of fear and anger, the success of the terrorist attack had 
an almost significant impact (F(1,64)=3.00, p<.09) upon the respondents’ report of the 
emotion of sadness, but the location of the attack did not have any effect (see Tables 18 
and 19).  A successful attack generated a higher degree of sadness (M-5.85) as reported 
by the respondents than an attempted attack (M=4.57).   
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TABLE 18.  Mean Self-Report of Sadness in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Consequence and Location (N=64) 
 Attack Outcome: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Attempt 4.13 
(3.07) 
5.00 
(3.16) 
4.57 
 Success 6.41 
(2.81) 
5.29 
(2.85) 
5.85 
Overall Mean:  5.27 5.15  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 19.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Consequence 
and Location on Self-Report of Sadness in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 .25 .25 .03 .87 
Attack Outcome: 1 26.37 26.37 3.00 .09 
Attack Outcome and 
Location: 
1 15.69 15.69 1.79 .19 
Residual: 60 527.38 8.79   
 
 
 
A correlation matrix, Table 20, of the respondents’ self-reporting of the specified 
emotions in response to the terrorists’ actions compared with the four responses 
available, did show a significant and positive relationship between anger and the military 
options and the unilateral-legal option.  In other words, these correlations suggest that 
the higher the level of self-reported anger in response to the attack, the higher the 
preference for those three options (both military and the unilateral-legal options).  There 
was no significant relationship between the multilateral-legal option and the emotion of 
anger.  No other emotion measured had any significant correlation with the respondents’ 
preference for the various responses. 
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TABLE 20.  Correlation Matrix of Four Responses and Reported Emotions  
in the First Experiment (N=64)10 
 Unilateral-Military 
Multilateral-
Military 
Unilateral
-Legal 
Multilateral-
Legal Fear Anger 
Multilateral-
Military .49**      
Unilateral-
Legal .44** .22     
Multilateral-
Legal .06 .41** .31*    
Fear .11 .02 .11 .03   
Anger .35* .29* .37** -5.82E-5 .35*  
Sadness -.01 -.14 -.07 .01 .29* .24* 
*p<.05.  **p<.01. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 The results yielded in this first experiment (only the desire for unilateral-legal 
action was significant) appear to be in the direction consistent with the concepts 
hypothesized in the earlier sections of this dissertation: successful terrorist attacks 
occurring domestically evoke a more emotional, angry response amongst the 
respondents which in-turn triggers a preference for military and/or unilateral responses.  
The finding that only one of the dependent variables was statistically significant could 
reflect several different responses amongst the respondents.   
 The one significant response was that of using unilateral-legal force to capture 
the terrorists and bring them to justice in response to attacks occurring in the US, 
compared with attacks occurring in Italy.  The results here would suggest a greater desire 
amongst the respondents to use unilateral-legal measures to bring the terrorists to justice 
perhaps because of the perception that it is the most effective at stopping the terrorism.  
                                                 
10 It is interesting to note the significant and positive correlations between the three emotions of Fear, 
Anger, and Sadness. 
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That this response is stronger in reaction to attacks in the US versus abroad may not 
support the contention that terrorism evokes a stronger reaction in people the closer it is 
to home.  This may instead reflect a sense amongst the respondents that when the attacks 
occur closer to home, there are more actions that can be taken by the US government, 
thus, the emotions of the respondents will have a greater influence upon the intensity and 
tempo of those government actions.  If the attacks occur in Italy, then that is the 
responsibility of the Italian Government; the respondents are not constituents, so their 
responses will have no influence.   
 The repeated measures suggest an important finding in the respondents’ desire 
for multilateral and legal options over the unilateral and military action.  The terrorist 
attack does not appear to trigger a strong preference amongst the respondents to “lash-
out” using unilateral and military action.  Instead the results suggest a desire amongst 
these respondents for less aggressive actions which involve cooperation with allies in 
bringing the terrorists “to justice” instead of simply using military force to kill them.  
Thus the respondents knew what actions they preferred.  The respondents appeared to be 
sensitive to the mechanics of the operation of the counter-terrorism policies and of the 
complex results each option might incur.   
Contrasted with the typical legal response to “common” crime discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter, the repeated measure results further suggest that there is a 
consistent reaction amongst victims to terrorism.  The act of terrorism does not matter as 
much as the intent (mens rea) of the terrorists.  The respondents appear to have an 
emotional reaction towards the terrorists (slightly more, the closer it is to “home”) 
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regardless of what the terrorists have done.  While the respondents seem to have a strong 
visceral reaction towards the terrorists, they, somewhat counter-intuitively, do not prefer 
the most dramatic and forceful response against the terrorists, but instead prefer the more 
deliberative multilateral and legal responses against the terrorists.  The respondents 
while angry at the terrorists, did not appear to be angry at an entire group or population, 
because they had a stronger preference for the options which specifically targeted those 
responsible for the attacks for capture or retaliation.  The respondents also had a strong 
preference for the options which involved working with or cooperating with foreign 
officials in targeting the terrorists.   
 The significant emotional response of the respondents suggests that the 
experiment did work as designed because of the different reactions depending upon the 
location and success of the attack.  The respondents indicated greater amounts of fear 
and anger when the attacks occurred closer to home.  The location of the attack does 
affect people’s reaction to terrorism, but there does not appear to be enough anger 
amongst the respondents to cause them to prefer a military response as one might expect.  
The lack of significant reaction to terrorism regardless of whether or not it was 
successful perhaps suggests that an attempted attack is viewed as being no different from 
a successful attack.  An attempted attack is just as bad as a successful attack, and thus 
people don’t feel any relief if the attack was merely an attempt.   
 Interestingly, the only significant emotions experienced in response to the attack 
were fear and anger, but not sadness.  The emotion of anger appeared particularly 
poignant according to the correlation matrix: the more anger the respondents reported, 
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the higher their preference for the unilateral and military options.  This suggests that 
terrorism does evoke a visceral reaction amongst the respondents as might be expected.  
Surprisingly, as indicated above, even though the respondents report high levels of 
anger, they do not automatically support the more violent unilateral-military response as 
one might expect; instead, they indicate a higher preference for the multilateral and legal 
options.  This might indicate some rational reflection on the part of the respondents 
regarding the attack results.  While the respondents do appear to have an emotional 
reaction of fear and anger to the terrorist attack, the results on the report of sadness 
suggest the emotions are not overwhelming, thereby allowing for some rational 
consideration by the respondents to the possible responses to the attack.  Therefore, there 
does appear to be a desire to react, but not too immediately, if the desire to respond using 
unilateral-legal action is the most desirous, which is arguably more contemplative than 
the military options.   
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 The first experiment in the preceding chapter examined the effect of success and 
location of the attack, while the next experiment in this chapter focuses on the effect of 
the third factor (socio-cultural similarity of the terrorists) in relation to the second factor 
(location of the attack: at home or abroad).  The first experiment established a preference 
amongst the respondents for the multilateral and legal measures in response to terrorist 
attacks occurring in the US; this remained consistent regardless of attack success or 
failure.  In addition to the variable of attack location which appears to have an affect 
upon the reaction of respondents, this experiment will attempt to determine if the 
identity of the terrorists will alter the respondents’ preferences for how to respond to 
terrorism.  The first variable of attack success will be held constant across all conditions. 
 As first introduced in the third chapter, the third variable being added in this 
chapter is that of the socio-cultural similarity of the terrorists.  The more different a 
stranger is from a respondent, and the further away the stranger’s out-group is located 
from that respondent’s in-group, the greater the likelihood the stranger poses a threat 
because he or she does not share the same in-group characteristics.  The respondents will 
then prefer unilateral and military counter-terrorism policies, the stronger that emotional 
response to the “different” person.  As discussed in the previous experiment, one has 
four categories of possible counter-terrorism policies available to use in response to an 
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attack alternating between multilateral-legal, unilateral-legal, multilateral-military, and 
unilateral-military options..   
 This second experiment will examine the third hypothesis of the dissertation 
(terrorist socio-cultural similarity) in conjunction, with the second variable from the first 
experiment in the previous chapter, i.e., location of the attack (in the US or abroad): 
H2. Location of terrorist attack 
2.a.i. A terrorist attack occurring domestically will generate a 
preference for a military policy response. 
2.a.ii. A terrorist attack occurring domestically will generate a 
preference for a response with a unilateral orientation. 
2.b.i. A terrorist attack occurring overseas against Americans 
will generate a preference for a legal policy response 
2.b.ii. A terrorist attack occurring overseas against Americans 
will generate a preference for a response with a 
multilateral orientation. 
 
H3. Identity of the group of terrorist and policy preferences 
3.a.i. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally dissimilar terrorists 
(occurring domestically or abroad) will generate a 
preference for a military policy response. 
3.a.ii. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally dissimilar terrorist 
(occurring domestically or abroad) will generate a 
preference for a response with a unilateral orientation. 
3.b.i. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally similar terrorists 
occurring domestically or abroad) will generate a 
preference for a legal policy response. 
3.b.ii. A terrorist attack by socio-culturally similar terrorists 
occurring domestically or abroad) will generate a 
preference for a response with a multilateral orientation. 
 
Method 
 This second experiment is identical to the first experiment in the previous chapter 
except that the first independent variable of attack success is held constant across all four 
conditions (only the story about the successful terrorist attacks is used), with the third 
variable of the socio-cultural similarity, or dissimilarity, of the terrorists being 
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introduced.  The four conditions were: socio-culturally similar terrorists attacking in the 
US, dissimilar terrorists attacking in the US, similar terrorists attacking Americans 
abroad; and dissimilar terrorists attacking Americans abroad. 
Participants 
Sixty-one undergraduate students at Texas A&M University participated in the 
study. They were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in every 
experiment. 
Design 
As before, this experiment was structured as a configuration of a 2x2 between 
groups factorial design.  The factors were: the proximity of the act (at home vs. abroad); 
and, the identity of the terror group (culturally similar vs. dissimilar to “Americans”).  
The first independent variable of outcome of the attack was held constant: the attack was 
successful in all four conditions.  The main dependent variables were preferences 
(ratings) of the respondents for four policy options pertinent to the act of terror and 
terrorism: unilateral-military, multilateral-military, unilateral-legal, and multilateral-
legal.  The responses along these categories were treated in the statistical analyses as a 
repeated measure.  In addition, the participants recorded their emotional responses (fear, 
anger and sadness) to the terror incident. 
The Research Material and the Manipulation of the Variables 
The participants were again instructed to read a news report that described a 
hypothetical terrorist incident, and asked to rate policy-options the government could 
pursue in response to the information they had just read. 
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The news report, as in the first experiment, was formatted along the conventional 
layout of news items that appear in the electronic, “web-based” versions of major 
newspapers.  The main skeleton of the story in the news is inspired by the “Bali 
nightclub bombings” of 2002; the terror event, arguably, created an emotional response 
and a desire for a response amongst many large populations, especially in Australia 
(where most of the victims originated).  The main script of the story deals with a terrorist 
attack consisting of a nighttime bombing of a resort/leisure area/citywide-
block/common-area/city-centre of restaurants, nightclubs and shops crowded with 
several thousand tourists/vacationers.  Four different versions of the script reflect the 
manipulated variables.   
The location of the attack was divided between having the attack occurring on 
either domestic US soil in Miami, Florida, or abroad in Rome, Italy.  The “attack” in 
Miami simply takes place in an area where large numbers of people were participating in 
recreation.  The same occurred in the Rome scenario, with the added element that it was 
known as an area popular with Americans living in and visiting Rome.   
The cultural-political similarity of the terrorist group was manipulated by varying 
the political structure and dominant religion in the source country.  In the “similar” 
condition the source country was described as a federal democracy in Europe where 80% 
of the population is Christian.  The source country in the “dissimilar condition was 
depicted as a monarchy with a population that is predominantly Muslim.  In both cases 
the motivation of the terrorist groups is identical – “…retaliation for America supporting 
the corrupt government of their country, which has been trying to destroy them.”   
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Following the exposure to the story, the respondents were asked to rate their 
preference of four possible policy responses (which were designed to operationalize the 
dependent variable of supporting legal or military policies): the use of unilateral or 
multilateral-legal/law enforcement and military policy domains (1. a unilateral-military 
strike against the terrorists, 2. a unilateral-legal response of sending special operations 
forces into the terrorists’ host country to capture the terrorists and bring them back to 
trial in the US, 3. the use of diplomacy to have the host country liquidate the terrorists 
using military force, and 4. the use of diplomacy to have the terrorists extradited to stand 
trial for the attack.   
Ratings were made on an eleven point scale (0-10) where higher numbers 
represent more support for a given policy.   
All four experimental conditions provided to the respondents were about a 
successful terrorist attack, the effect of attack success having been examined in the first 
experiment.   
Procedure 
Again, the participants worked individually (self-paced) on networked 
workstations. The DecTracer program served as a computerized platform for 
presentation of the terror incident and as the recording device for the participants’ 
responses.  An experimental session lasted about 20 minutes.  The sessions concluded 
with an informal debriefing phase where the participants were introduced to the research 
rationale and context. 
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Results 
Unilateral-Military 
 The analysis of the results from this second experiment, as in the first, begin with 
the univariate analysis of the respondents’ preferences for each of four options available 
for responding to the terrorist attack depending upon their condition assignment (the four 
combinations of the independent variables of attack location and terrorist similarity).  
Starting with the unilateral-military option summarized in Tables 21 and 22, there was 
no significant preference on the part of the respondents for its use, although the direction 
of those preferences is consistent with that hypothesized: a preference for the more 
forceful responses when the attacks were domestic and committed by dissimilar 
terrorists.  The respondents had a higher preference for the unilateral-military option 
when the attack was in the US (M=5.36) than when it was in Italy (M=4.30).  Unilateral-
military action was preferred more when the terrorists were socio-culturally dissimilar 
(M=5.08) than when the terrorists were similar (M=4.58).  Furthermore, the interaction 
of these two variables created some slightly inconsistent results in that the respondents 
were somewhat more likely to support it when similar terrorists attacked in the US 
(M=4.50) and Italy (M=4.67) than when dissimilar terrorists attacked in Italy (M=3.94). 
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TABLE 21.  Mean Preferences for a Unilateral-Military Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 4.50 
(2.94) 
4.67 
(3.70) 
4.58 
 Dissimilar 6.21 
(3.95) 
3.94 
(2.54) 
5.08 
Overall Mean:  5.36 4.30  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 22.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Preferences for a Unilateral-Military Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 16.92 16.92 1.55 .22 
Terrorist Identity: 1 3.69 3.69 .34 .56 
Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity: 
1 22.69 22.69 2.08 .15 
Residual: 57 620.63 10.89   
 
 
 
Multilateral-Military 
 As illustrated in Tables 23 and 24, the respondents did, somewhat unexpectedly 
from what was hypothesized, have a significant preference (F(1,57)=6.03, p<.02) for use 
of the multilateral-military option when the terrorists were similar (M=7.01) than when 
they were dissimilar (M=5.04).  The hypotheses in this study were based on the 
assumptions that the respondents would have a greater preference for the use of military 
options, regardless of unilateral or multi, against dissimilar terrorists than similar, which 
is not the case in this instance.  The results do indicate the respondents’ apparent comfort 
in allowing the local government to respond to the similar terrorists.   
The preference, again unexpectedly but not significantly, for the use of this 
option when the attack occurred in Italy (M=6.13) was slightly higher than when in the 
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US (M=5.91).  Again, this study hypothesized that the respondents would have a higher 
preference for the options in response to attacks closer to home, although the difference 
between these two sets of preferences depending upon the location of the attack is not 
too great relatively speaking. 
 
TABLE 23.  Mean Preferences for a Multilateral-Military Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 6.75 
(3.04) 
7.27 
(2.96) 
7.01 
 Dissimilar 5.07 
(3.56) 
5.00 
(2.97) 
5.04 
Overall Mean:  5.91 6.13  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 24.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Preferences for a Multilateral-Military Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 .75 .75 .08 .78 
Terrorist Identity: 1 59.16 59.16 6.03 .02 
Attack Location and Terrorist 
Identity: 
1 1.32 1.32 .13 .72 
Residual: 57 558.86 9.81   
 
 
 
Unilateral-Legal 
 The respondents’ preferences for the unilateral-legal option, as summarized in 
Tables 25 and 26, were not significant; however the directionality of their preferences 
was consistent with those above for the multilateral-military option, which are 
inconsistent with the preference ratings expected: the hypotheses predicted results the 
exact opposite.  The respondents appeared to indicate no significant preference for the 
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unilateral-legal option regardless of the attack location and identity, although it was 
hypothesized and indicated in the previous chapter that there was a preference for the 
unilateral-legal option, this preference did not carry forward to this experiment and was 
not affected by the identity of the terrorists.  
 
 
TABLE 25.  Mean Preferences for a Unilateral-Legal Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 6.31 
(2.65) 
6.93 
(3.63) 
6.62 
 Dissimilar 5.79 
(3.24) 
5.38 
(2.96) 
5.58 
Overall Mean:  6.05 6.15  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 26.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Preferences for a Unilateral-Legal Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 .17 .17 .02 .90 
Terrorist Identity: 1 16.53 16.53 1.69 .20 
Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity: 
1 4.05 4.05 .41 .52 
Residual: 57 558.48 9.80   
 
 
 
Multilateral-Legal 
 As presented in Tables 27 and 28, the socio-cultural similarity did have a 
significant impact (F(1,57)=4.88, p<.03) upon the respondents’ preference for the use of 
the multilateral-legal option; and, again, the preference to use this option was higher 
when the terrorists were similar (M=7.49) than when dissimilar (M=5.81).  These results 
were the opposite of those expected in the hypotheses that there would be an overall 
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greater preference to use the legal option against dissimilar terrorists regardless of attack 
location, although it is not inconsistent that respondents would feel more comfortable 
allowing for multilateral action against similar terrorists because of their “better 
understanding” of culturally similar terrorists.  The preference, although not significant, 
to use this option when the attack occurred in Italy (M=6.93) was slightly higher than 
when the attack occurred in the US (M=6.37).   
 
TABLE 27.  Mean Preferences for a Multilateral-Legal Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 7.31 
(2.63) 
7.67 
(2.77) 
7.49 
 Dissimilar 5.43 
(3.52) 
6.19 
(2.95) 
5.81 
Overall Mean:  6.37 6.93  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 28.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Preferences for a Multilateral-Legal Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 4.71 4.71 .53 .47 
Terrorist Identity: 1 42.99 43.00 4.88 .03 
Attack Location and Terrorist 
Identity: 
1 .62 .62 .07 .79 
Residual: 57 502.64 8.82   
 
 
 
Military versus Legal 
 The univariate analysis indicated significant support for the two multilateral 
options which involved using military and legal responses which included cooperation 
with other countries against the similar terrorists, perhaps based upon the respondents’ 
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assumptions that the other country being similar (when the terrorists were similar in the 
scenarios, the foreign countries were similar to the US) it would be as competent in 
dealing with the terrorists as the US.  Turning now to the repeated measures analysis of 
the effect of location and similarity upon the respondents’ preferences for the two 
military options combined versus the two legal options combined, one can observe in 
Tables 29 and 30 a general trend in the respondents’ preferences for the types and 
orientation of policies in relation to the independent variables which appeared counter to 
those hypothesized in the above univariate analyses.  The respondents appear to have a 
dominant preference to use the legal options in all four of the scenarios over the military 
options.  The results indicate a significant difference (F(1,57)=5.03, p<.03) in the 
preference for the combined military versus legal options across all four of the different 
situations.   
 
TABLE 29.  Mean Preferences for Military and Legal Options as a Function of Attack 
Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Attack Location: 
 US Italy 
Policy Type: Military Legal Military Legal 
Terrorist Identity:     
Similar 5.63 
(2.69) 
6.81 
(2.34) 
5.97 
(3.02) 
7.30 
(2.92)  Dissimilar 5.64 
(3.10) 
5.61 
(2.71) 
4.47 
(2.51) 
5.78 
(2.86) 
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations.   
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TABLE 30. ANOVA Summary Table for Preferences for Options (as a Repeated 
Measure) and the Attack Location and Terrorist Identity 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 .06 .06 .01 .94 
Terrorist Identity: 1 33.59 33.59 3.40 .07 
Attack Location and Terrorist 
Identity: 
1 6.54 6.36 .64 .43 
Residual: 57 563.37 9.89   
Military vs. Legal: 1 27.41 27.41 5.03 .03 
Military vs. Legal and 
Terrorist Identity: 
1 4.24 4.24 .78 .38 
Military vs. Legal and Attack 
Location: 
1 2.94 2.94 .54 .47 
Military vs. Legal, Terrorist 
Identity and Attack Location: 
1 2.75 2.75 .50 .48 
Residual: 57 310.47 5.45   
 
 
 
Unilateral versus Multilateral 
 The repeated measure analysis of the respondents’ preferences for the combined 
unilateral-military and legal options versus combined multilateral options (Tables 31 and 
32) indicate a significant difference (F(1,57)=8.77, p<.01) in the respondents’ preference 
for the multilateral options over the unilateral options across all four situations 
regardless of location and terrorist similarity.   
Consistent with and similar to the previous experiment in Chapter V, the other 
significant difference (F(1,57)=6.98, p<.01) is the interaction, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
between the preference to use the multilateral options and the location of the attack 
being abroad.  The respondents appear to have a greater preference to use the 
multilateral options when the attack occurred in Italy.  The respondents appear to be 
indicating a trust for working with foreign authorities in responding to an attack on US 
citizens abroad.  This preference also may indicate a belief on the part of the respondents 
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that the foreign authorities may prove more adept at dealing with the terrorists because 
of the authorities’ local knowledge. 
 
TABLE 31.  Mean Preferences for Unilateral and Multilateral Options as a Function of 
Attack Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Attack Location: 
 US Italy 
Policy Type: Unilateral Multilateral Unilateral Multilateral 
Terrorist Identity:     
Similar 5.41 
(1.94) 
7.03 
(1.69) 
5.80 
(3.36) 
7.47 
(2.53)  Dissimilar 6.00 
(2.76) 
5.25 
(2.67) 
4.66 
(2.17) 
5.59 
(2.64) 
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations.   
 
 
 
TABLE 32. ANOVA Summary Table for Preferences for Orientation (as a Repeated 
Measure) and Attack Location and Terrorist Identity 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 .06 .06 .01 .94 
Terrorist Identity: 1 33.59 33.59 3.40 .07 
Attack Location and Terrorist 
Identity: 
1 6.36 6.36 .64 .43 
Residual: 57 563.37 9.88   
Unilateral vs. Multilateral: 1 23.00 23.00 8.77 .01 
Unilateral vs. Multilateral and 
Terrorist Identity:: 
1 5.68 5.68 2.17 .15 
Unilateral vs. Multilateral and 
Attack Location: 
1 18.31 18.31 6.98 .01 
Unilateral vs. Multilateral, 
Attack Location and Terrorist 
Identity: 
1 5.15 5.15 1.96 .17 
Residual: 57 149.45 2.62   
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FIGURE 1.  Interaction of Preference for Policy by Orientation  
in Relation to Attack Location 
 
 
 
Emotions 
 Examining the respondents’ self-reports of certain emotions in response to the 
attacks (shown in Tables 33 and 34), they did not exhibit any significant difference in 
the report of fear between the conditions.  They reported an almost identical level of fear 
when the attack occurred in Italy (M=3.45) versus in the US (M=3.17); and when the 
terrorists were dissimilar (M=3.53) versus when they were similar (M=3.10).   
 
TABLE 33.  Mean Self-Report of Fear in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 3.31 
(2.47) 
2.87 
(2.70) 
3.09 
 Dissimilar 3.00 
(2.32) 
4.00 
(2.42) 
3.50 
Overall Mean:  3.16 3.43  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
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TABLE 34.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Self-Report of Fear in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 1.17 1.17 .19 .67 
Terrorist Identity: 1 2.56 2.56 .42 .52 
Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity: 
1 7.95 7.95 1.29 .26 
Residual: 57 351.17 6.16   
 
 
 
 There were no significant differences between the conditions when it came to the 
respondents’ report of anger as illustrated in Tables 35 and 36.  There was almost no 
difference between the level of anger reported in response to the attack occurring in Italy 
(M=6.49) than in the US (M=6.83).  There was also no difference in response to the 
attackers being either similar (M=6.49) or dissimilar (M=6.83).   
 
TABLE 35.  Mean Self-Report of Anger in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 6.44 
(2.37) 
6.53 
(3.18) 
6.49 
 Dissimilar 7.21 
(2.56) 
6.44 
(2.42) 
6.83 
Overall Mean:  6.83 6.49  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 36.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Self-Report of Anger in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 1.76 1.76 .25 .62 
Terrorist Identity: 1 1.76 1.76 .25 .62 
Attack Location and Terrorist 
Identity: 
1 2.89 2.89 .42 .52 
Residual: 57 6.98 6.98   
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 The levels of sadness reported by the respondents (Tables 37 and 38) were not 
significantly affected by the location of the attack, or by the socio-cultural similarity of 
the terrorists.  The means were very similar between the groups divided between 
location and between terrorist identity.  These means were virtually identical in the 
interaction analysis of location and similarity.   
 
TABLE 37.  Mean Self-Report of Sadness in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Location and Terrorist Identity (N=61) 
 Terrorist Identity: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Similar 5.38 
(2.47) 
5.13 
(2.85) 
5.25 
 Dissimilar 5.64 
(2.65) 
5.75 
(3.02) 
5.70 
Overall Mean:  5.51 5.44  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 38.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity on Self-Report of Sadness in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 .07 .07 .01 .93 
Terrorist Identity: 1 2.97 2.97 .39 .53 
Attack Location and 
Terrorist Identity: 
1 .46 .46 .06 .81 
Residual: 57 433.70 7.61   
 
 
 
 The correlation matrix of the respondents’ preferences for each of the four 
responses compared with their self-report of emotions (Table 39) predominantly 
indicates a significant relationship between anger and a preference for a policy.  The 
respondents’ report of anger had a significant (p<.01) and positive (.41) correlation with 
their preference for the offensive military action.  A preference for the multilateral-
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military option also had a significant (p<.01) and positive correlation with the level of 
anger reported (.37).  Although the multilateral option was preferred in response to 
attacks by similar terrorists in Italy, one might not expect anger to be associated with the 
preference for this option but rather with the more “aggressive” unilateral option.  One 
could argue that a report of anger indicates a desire to pursue more active options, such 
as unilateral-military action instead more passive options as multilateral-legal action 
which involves other parties and which takes more time to complete. 
 The respondents’ report of anger also had a significant (p=.03) and positive (.29) 
correlation with the respondents’ preference for pursing the unilateral-legal option.   
 
TABLE 39.  Correlation Matrix of Four Responses and Reported Emotions 
in the Second Experiment (N=61) 
 Unilateral-Military 
Multilateral
-Military 
Unilateral-
Legal 
Multilateral-
Legal Fear Anger 
Multilateral
-Military .48**      
Unilateral-
Legal .29* .49**     
Multilateral
-Legal -.13 .30** .59**    
Fear -.02 -.08 -.07 -.02   
Anger .41** .37** .29* .07 .18  
Sadness .08 .01 .17 .19 .44** .37** 
*p<.05.  **p<.01. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of this experiment appear to have yielded results similar to the first 
experiment described in the previous chapter, which indicated a preference for 
multilateral and legal responses.  This second experiment produced significant results 
indicating a preference for the multilateral-military and multilateral-legal actions when 
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used against similar terrorists abroad.  The first glance of this finding might suggest that 
the respondents were concerned with socio-culturally similar terrorists attacking 
Americans abroad; however, given that the results of the preferences for the use of 
unilateral-military force are consistent with those hypothesized, and given the current 
history of terrorism and debate over counter-terrorism policy in the US, these results 
may actually be quite consistent with the hypotheses of this study.   
These findings may actually indicate an increased preference, or confidence, on 
the part of the respondents that the multilateral-military and legal actions will be 
successful, especially against terrorists who seem similar.  The respondents might be less 
confident about preferring unilateral action against the dissimilar terrorists because the 
respondents are not sure how best to respond to them given some of the current 
“criticism” or increased scrutiny in the popular media of current US counter-terrorism 
policy against dissimilar terrorists.  Since the multilateral options used in this study 
operate upon a reliance of action by the foreign government against the terrorists, the 
respondents may be acting upon a recognition that the foreign government may actually 
be better able to prosecute the terrorists, especially if we recognize, understand, trust, 
and are confident in that similar government to so do.  In contrast, these findings indicate 
that the respondents seem confident that these multilateral options are not preferred in 
dealing with the dissimilar terrorists.  They would prefer the “more aggressive” 
unilateral options against dissimilar terrorists who attacked the US, but they are not 
significantly confident in that preference.   
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This analysis seems further strengthened when the four options are combined and 
cross-tested in the repeated measures.  The respondents indicated significant support for 
the legal options of bringing the terrorists to justice, especially when used against similar 
terrorists.  When the four options were measured as multilateral versus unilateral 
options, the results were again significant in essentially the same direction: support for 
multilateral measures against similar terrorists.  These findings appear consistent 
regardless of the location of the attack.  While one might also expect significant results 
for the reverse, the use of unilateral action against dissimilar terrorists attacking the US, 
one could argue that the respondents were not necessarily averse to a unilateral response 
to dissimilar terrorists attacking the US homeland; rather, the respondents were more 
confident in using the multilateral measures to stop those similar terrorists.  The 
respondents did not report significant levels of the emotion of fear and anger in response 
to an attack by dissimilar terrorists upon the US, which might suggest a lack of surprise 
to the attack given the recent history of similar attacks.  
The results in this chapter confirm the results of the previous chapter that the 
location of a terrorist attack affects respondents’ choice of a response to the attack: a 
preference for unilateral-legal action when the terrorist attacks occurred in the US.  The 
experiments in this chapter also suggest that the socio-cultural similarity of the terrorists 
is an important influence on the respondents’ preference for certain policy responses: the 
use of multilateral and legal action against similar terrorists, especially when the attacks 
are abroad.  The respondents also indicated, in conjunction with their desire to use 
multilateral-legal action against the terrorists, strong feelings of anger.  The next issue 
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might then be what role emotion plays, if any, in influencing the respondents’ 
preferences for the various counter-terrorism policies.   
 74
CHAPTER VII 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 The previous two experiments served to establish and determine the effect of the 
three independent variables (terrorist attack success, attack location, and terrorist socio-
cultural similarity) upon the respondents’ preference for certain types of counter-
terrorism policy responses.  Those experiments established an overall equal preference 
amongst the study participants for the multilateral and legal options equally in response 
to both successful and failed attacks, especially when the action occurred in the US.  The 
respondents also appeared to indicate higher feelings of fear and anger when they 
preferred military and unilateral responses. 
While the respondents in the previous two experiments reported both 
experiencing emotions and preferring certain policy responses depending upon the 
varying qualities of the attack, the question may still remain going into this third 
experiment, as to whether or not the respondents’ preferences for one response over 
another is influenced by the emotions they reported.  In an effort to answer this question, 
this third experiment will hold the above independent variables of attack success and 
terrorist socio-cultural similarity constant, while again testing the location variable, but 
will do so in concert with the addition of a new variable which is the probability of 
success for each of the policy responses.  The goal of introducing this new variable is to 
explore the respondents’ utility calculations in relation to their preferences for the 
counter-terrorism policy responses.   
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The assumption in the previous two experiments was that the certain combination 
of qualities of the terrorist attacks would trigger stronger emotional reactions amongst 
the respondents.  The respondents, experiencing a stronger emotional reaction might 
then (perhaps too simply stated) have an almost primordial desire to kill the terrorists 
(responding as quickly and efficiently as possible) which would cause them to select the 
unilateral and military options.  The unilateral options might be considered quick and 
efficient because the US could enact them faster by not having to involve other countries 
who might slow down the process or prefer other responses be used against the terrorists 
that might not be effective in the minds of the respondents.  The military options would 
be preferred because they involve more violence as well as involve killing the terrorists 
easing the respondents’ feelings of anger through revenge, and satisfying their feelings 
of fear by ending the terrorist threat by killing the terrorists.   
While the respondents in the previous two experiments did appear to consistently 
choose military and unilateral options when the attacks occurred in the US, and 
multilateral and legal options when the attacks occurred overseas, the question still 
remains as to whether or not these options were being chosen by the respondents as a 
result of being influenced by their emotions or because they thought the options were the 
best response given the situation.   
In order to answer this question, this experiment adds as a treatment the 
probabilities of success to the options.  The assertion being that if the respondents are 
making decisions based upon their emotions and not upon their rational consideration of 
what will be the most logically successful option, then they will continue to choose 
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options regardless of the probability of success of the option.  In other words, if the 
respondents want to use unilateral and military options against the terrorists, and the 
respondents desire this option because their emotions of fear and anger make them desire 
revenge (to permanently stop the terrorists from committing future attacks by killing 
them), then the respondents will continue to choose this option even if it has a lower 
probability of success.   
In this experiment, the respondents, as in the previous, had the same four options 
for responding to the terrorist attacks.  The options/responses in this experiment included 
probabilities of success in their descriptions.  The probabilities provided for half of the 
experimental conditions had probabilities extrapolated from the rates of success of the 
same kinds of responses to terrorist attacks as in history (as discussed in the second 
chapter).  The second set of experimental conditions given the other half of respondents 
had probabilities of success for the responses which were reversed.  This was to 
determine a difference between preferences for the same option depending upon its 
probability of success: i.e. whether or not respondents indicate a higher preference for an 
option when its probability of success was higher and indicate a lower preference for the 
same option when its probability of success was lower.   
The probabilities provided were distinctly different (as illustrated more carefully 
in the methods section) from each other; thus, if the respondents were attentive, which 
the previously mentioned research suggests also requires less emotion and more rational 
cognition on the part of the subjects, they should notice the distinctive differences in 
probabilities associated with each of the responses, logically preferring the options with 
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the higher probabilities of success.  If the respondents experienced higher levels of 
emotion, fear and anger, triggered by their response to the terrorist attack, then they 
might be less attentive to the probabilities of success of the options and will choose the 
option which satisfies or answers their emotions regardless of its probability of success.  
If the respondents are angry in response to a terrorist attack in the US, which the 
previous experiment suggests the respondents will be, then they should indicate a higher 
preference for the unilateral and military options, which as argued above, should better 
satisfy their feelings of fear and anger, even when its chance of success is lower than 
other options given the respondents.   
Thus, the experiment in this chapter will focus its examination on: 
H4. Effects of probability of response success 
4.a.i. The preference for a military option will be influenced by 
a strong negative emotion generating a disregard for the 
options’ chance of success. 
4.a.ii. The preference for options with a unilateral orientation 
will be influenced by a strong negative emotion generating 
a disregard for the option’s chance of success. 
4.b.i. The preference for a legal option will be made based upon 
the options’ chance of success and will not be influenced 
by emotion. 
4.b.ii. The preference for options with a multilateral orientation 
will be made based upon the options’ chance of success 
and will not be influenced by emotion. 
 
Method 
This third experiment held constant the consequence of the attack (it being 
successful) and the similarity of the terrorists (they being socio-culturally dissimilar): 
alternating between the location of the attack being at home and abroad.  These two 
groups were further divided into another two groups (as presented in Table 40), each 
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given two different versions of probabilities of success of the four policy options as 
above: the first being historically-based, or having probabilities as one would expect 
based upon similar responses which have occurred in history (unilateral-military having 
a 70% chance of success, multilateral-military 35%, unilateral-legal 50%, and 
multilateral-legal 80%), and the second having probabilities the complete reverse 
(unilateral-military having a 50% chance of success, multilateral-military 80%, 
unilateral-legal 70%, and multilateral-legal 35%).   
 
TABLE 40.  The Four Conditions in Experiment Three (ordered  
by probability of success) 
Attack Location: 
Response Success: US Italy 
Historically- 
Based 
Multilateral-Legal: 80% 
Unilateral-Military: 70% 
Unilateral-Legal: 50% 
Multilateral-Military: 35% 
Multilateral-Legal: 80% 
Unilateral-Military: 70% 
Unilateral-Legal: 50% 
Multilateral-Military: 35% 
Reversed 
Multilateral-Military: 80% 
Unilateral-Legal: 70% 
Unilateral-Military: 50% 
Multilateral-Legal: 35% 
Multilateral-Military: 80% 
Unilateral-Legal: 70% 
Unilateral-Military: 50% 
Multilateral-Legal: 35% 
 
 
In other words, the first group was told of a successful terrorist attack by 
dissimilar terrorists in the US, and the four options (exactly the same as in the previous 
two experiments) they were given of how to respond to the attacks included probabilities 
of success the same as similar responses in history.  The second group was the same but 
their attack occurred in Italy.  The third and fourth groups were the same as the above 
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two, but the probabilities of success of the responses given to them were completely 
reversed (see below for more detail). 
The specific probabilities for each of the options were derived from the 
descriptions of similar counter-terrorism responses which have occurred in history and 
which were introduced in the literature review in the second chapter.  The probabilities 
were intended to be simple and distinct, the respondents readily noticing a difference 
between the responses and their probabilities of success.  Unilateral-military options in 
past history have generally had significant, above average success (arbitrarily set at 
70%) in stopping future terrorism, assuming the attacks were successfully prosecuted 
with reliable intelligence, by killing the terrorists which prevents them from carrying out 
future attacks.  In acting unilaterally a state could assure that it attacked and eliminated 
all of the necessary targets without having to rely on another country which might not 
have otherwise prosecuted the attack as diligently. 
Multilateral-military options have arguably been less successful in history 
because they required action on the part of a country possibly less sympathetic to the 
victim country, and thus less likely to use military action against the terrorists as 
diligently as the victim country.  Additionally, the other country usually has the terrorists 
residing within its own borders which suggests that the terrorists were given sanctuary 
by sympathetic members of the government of that other country; thus, they would be 
less willing to take action against the terrorists because of this sympathy.  If military 
action were taken, assuming it was not executed as vigorously as possible, there is a 
danger that not all of the terrorists would be killed.  The remaining terrorists and their 
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supporters would be angered by these military attacks which would provoke them into 
committing further acts of terrorism.  Thus, while the multilateral action might have 
some success, historical examples (such as is arguably the case with the current 
Pakistani inability to successfully fight al-Qaeda) suggest this option would have less 
overall success, arbitrarily set at a 35% probability of success, or just above one chance 
in three. 
The unilateral-legal option has generally had significant by not overwhelming 
success at stopping terrorism, which was arbitrarily set at 50% based upon previous 
unilateral-legal actions in history.  The US has had significant success in capturing 
terrorists at home and abroad, prosecuting them and then incarcerating them with life 
sentences.  This legal action stops the terrorists from committing future acts because 
they are incarcerated, in addition to lowering their respect and stature amongst their 
followers and supporters because they appear incompetent for having been caught 
(which one might argue occurred with the Yunis and Rahman cases).  The terrorists not 
being killed further lowers their stature because they are not martyred, as well as 
suggesting that the US is more humane and just because they did not simply execute the 
perpetrator, thereby, perhaps, altering the terrorists’ supporters’ opinion of the US into 
being more favourable.  Alternatively, however, the unilateral-legal option does have 
serious drawbacks which equally challenge its chance for success, the first of which is its 
reliance on good credible actionable intelligence.  It has been and is very difficult to 
trace individuals in foreign countries so that government agents could locate and arrest 
them, especially when the individuals are trained in hiding and have a network of 
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sympathetic supports willing to provide them refuge.  Secondly, the act of unilaterally 
entering another sovereign country without their permission and forcibly removing an 
individual has the general propensity to upset and anger the citizens of that country.  
This reaction is likely to cause a straining of diplomatic relations, making it difficult to 
execute future renditions if the authorities in that other country are alerted to the 
possibility of it happening again.  The anger amongst the population of that country in 
response to the unilateral “invasion,” although merely legal, is likely to further general 
support amongst the population of that other country for the terrorists, which limits the 
overall success of this option in stopping future terrorism.   
The multilateral-legal option was arbitrarily given an 80% probability of success 
based upon the assumption that cooperation amongst countries in prosecuting a 
comprehensive legal campaign against the terrorists will be most successful of all the 
options in the “long-term.”  The cooperation amongst many states assures that there are 
fewer locations in which the terrorists can hide and train, because the more they travel 
the more likely they are to be caught.  The use of legal action against the terrorists has a 
significant psychological impact upon their base of support because public legal action 
declaring them to be common criminals challenges their moral superiority.  The country 
using legal action against the terrorists appears considerate and morally justified in 
taking the time to establish that the terrorists are not legitimate.  Furthermore, the use of 
legal action also has the least amount of risk in causing collateral damage to innocents 
when attacking the terrorists.  The terrorists often need a government to overreact 
towards them and use too much force (especially if using a military response) which 
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then kills innocent civilians who will become angry towards the government and more 
sympathetic towards the terrorists.  The terrorists win when they are able to establish 
broad popular support to the extent that they are able to become the dominant authority 
or achieve their agenda.  In the long term, many experts believe (as illustrated in the 
second chapter) that the multilateral-legal action against those committing terrorism will 
expose their actions as being extremist and illegitimate, as was the case with many of the 
marxist terrorist groups during the “Cold War” against communism (including Carlos 
the Jackal, Red Brigade, Shining Path, Libya’s Khadaffi, etc.).11   
Participants 
60 undergraduate students at Texas A&M University participated in this third 
experiment.  They were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. 
Design 
The third experiment was structured as a configuration of a 2x2 between groups 
factorial design.  The factors were: the proximity of the act (at home vs. abroad), and the 
probability of success of the policy options.  The dependent variables were preferences 
(ratings) of the respondents for the four policy options pertinent to the act of terror and 
terrorism: unilateral-military, multilateral-military, unilateral-legal, multilateral-legal.  
The respondents’ preferences for responses in these categories were treated in the 
statistical analyses as a repeated measure.  In addition, the participants recorded their 
emotional responses (fear, anger and sadness) to the terror incident. 
                                                 
11 Even if the logic of these probabilities is not accepted-as it is not totally established empirically-it is still 
plausible that the public will accept these probabilities alternatively as rank order of each options’ 
probability of success, and use them, or not, for their selection of an option.   
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The Research Material and the Manipulation of the Variables 
As in the previous two experiments in the previous two chapters the participants 
were instructed to read a news report that described a hypothetical terrorist incident, and 
were then asked to rate policy-options the government could pursue in response to the 
information they had just read. 
Again, the news report was formatted along the conventional layout of news 
items that appear in the electronic, “web-based” versions of major newspapers.  The 
main skeleton of the story in the news is inspired by the “Bali nightclub bombings” of 
2002; a terror event which, arguably, created an emotional response and a desire for a 
response amongst many large populations, especially in Australia (where most of the 
victims originated).  The main script of the story deals with a terrorist attack consisting 
of a nighttime bombing of a resort/leisure area/citywide-block/common-area/city-centre 
of restaurants, nightclubs and shops crowded with several thousand tourists/vacationers.  
Eight different versions of the script reflect the manipulated variables.   
The Proximity of the Attack to the Respondents 
The location of the attack is divided between having the attack occurring on 
either domestic US soil in Miami, Florida, or abroad in Rome, Italy.  The “attack” in 
Miami simply takes place in an area where large numbers of people are participating in 
recreation.  The same occurred in the Rome scenario, with the added element that it was 
known as an area popular with Americans living in and visiting Rome.   
Following the exposure to the story, as illustrated above in Table 40, the two 
groups of respondents, divided according to the independent variables of attack location, 
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were divided further into two groups and asked to rate their preference of four possible 
policy responses (which were designed to operationalize the dependent variable of 
supporting either legal/military and unilateral-multilateral policies).   
The first and second groups were given this following set of four possible options 
with historically-based probabilities of success: the use of unilateral or multilateral 
action in both the legal/law enforcement and military policy domains (1. a unilateral-
military strike against the terrorists with a 70% chance of stopping further terrorism, 2. a 
unilateral-legal response of sending special operations forces into the terrorists’ host 
country to capture the terrorists and bring them back to trial in the US with a 35% 
chance of stopping terrorism, 3. the use of multilateral-military action to have the host 
country liquidate the terrorists using military force with a 50% chance of stopping 
further terrorism, and 4. the use of multilateral-legal action to have the terrorists 
extradited to stand trial for the attack with an 80% chance of stopping further terrorism).   
The third and fourth groups were given the following set of four possible options 
with the probabilities of success reversed: the use of unilateral or multilateral action in 
both the legal/law enforcement and military policy domains (1. a unilateral-military 
strike against the terrorists with a 50% chance of stopping further terrorism, 2. a 
unilateral-legal response of sending special operations forces into the terrorists’ host 
country to capture the terrorists and bring them back to trial in the US with an 80% 
chance of stopping terrorism, 3. the use of multilateral-military action to have the host 
country liquidate the terrorists using military force with a 70% chance of stopping 
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further terrorism, and 4. the use of multilateral-legal action to have the terrorists 
extradited to stand trial for the attack with a 35% chance of stopping further terrorism).   
Ratings were made on an eleven point scale (0-10) where higher numbers 
represent more support for a given policy.   
Procedure 
As in the two experiments in the previous two chapters the participants worked 
individually (self-paced) on networked workstations. The DecTracer program served as 
a computerized platform for presentation of the terror incident and as the recording 
device for the participants’ responses.  An experimental session lasted about 20 minutes.  
The session was concluded with a debriefing phase where the participants were 
introduced to the research rationale and context. 
Results 
Unilateral-Military 
 Analyses of the results from the third experiment, as in the first two, begin with 
the univariate analysis of the respondents’ preferences for each of four options available 
for responding to the terrorist attack depending upon their condition assignment (the four 
combinations of the independent variable of attack location and historically 
based/reversed probabilities of success for the four responses).  As illustrated in Tables 
41 and 42, there was no significant difference between those exposed to the attack in the 
US opposed to in Italy in their preference for the use of unilateral-military action in 
response to the attack.  The direction and level of preference were, however, numerically 
higher when the attack occurred in the US (4.70) compared with Italy (3.60), a trend 
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which was seen in the previous experiments and repeated here.  There was also no 
significant difference between those given the options with the historically-based 
probabilities of success versus those given the reversed probabilities (again, see Table 
40).  The numerical difference of the preferences between the two groups, however 
slight, is consistent with the probability cited: M=4.40 for a 70% chance of success, and 
a lower mean preference of 3.90 for the lower unexpected probability of 50%.  Hence, 
the probability of success of this option did not influence the respondent’s selection of it. 
 
TABLE 41.  Mean Preferences for a Unilateral-Military Response to the Attack as a 
Function of \Its Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
Based 
4.80 
(2.88) 
4.00 
(2.04) 
4.40 
 Reverse: 4.60 
(2.61) 
3.20 
(2.65) 
3.90 
Overall Mean:  4.70 3.60  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 42.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Preferences for a Unilateral-Military Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 18.15 18.15 2.58 .10 
Response Success: 1 3.75 3.75 .57 .45 
Attack Location and 
Response Success: 
1 1.35 1.35 .21 .65 
Residual: 56 368.40 6.58   
 
 
 
Multilateral-Military 
 Examining Tables 43 and 44, the location of the attack in relation to the 
probability of success of the options does not appear to have had a significant impact 
 87
upon the respondents’ selection of the multilateral-military option.  There was an almost 
significant (F(1,56) F=2.76, p<.10) difference between the preference of the option when 
the probability of success was a historically-based 35% (M=5.94) versus when it was a 
reversed probability of success of 80% (M=7.10).  Consistent with the logical choice of 
the actual probabilities provided for the option, there was a higher preference for the 
option when it had a higher, but reversed probability of 80% versus the historically-
based probability of 35%.  The probability of success of this option entailing the 
involvement of another country does appear to have had some impact upon the 
respondents’ selection of it.  The respondents appear to have been rationally choosing 
the option with the higher probability of success. 
 
TABLE 43.  Mean Preferences for a Multilateral-Military Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
Based 
6.60 
(3.16) 
5.27 
(3.24) 
5.94 
 Reversed 7.33 
(1.84) 
6.87 
(2.39) 
7.10 
Overall Mean:  6.97 6.07  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 44.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Preferences for a Multilateral-Military Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 12.15 12.15 1.65 .21 
Response Success: 1 20.42 20.42 2.76 .10 
Attack Location and 
Response Success: 
1 2.82 2.82 .38 .54 
Residual: 56 413.60 7.39   
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Unilateral-Legal 
 There was no significant relationship between attack location and probability of 
success in relation to the preference for the unilateral-legal option (see Tables 45 and 
46).  There was also very little apparent difference between the mean preference for this 
option when the historically-based probability of success was 50% (M=5.47) versus 
when the reversed probability was 70% (M=5.63).   
 
TABLE 45.  Mean Preferences for a Unilateral-Legal Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
Based 
4.80 
(3.05) 
6.13 
(2.80) 
5.47 
 
Reversed 5.80 
(2.76) 
5.47 
(3.16) 
5.63 
Overall Mean:  5.30 5.80  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 46.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Preferences for a Unilateral-Legal Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 3.75 3.75 .43 .51 
Response Success: 1 .42 .42 .05 .83 
Attack Location and 
Response Success: 
1 10.42 10.42 1.20 .28 
Residual: 56 486.27 8.68   
 
 
 
Multilateral-Legal 
 As demonstrated in Tables 47 and 48, there was a significant preference 
(F(1,56)=29.38, p<.01) for the multilateral-legal option when the probability of its 
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success was the higher and historically-based 80% (M=8.20) than the lower, reversed 
probability 35% (M=5.27).  This result indicates a relationship between the respondents’ 
rational cognitive calculations and the legal option.  The selection of the more thoughtful 
and deliberative legal option is associated with the respondents’ deliberate consideration 
of the probability of success of the option.  Strong emotions on the part of the 
respondents do not appear to be part of their selection of this option as they seem to 
choose it based upon its chance of success.  This deliberative consideration, while 
having less of an emotional component, regarding the options also suggests a less 
emotional response to the attacks on the part of the respondents, otherwise one might see 
less consideration by the respondents of the options’ probability of success. 
 
TABLE 47.  Mean Preferences for a Multilateral-Legal Response to the Attack as a 
Function of Its Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
based 
8.33 
(1.99) 
8.07 
(1.79) 
8.20 
 
Reversed 4.53 (2.26) 
6.00 
(2.30) 
5.27 
Overall Mean:  6.43 7.03  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 48.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Preferences for a Multilateral-Legal Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 5.40 5.40 1.23 .27 
Response Success: 1 129.07 129.07 29.38 <.01 
Attack Location and Response 
Success: 
1 11.27 11.27 2.57 .12 
Residual: 56 246.00 4.39   
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Analysis of All Four Options Combined 
 After separately examining the respondents’ preferences for each of the four 
responses on an individual basis, the preferences of the respondents for the policy 
responses combined are examined together in a repeated measures analysis (2x2x4 
ANOVA presented in Tables 49 and 50).  Regardless of the location of the attack or 
probability of success for one of the responses, the respondents had significant 
(F(3,168)= 14.79, p<.01) preferences for the types of options themselves.  As is 
noticeable in Figure 2, the strongest preference was for the multilateral-legal option 
(M=6.74).  In comparing the preferences for the two legal options with the preferences 
for the two military options one should note that overall the means are higher for the 
legal options.  However, there is still a greater preference for the multilateral-military 
(M=6.52) option over the unilateral-legal option (M=5.56).  Generally, the preferences 
of the respondents appear to be for the multilateral options of cooperating with or 
involving other countries in responding to the terrorists.  This might suggest a measured 
reaction on the part of the respondents in reaction to the terrorism as well as the potential 
for trust amongst the respondents of other countries to respond to terrorism, and not a 
preference to simply react unilaterally.   
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TABLE 49.  Mean Preferences for All  Four Responses as a Function of Attack  
Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Attack Location: 
 US Italy 
Policy Type: Uni-
Mil 
Mult-
Mil. 
Uni-
Lgl 
Mult-
Lgl 
Uni-
Mil 
Mult-
Mil 
Uni-
Lgl 
Mult-
Lgl 
Historically- 
Based 
4.80 
(2.88) 
6.60 
(3.16) 
4.80 
(3.05) 
8.33 
(1.99) 
4.00 
(2.04) 
5.27 
(3.24) 
6.13 
(2.80) 
8.07 
(1.79) Response 
Success: Reversed 4.60 (2.61) 
7.33 
(1.84) 
5.80 
(2.76) 
4.53 
(2.26) 
3.20 
(2.65) 
6.87 
(2.39) 
5.47 
(3.16) 
6.00 
(2.30) 
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations.  Uni=Unilateral, Multi=Multilateral, Mil.=Military, Lgl.=Legal.  The bolded figure 
in each column-pair is the option which had the higher probability of success of the two. 
 
 
 
TABLE 50.  ANOVA Summary Table for Preferences for All Responses (as a Repeated 
Measure) and Attack Location and Response Success 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 3.04 3.31 .30 .59 
Response Success: 1 16.54 16.54 1.62 .21 
Attack Location and 
Response Success: 
1 .10 .10 .01 .92 
Residual: 56 570.53 10.19   
All Four Responses: 3 249.25 83.08 14.79 <.01 
All Four Responses and 
Attack Location: 
3 36.41 12.14 2.16 .10 
All Four Responses and 
Response Success: 
3 137.11 45.70 8.14 <.01 
All Four Responses, 
Attack Location and 
Response Success: 
3 25.75 8.58 1.53 .21 
Residual: 168 943.73 5.62   
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FIGURE 2.  Means of Respondents’ Preferences for Each Policy Response (the bifurcated 
probabilities provided the respondents indicated on the graphs respectively) 
 
 
 
When examining the respondents’ preferences for the four responses in light of 
the probabilities of success of the options, the repeated measure of the preferences for 
the four options combined shows, in Table 50, a significant interaction of preferences for 
particular options and the options’ probability of success (F(3,168)=8.14, p<.01).  The 
respondents indicated, as expressed in Figure 3, a higher preference for an option when 
it was listed as having a higher probability of success and vice versa; for example: 
M=8.20 for the multilateral-legal option when it had an 80% chance of success 
compared with M=5.93 for the multilateral-military option with the 35% chance of 
success.  When the probabilities for the two were given the “reversed” probabilities of 
success, the multilateral-legal option with a 35% chance of success and the multilateral-
military with an 80% chance, the means were a lower 5.27 and a higher 7.10 
respectively.   
70%/50% 
35%/80% 
50%/70% 
80%/35% 
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Furthermore, the preference for an option, regardless of type, was higher when 
the probability of success of the option itself was higher.  Examining Figure 3, one can 
see there was higher preference for the option with an 80%, the second highest 
preference for 70%, third for the option with 50%, and so on.  A similar result exists 
between the unilateral-military and unilateral-legal options, although it is not as 
noticeable because the difference between the historically-based and reversed 
probabilities is not as great (expected 70% and 50%, and vice-versa for unexpected).   
The results definitively indicate an overall finding that the respondents were 
rationally considering the options by preferring the option based upon its probability of 
success.  This notion of careful consideration of the options is also true with respect to 
the respondents’ consideration of the multilateral options suggesting they were not 
averse to involving other countries in responding to the terrorism (which one can assume 
would be when it was advantageous).  These results appear to strongly suggest, if the 
respondents were having an emotional reaction to the terrorist attack, those emotions 
were most likely not causing them to irrationally prefer certain responses over others, 
based upon the stronger preferences for the options which had higher probabilities of 
success. 
It is interesting to note, however, that there was very little difference in the 
preference for the unilateral-legal option regardless of whether or not its probability of 
success was 50% or 70%.  One could argue that this might be due in part to a perception 
on the part of the respondents that there is not as much of a difference between 50% and 
70%; although this was not the case with the unilateral-military option which shared the 
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70%/50% paring with the unilateral-legal option, and which had a relatively larger gap 
(0.5 compared with 0.23) in its preference rating depending upon its probability of 
success.  Alternatively, one could argue that the unilateral-legal response, which called 
for the forcible extradition of the terrorists, was more contemplative than the military 
options, and thus, since the respondents were rationally considering the probability of 
success of the options in both experiment treatments, there should be equal preference 
for this option regardless of its probability of success.   
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FIGURE 3.  Interaction of Preference for Each Policy Response In Relation to Policy 
Probability of Success (the bifurcated probabilities provided the respondents 
indicated on the graphs respectively) 
 
Emotions 
 Generally speaking there were no significant interactions (in Table 51 and 52) 
between respondents report of the certain types of emotions and their preference for a 
35% 
80% 
70% 
50% 
80% 
35%
50% 
70% 
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response based upon its probability of success, which is entirely consistent with the 
hypotheses of this experiment.  The choice of a response based upon its probability of 
success should not be influenced by emotion, since, as asserted earlier, emotion should 
cause one to be less considerate of the rational outcome of an option.   
 Examining the respondents’ report of emotions experienced in response to the 
attacks indicates a significant difference (F(1,56)=6.48, p<.01), as displayed below in 
Table 52, between the levels of fear reported in relation to where the respondents were 
told the attack occurred.  When told the attack occurred in the US, the respondents were 
more likely to report fear (M=3.93) than when the attack occurred in Italy (M=2.33).   
 
TABLE 51.  Mean Self-Report of Fear in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
Based 
3.67 
(2.72) 
2.20 
(2.54) 
2.93 
 Reversed 4.20 
(2.60) 
2.47 
(1.77) 
3.33 
Overall Mean:  3.93 2.33  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 52.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Self-Report of Fear in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 38.40 38.40 6.48 .01 
:Response Success: 1 2.40 2.40 .41 .53 
Attack Location and Response 
Success: 
1 .27 .27 .05 .83 
Residual: 56 331.87 5.93   
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 There was no significant difference between the groups of respondents in their 
report of anger (Tables 53 and 54).  The mean level of anger reported for those told of an 
attack in the US (M=6.03) was higher than when in Italy (M=4.73).  The level of anger 
reported between the groups given the different probabilities of success for the options 
of response were very similar (historically-based: M=5.03, reversed: M=5.73). 
 
TABLE 53.  Mean Self-Report of Anger in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
Based 
5.67 
(2.94) 
4.40 
(3.58) 
5.03 
 Reversed 6.40 
(2.47) 
5.07 
(3.13) 
5.73 
Overall Mean:  6.03 4.73  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 54.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Self-Report of Anger in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 25.35 25.35 2.71 .11 
Response Success: 1 7.35 7.35 .79 .38 
Attack Location and Response 
Success: 
1 .01 .02 .00 .97 
Residual: 56 523.47 9.35   
 
 
 
 The respondents also did not report any significant levels of sadness between the 
four conditions (Tables 55 and 56).  Divided between the two probabilities of success of 
responses there was very little difference (expected: M=5.30; unexpected: M=5.47).  
Those told of the attack in the US reported an almost one point higher level of sadness 
(M=5.83) than when it occurred in Italy (M=4.93). 
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TABLE 55.  Mean Self-Report of Sadness in Response to the Attack as a Function of Its 
Location and Response Success (N=60) 
 Response Success: Attack Location: Overall Mean: 
  US Italy  
Historically-
Based 
6.13 
(2.64) 
4.47 
(3.60) 
5.30 
 Reversed 5.53 
(2.45) 
5.40 
(2.97) 
5.47 
Overall Mean:  5.83 4.93  
Note: Main entries are the respondents’ mean preferences ratings on a scale of 0-10; entries in parentheses 
are standard deviations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 56.  ANOVA Summary Table for the Effects of Terrorist Attack Location and 
Response Success on Self-Report of Sadness in Response to the Attack 
Condition: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square: F-Value: P-Value: 
Attack Location: 1 12.15 12.15 1.40 .24 
Response Success: 1 .42 .42 .05 .83 
Attack Location and 
Response Success: 
1 8.82 8.82 1.02 .32 
Residual: 56 486.80 8.69   
 
 
 
 A review of the correlation matrix of the relationships between the respondents’ 
self-report of several emotions and their preferences for each of the four possible 
response options (Table 57) indicate several significant relationships, very similar to 
those in the other experiments in the previous chapters, between the level of anger, fear, 
and the preferences for the four option responses.  There was a very significant (p<.01) 
and positive correlation (.42) between the respondents’ reported level of anger and their 
preference for the unilateral-military option.  A significant (p<.01) and positive 
correlation (.45) also existed between the level of anger reported and respondents’ 
preference for the multilateral-military option. 
 Additionally, the respondents’ preference for the unilateral-legal option was 
significant (p<.02) and positively correlated (.30) with their report of anger.  Unique to 
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the respondents’ preference for this option compared with the other three, is the 
significant (p<.05) but negative relationship (-.26) with their self-report of shock.  There 
did not appear to be any significant correlation between the respondents’ preference for 
the multilateral-legal option and their report of any of the selected emotions.   
 
TABLE 57.  Correlation Matrix of Four Responses and Reported Emotions 
in the Third Experiment (N=60) 
 Unilateral-Military 
Multilateral-
Military 
Unilateral
-Legal 
Multilateral-
Legal Fear Anger 
Multilateral
-Military .42**      
Unilateral-
Legal .33* .14     
Multilateral
-Legal -.13 -.05 -.01    
Fear .18 .22 .12 .11   
Anger .42** .45** .30* -.09 .56**  
Sadness .02 .04 -.05 .02 .34** .40** 
*p<.05.  **p<.01. 
 
 
Discussion 
 The strongest and most consistent result across all of the analyses is that the 
respondents did not appear to be responding “emotionally” to the terrorist attacks in such 
a way that they were preferring counter-terrorism policies without considering the 
probability of success.  The respondents appeared to be considering, relatively carefully 
and “rationally,” the probability of success of the various response-choices when 
indicating their preferences for them.  The respondents do not appear to have been 
simply selecting the strongest response to the terrorism regardless of its chance for 
success.  Furthermore, when there was a stronger preference for a response it was 
 99
generally for the multilateral and legal options which had higher probabilities for 
success.   
 The analysis of the preferences for each of the four options for a response to the 
attack suggests that the respondents were relatively careful in their preference of the 
options depending upon the indicated probability of success of the options.  The 
respondents had an increased preference for the options the higher the probability of its 
success.  The respondents were apparently not “simply” indicating a preference for an 
option simply because they preferred it for some other reason such as emotion.  This is 
contrary to the hypothesized reaction which suggested the respondents would prefer the 
stronger responses based upon an emotional reaction.  It is worth noting, however, that 
the respondents did seem to indicate a slightly higher preference for the options when 
the attacks occurred in the US than in Italy, which is consistent with the hypotheses.  
Overall, the respondents appeared to be calmly and “rationally” considering their 
preferences for the options. 
 The repeated measures, which provided a more comprehensive analysis of the 
respondents’ preferences for the options by combining and analyzing them together, 
indicated more noticeably the pattern of the respondents preferring options depending 
upon their probability of success.  Additionally, the respondents indicated a higher 
preference for an option based upon its rank order of probability of success, the higher 
the probability of success of an option, the higher the rate of preference for it when 
compared with preferences for options which had average probabilities of success.  The 
degree of preference for the options seemed to closely rise and fall with the probability 
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of success of the option itself, and when these probabilities were present their 
preferences did not appear influenced by the location of the attack.   
Furthermore, the analysis of the preference for the options when they were 
divided between unilateral/multilateral and legal/military, appear to indicate a preference 
for multilateral and legal options across the differences in probability of success and 
location of the attack.  Although, there was relatively consistent support for the 
unilateral-legal option regardless of its probability of success, perhaps indicating a 
preconceived level of support on the part of the respondents for the deliberative and 
logical legal action which still retained self-control measures by being unilateral.   
Thus, when the respondents did prefer to respond, not only did they prefer 
options with a higher probability of success, but also options which were more 
sophisticated.  The preference for the multilateral and legal options further suggests the 
respondents were careful and deliberate in their analysis of the possible policy options 
for responding to the terrorist attacks.  The legal options suggest more deliberative and 
comprehensive responses which are complex and which may produce an outcome less 
favourable than initially desired (the terrorists are found not guilty and set free to 
terrorize further).  Alternatively, the legal response, especially when done multilaterally, 
has the possibility of providing a more comprehensive and lasting solution satisfactory 
to more parties, and which might prevent terrorism for a longer period of time.  The 
respondents, by indicating a preference for multilateral options, could also be interpreted 
as signaling their acceptance for international cooperation in dealing with terrorism, 
which would require a significant amount of trust on the part of respondents’ for other 
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states over the respondents’ own personal security from terrorists.  This level of trust is 
significant in-and-of-itself because it indicates that terrorism is not generating the level 
of fear designed to drive an overreaction on the part of government to the terrorists, 
which was their goal initially, thereby generating dissention between a population and 
their government allowing for conditions for the terrorists to achieve their political goals.  
That the respondents would consider these factors and still prefer these options would 
suggest that they are not responding quickly and emotionally to the terrorist attacks.  The 
respondents are carefully considering the options and attempting to indicate a preference 
for those responses they believe are the best, not the most satisfying.   
 The analysis of the emotions further supports these conclusions indicating no 
significant report of emotion upon the part of the respondents in response to the attacks 
during their consideration of the various options and their probability of success.  All of 
the indicators of respondents’ emotions suggested levels which were relatively minimal 
and stable. 
 In summary, the findings of this experiment suggest that the respondents were 
not responding emotionally to the terrorist attacks; they were not simply “lashing out” 
and preferring the use of the most violent responses possible.  The respondents appeared 
to be calm and thoughtful when considering how they wanted to respond to the 
terrorism.  They appear to have considered the utility or probable success of the options 
available.  As a result of this rational behaviour the respondents appear to have had a 
greater preference for the legal and multilateral options.  If and when emotion was 
 102
involved it appears to have been associated with the respondents’ preference for the 
unilateral and military options.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
EXPERIMENT SUMMARY 
 
 The intention of this study has been to understand why governments sometimes 
switch from the normal law enforcement response to terrorism and use more “drastic” 
military force.  The results from the three experiments seem to suggest that the most 
important factors which determine when this alternation will occur is the location of the 
attack and the probability of success of the response.  When the attack occurs at home in 
the US compared with abroad in Italy, the respondents had stronger preferences for the 
aggregate responses.  The responses they preferred most across all of the terrorist attack 
situations provided in all three of the experiments were the legal responses over military; 
and then, between their two orientations, the respondents preferred the multilateral over 
unilateral options.   
The socio-cultural similarity of the terrorists had some impact upon the 
preferences of the respondents in that the respondents did indicate an almost 
significantly higher preference for the legal and multilateral options in response to 
terrorist attacks by socio-culturally similar terrorists.  This was presumably because the 
respondents felt more knowledgeable and, thus, more comfortable with, the similar 
terrorists who could then be dealt with by the more complex and deliberative legal 
processes involving other countries.   
 Whether the terrorist attacks were successful or mere attempts had no influence 
upon the respondents’ preferences for any of the possible responses.  This result was 
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quite surprising given the important distinction with respect to punishment made in the 
American legal system between attempted versus successful crime, the latter receiving 
much harsher punishment.  One could argue that this represents a perception on the part 
of respondents that terrorism, whether attempted or successful, is different from more 
common “everyday” criminal activity.  The focus of targets of terrorism then is on the 
intentions and messages of the terrorists rather than on the consequences of the actual 
acts, understandable given the psychological nature of the tactic of terrorism which is 
designed to use its terror aspect to manipulate mass political behaviour.  This result thus 
indicates the respondents’ preferences to respond equally to attempted and successful 
terrorism. 
The respondents’ reports of anger were significantly correlated with a preference 
for the military options; there were no significant reports of any of the emotions in 
response to any of the experimental conditions of the terrorist attacks throughout the 
experiment.  Overall, the respondents appeared to be acting calmly and rationally in 
response to the attacks, choosing the “more contemplative” legal and multilateral 
options.   
This assertion that the respondents were acting rationally and without significant 
emotion in preferring certain responses to the terrorism is further supported by the third 
experiment which provided significant results suggesting that the respondents were 
indicating preferences for the options based primarily upon the options’ probability of 
success.  Thus, when the respondents were given the options for responding to the 
terrorist attacks with the addition of having a certain probability of success, the 
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respondents indicated higher preferences for the options the greater its probability of 
success.  This was an interesting finding methodologically speaking because the 
respondents were given the options individually instead of as a group, and they 
consistently indicated a stronger preference for options with higher probabilities of 
success.  Furthermore, not only were the respondents rationally choosing options based 
upon their probability of success, but they were also choosing the legal options (arguably 
more deliberative processes which take longer and have the possibility of letting guilty 
terrorists go free) which were multilateral (adding even more complexity to the response 
by involving other countries).   
The literature review suggested that terrorist attacks would cause emotional 
reactions amongst the targeted population, and this study examined whether or not that 
reaction would be strong enough to cause respondents to prefer unilateral and military 
options.  The results suggest that the respondents (if they reacted emotionally to a 
terrorist attack) were not so influenced by emotions to prefer the unilateral and military 
options, nor were they so influenced by emotion as to act irrationally and ignore the 
possibility of success.  Have the respondents been desensitized by recent terrorism 
events such as 9/11 that they do not respond emotionally or irrationally towards the issue 
of terrorism, or do targets of terrorism, regardless of the quality of the acts of terrorism 
itself, always act rationally and calmly towards these issues of threats to national 
security? 
One could argue that the results from these experiments are consistent with 
recent historical events regarding responses to terrorism.  The US had relatively broad 
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popular support when it responded with military force (which one could argue was really 
quite multilateral in nature given the broad cooperation with the native Afghani forces) 
in Afghanistan to the attacks of 9/11 which occurred at home in the US.  Alternatively, 
one could argue there was less popular support for relatively “unilateral”-military action 
in response to a “merely-possible, distant and poorly articulated” threat of an attack of 
terrorism from Iraq.  These are issues seemingly well suited for a discussion in a case 
study.   
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CHAPTER IX 
CASE STUDY 
 
The responses of US government officials to terrorist threats in recent history 
appear consistent, for the most part, with those of the respondents to the simulated 
terrorist attacks in the experiments detailed in the previous chapters.  In response to 
attempted terrorist attacks at home and abroad (the first World Trade Center Bombing in 
1993, and the breakup of the Bojinka terrorist plot in the Philippines and the subsequent 
arrest of its mastermind Ramzi Yousef two months later), as well as successful terrorist 
attacks abroad (the attacks on the Khobar Towers housing US military personnel in 
Saudi Arabia), the US government’s response was primarily (although not entirely) of a 
multilateral-legal or law enforcement nature.  Successful terrorist attacks occurring 
within the US, specifically the September 11 attacks, solicited an almost immediate 
“unilateral”-military response.  The historical description of how the US government 
chose to respond in the manner it did in the above four cases is studied in this chapter. 
 This study began with the question of why the variation in the different 
responses, either uni- or multilateral and legal or military, of the US reaction to terrorist 
attacks.  The hypotheses were that a decisionmaker’s preference (believed to be driven 
in-part by his or her emotional response) to choose one response over another is 
influenced (subconsciously) by the success and location of the attack, the identity of the 
respondents, and the probability of success of the response.  No specific evidence exists 
(at least not in any large enough volume to allow for any meaningful quantitative 
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statistical testing) to state or to infer that the political leaders and decisionmakers of the 
US government were knowingly or admittedly influenced by these factors in choosing 
their responses to terrorism.   
 The experiments in the previous chapters allowed for the quantitative testing of 
whether or not the above specific elements of a terrorist attack had any influence upon 
respondents’ preferences for one type of response over another.  The advantage of the 
experiments is that they allow for the testing of the influence of specific elements and 
factors in particular political decisionmaking situations.  Some scholars argue that the 
primary disadvantage of this method is that it lacks external validity: decisionmaking in 
reality is a much more complicated process influenced by many other important 
elements and factors, or the context, not easily replicated or present in the experimental 
setting.   
 Case studies in which one analyzes a series of actions and decisions occurring 
during certain historical events, argue other scholars, suffer from the opposite problem 
of experiments: there are an overwhelming and unlimited number of elements and 
factors present in the events examined that rigorous and scientific analysis of the 
influence of elements and factors on these events seems virtually impossible.  
Combining both the experimental and case studies methods, however, could help to 
alleviate the problems of both.  Once hypotheses have been examined using 
experimental methods, they then can be evaluated using the case study method in which 
historical events are examined for the influence of those specific variables developed 
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from the experiment(s).  This process allows for a more rigorous, disciplined and 
sophisticated case study. (George and Bennett, 2005) 
Methodology: Process Tracing and Congruence 
 With specific variables examined in the experimental sections, the hypotheses 
now can be evaluated in the context of historical cases using the confluence of two 
methods of case study research: the process-tracing and congruence methods.   
 The process-tracing method involves providing a detailed description of a 
historical event, specifically including details which illustrate how the chain of events 
occurred in a manner as predicted by the chosen variables of study.  In other words, one 
traces the process of how decisionmakers made their decision as they were influenced by 
the variables in a particular manner and with the predicted result. (George, 1979:105) 
 The congruence method consists of describing, in greater detail than the process-
tracing method, how specific events or resulting decisions are consistent or congruent 
with the variables predicting that particular outcome.  The congruence method focuses 
on comparing the variables in relation to specific events, in contrast to the more general 
description of the events the process-tracing method provides, by describing a 
confluence of events (or the elements of an event) in light of the variables. (George, 
1979:105)  
 The combination of the two methods yields a description of the process by which 
political decisionmakers arrived at a decision on how to respond to the acts of terrorism 
as they were influenced by the variables, but with greater and more detailed analysis of 
how the variables influenced each of the decisions in the process. 
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Case Selection 
 As illustrated in Table 58, there have been throughout the past century 
approximately 21 acts of international terrorism involving the United States which are 
appropriate for study in this thesis; this is a relatively limited number.   
 
 
TABLE 58.  List of International Terrorism Events Involving the US 
No. Date Event Outcome Location Identity DepVar./R
esponse 
1 1898 USS Maine Success ? Similar? Mil 
2 1920 Wall Street Bombing/ 
Sacco and Vanzetti 
Success Home Dissimilar Lgl 
3 1979 Iranian Embassy Success Abroad Dissimilar Mil 
4 1983/83 Beirut Bombings  Success Abroad Dissimilar Mil 
5 1982-92 Beirut Kidnappings Success Abroad Dissimilar Mil 
6 1985 TWA 847 Success Abroad Dissimilar Mil 
7 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Success Abroad Dissimilar Mil 
8 1988 Pan Am 103 Success Abroad Dissimilar Lgl 
9 1993 First WTC Bombing Attempt Home Dissimilar Lgl 
10 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing Success Home Similar Lgl 
11 1995 Bojinka/Yousef Attempt Abroad Dissimilar Lgl 
12 1996 Khobar Towers 
Bombing 
Success Abroad Dissimilar Lgl. 
13 1996 TWA 800 (initial 
speculation) 
Success Home Dissimilar Lgl 
14 1998 Africa Embassy 
Bombings 
Success Abroad Dissimilar Mil 
15 2000 Millennium Bombings Attempt Home Dissimilar Lgl. 
16 2000 USS Cole Success Abroad Dissimilar Lgl. 
17 2001 9/11 Success Home Dissimilar Mil 
18 2001 Las Vegas Attempt? Home Dissimilar Lgl 
19 2002 R.Reid/Shoe bomber Attempt ?12 Dissimilar Lgl 
20 2004 Madrid Bombings Success Abroad Dissimilar Lgl 
21 2005 London Bombings Success Abroad Dissimilar Lgl 
22 2006 Transatlantic flight/ 
sports drink bombings 
Attempt ?12 Dissimilar Lgl 
 
                                                 
12 While these events occurred/would occur on “American soil” of US Airlines, the planes were over 
international waters or British airspace, hence the question mark. 
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In selecting cases for study of how government officials and their constituents 
(whose views government decisionmakers would consider in choosing a politically 
popular response) responded to the acts of terrorism (whether they chose a uni- or multi-
lateral, legal or military response), in relation to the independent variables of attack 
success, attack location, and terrorist identity, four cases were selected in accordance 
with those independent variables.  The cases were chosen to provide variation upon the 
independent variable and to minimize any selection bias possible from inclusion based 
upon the dependent variable.  Again, practically speaking, there is always a target for a 
military attack against a terrorist, even if it is the apartment of a single terrorist in a 
friendly country.  Realistically, however, who and/or which nation-state is responsible 
for an attack (and thus whom to target for a response) is not easily recognizable.  There 
also may be diplomatic repercussions from carrying out the destruction of that apartment 
making it prohibitive should the involvement of the responsible government be 
discovered.  This study included two cases where those responsible for the attacks (the 
Khobar bombing and 9/11) were reconizable and two where one could not easily 
recognize who was responsible (the first WTC bombing and the Bojinka plot).  There are 
apparently no recorded cases of international terrorist attacks by socio-culturally similar 
terrorists, thus the examination of this variable was dropped.   
The fourth variable, whether the probability of success of the option was 
considered and/or influenced the decisionmakers in selecting a particular response, is 
also noted.  However, the probability of success of an option may have less bearing on 
which responses are evaluated initially and more on what is finally selected after the first 
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three variables already have narrowed the number of choices which politically would be 
popular. 
Four cases were selected for study.  The first World Trade Center attack in 1993 
is classified as an attempted (because it failed to have the intended result) terrorist attack 
at home.  The Bojinka bomb plot (often cited as the forerunner to the September 11 
attacks) and the resulting arrest of its mastermind Ramzi Yousef is the case selected for 
the attempted terrorist attack abroad.  The bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi 
Arabia in 1996 is selected as the successful terrorist attack abroad.  The September 11 
attacks are selected as the successful terrorist attack at home.  In all instances the 
terrorists were socio-culturally dissimilar to Americans, although this variable was not 
considered.   
First World Trade Center Bombing 
 On February 26, 1993 at 12:17 P.M. a rented cargo panel-van packed with a 
1,500 pound (enhanced with hydrogen gas canisters) urea-nitrate-fuel-oil mixture bomb 
exploded in an underground parking garage under the World Trade Center in New York 
City.  The bomb destroyed several levels of the parking lot and instantly killed six 
people who were sitting down to lunch in their various offices located in that area.  The 
copious amounts of thick black smoke produced by the bomb and resulting fires rose up 
into the two towers burning and suffocating thousands of occupants.  This in turn caused 
the panicked evacuation of those victims, many of whom were seriously injured in the 
melee of the ensuing escape. (Lance, 2003:114-9; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008; 
Miller et al., 2002:95) 
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 The bombing was arguably the culmination of elements which could be traced 
back to any number of events in history.  Some authors would suggest that it began with 
events in Egypt, and with radical Islamic extremists angered enough by several different 
events in history that they decided to conduct violent action against their perceived 
enemies.  The first event which angered these extremists was the creation of the 
religiously “antithetical” State of Israel, which is believed to have triggered the advent of 
the modern radical Islamic extremist movement by providing them with a raison d’être.  
These extremists also became increasingly angry with what they perceived as their own 
corrupt socialist Egyptian government and its actions to limit the power of the 
extremists. (Lance, 2003:22-47; Miller et al., 2002:38-68)  
Concomitantly, the radical Islamists became involved in the effort to remove the 
“godless” Soviets from the Muslim country of Afghanistan.  Supported with weapons 
and training from the US, the fight in Afghanistan created a large number of militant and 
experienced extremist fighters, who would then return to their home countries ten years 
later emboldened after their successes in Afghanistan.  The radical Islamic organizations 
that worked with the CIA and which recruited, trained, supported and controlled the 
fighters, however, remained intact and looked for other battles to fight in the name of 
Islam.  The leaders of one of these particular groups included: Osama bin Laden, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. (Lance, 2003:22-47; Miller et al., 2002:38-
68) 
 In 1981, the extremists finally were so angered by President Sadat’s signing of a 
peace treaty with Israel (their mortal enemy), they organized to assassinate Sadat.  The 
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Egyptian Government’s response to the assassination was a relatively strong action 
against the Islamic Extremists: arresting, trying, and executing many.  Some later were 
released from prison, and many left the country.  One of those was Sheik Omar Abdel 
Rahman, a “fiery” and blind Islamic cleric, who is believed to be the leader of the 
specific group of radical Islamists who assassinated Sadat.  Rahman, however, also had 
been working with the CIA in the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  In 
appreciation for this cooperation, the CIA arranged for him to obtain a visa to live in the 
US.  Unfortunately, those who helped obtain the visa did not realize that Rahman and his 
followers did not have any positive views for the US even after receiving American 
support in Afghanistan.  Instead, Rahman and his followers, including most of their 
other Islamic extremist comrades who had fought in Afghanistan, actually blamed the 
US for the Egyptian government’s oppression of them, along with its support of Israel.  
Now in the US, Rahman and his supporters began to take steps to attack and weaken the 
US from within. (Lance, 2003:22-47; Miller et al., 2002:38-68) 
 One of the first acts of violence Rahman and his supporters carried out, besides 
murdering the moderate Muslims in their new mosques who opposed them, was the 
assassination of the radical Jewish Rabbi, Meir Kahane.  One of Rahman’s followers 
who carried out the attack, was later acquitted of the charges of killing Kahane due to 
“errors” on the part of the police and city prosecutors, although he was convicted and 
received an eight year sentence on weapons charges.  Rahman and his followers, 
however, were frustrated in their efforts to commit terrorism in the US due to a lack of 
experience and resources.  As a result they asked for more help from bin Laden and his 
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network, who in turn sent additional funds and, more importantly, a man by the name of 
Ramzi Yousef.  Yousef would become a key figure in understanding all future terrorist 
attacks against the US. (Miller et al., 2002:80; Lance, 2003) 
 Yousef is from an area of Pakistan which was home to a significant population of 
Islamic extremists who had been heavily involved in the fight with the Soviets in 
Afghanistan.  Yousef had gone to university in Kuwait where he studied engineering in 
addition to which he received extensive training in espionage and bomb-making during 
the fight with the Soviets.  He was also half-Palestinian, of which he was extremely 
proud, expressing a desire to carry out violence, and he did so, against any of those 
whom he deemed to support the “Israeli oppression” of the Palestinians. (Lance, 
2003:22-47; Miller et al., 2002:38-68) 
 Yousef arrived in New York on September 1, 1992.  He immediately set to work 
with Rahman’s supporters planning terrorist attacks.  Yousef and his compatriots began 
scouting out various targets for a possible attack, and while several were considered, the 
World Trade Center was chosen.  An area at a storage locker in New Jersey was found to 
build the bomb, and ingredients for the bomb were purchased from various chemical 
supply companies.  Two days before the attack one member of the group rented a van 
from a rental agency in New Jersey.  Late in the day before the bombing, Yousef and the 
three men helping him loaded the bomb into the van and drove to a location in Brooklyn 
closer to New York.  The next morning Yousef and a partner, followed by a third in a 
second separate car, drove to the World Trade Center, arriving around noon.  They 
parked the van with the bomb in an area where Yousef intended to destroy one of the 
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support beams for one of the two buildings.  Yousef hoped this would cause one 
building to collapse and crash into the other causing both to collapse.  He had considered 
adding cyanide gas to the bomb to kill those not directly killed by the explosion, but 
decided against it because he thought it would complicate the bomb.  Yousef lit the fuse 
for the bomb, which was designed to burn for twelve minutes before setting it off at 
approximately 12:17 P.M.  The two then got into the second car and fled the scene 
heading to New Jersey after stopping to mail letters which claimed responsibility for the 
attack.  They stopped on the New Jersey shoreline to view the results of their bombing; 
but, with a mere plume of smoke visible, Yousef was furious to see the towers still 
standing.  After that, Yousef returned to his apartment in New Jersey and changed his 
appearance.  He then headed to JFK Airport and boarded a flight back to Pakistan. 
(Lance, 2003:113-33) 
 Although, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been conducting 
surveillance on Rahman and his followers, including the use of an undercover agent, and 
although they had intelligence that some type of terrorism was going to happen, the 
investigation/intelligence-operation was halted several months beforehand.  This was 
believed to have been due to internal bureaucratic politics and ignorance, of the threat 
radical Islamic terrorists posed, within the FBI.  Many authors have suggested that had 
the investigation continued, the bombing could have been stopped; and, as a result this 
could have prevented the later terrorist attacks including the September 11attacks. 
(Lance, 2003: Miller et al., 2002) 
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The Response 
 The immediate response to the explosion at the World Trade Center was 
relatively routine and relatively unremarkable.  The first to respond to the explosion 
were the New York City Fire and Police Departments (FDNY and NYPD).  Some of the 
FBI agents whose responsibility it was to investigate terrorism, had even felt the 
vibrations from the blast while having lunch.  Their reaction was to return to their office 
and to listen to the NYPD radio communications.  The initial assessment as to what had 
happened, and, for several days, what was considered the official cause of the blast, was 
the explosion of a transformer in a train station underneath the towers. (Lance, 2003:119; 
Miller et al., 2002:97) 
 The then member of the National Security Council responsible for terrorism 
issues, Richard Clarke, who had been asked to remain in that position by the new 
Clinton presidential administration, was still dealing with the transition of the new 
administration when the National Security Advisor Anthony Lake called him to ask 
about the explosion.  The President apparently had tasked the National Security Advisor 
to monitor the event and has allowed the pertinent agencies to have the primary 
responsibility for handling and responding to it.  Clarke, who had no knowledge of the 
incident, told Lake they were still gathering information about it.  Clarke then contacted 
the watch center which monitored all major events; its commander was unsure if he was 
supposed to contact Clarke regarding the incident since it had occurred domestically, not 
abroad, and most people did not believe terrorism would occur domestically.  Clarke 
assured him that he was to be informed, but there was still no information except that it 
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might be a transformer explosion.  Clarke had to get his colleague who dealt with illicit 
narcotics to contact his police contacts in the NYPD, who in-turn told him of their 
suspicion that it might be a bomb. (Clarke, 2004:74-7) 
 As part of the automatic response on the part of the NYPD to such a large event, 
especially an event which appeared to be an explosion, was the inclusion of the 
department bomb squad.  Based upon their initial assessment upon arriving at the scene 
just after the explosion, they suggested that it was a large truck bomb.  As soon as the 
agents in the FBI who investigate terrorism learned of that determination from the 
police, they, in the form of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) commanded by Neil 
Hermann, arrived at the scene, took command of the investigation, and set up a 
command post in a building across the street.  In the meantime, another agent within that 
unit opened a case file for the investigation and gave it the name TRADEBOM; a 
description of the file and the event would be sent throughout the FBI.  In his description 
of the event, this agent described it as a non-middle eastern terrorist bombing because 
this was seen by the agents in the New York office as the first terrorist bombing outside 
the Middle East, and because, more importantly, none of them believed that middle 
easterners were willing or capable of carrying out such an event. (Lance, 2003:113; 
Miller et al., 2002:99-101) 
 A senior FBI agent with extensive experience in explosive devices then took over 
recovery of evidence from the blast site itself the day after the blast, leading a team of 
bomb disposal and crime scene investigators from a variety of local, state and federal 
agencies.  One of the first investigators lowered into the blast crater, which was a 
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hundred feet wide and several stories high, was a member of the NYPD Bomb Squad, 
Don Sadowy.  Sadowy noticed a piece of a truck axle which was located in the crater in 
such a manner that he intuitively suspected it had come from the vehicle which held the 
bomb; and, furthermore, it was a piece of the vehicle which would have a copy of the 
vehicle’s unique identification number (specifically a C-VIN: a specially hidden and 
coded version of the VIN designed to evade the detection of car thieves).  Although the 
supervisors had specifically ordered the investigators not to retrieve any physical 
evidence, Sadowy took the car part with him, catalogued and sent it to the NYPD and 
then the FBI forensics lab.  A few hours later the lab was able to retrieve the VIN and 
identify the vehicle as the van rented from a company in New Jersey by one of Yousef’s 
accomplices for carriage of the bomb. (Miller et al., 2002:101-3) 
The investigators would now get a very lucky break in the case when the 
conspirator who had rented the van, Mohammed Salameh, decided to attempt to retrieve 
his security deposit for the van, calling the rental company, telling them the van had 
been stolen and demanding his deposit back.  The rental company, now cooperating with 
the FBI, told Salameh to come in to the agency to pick up his deposit.  When Salameh 
arrived at the agency to pick up his deposit he was arrested. (Miller et al.,2002:104-6) 
Once the FBI began to question Salameh and to investigate his background, 
investigators realized that he previously had been surveilled and photographed with 
Rahman and his followers during the previous investigation which had been shut down 
by FBI supervisors for internal bureaucratic political reasons.  After executing a search 
warrant on Salameh’s apartment, the FBI found evidence linking him to other 
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conspirators; one was arrested at his New York apartment while another was arrested 
and extradited from Egypt (to where he had fled shortly after the bombing).  The FBI 
began to discover the identities of most of those responsible for the bombing, including 
Yousef. (Lance, 2003:133-5) 
At 1:00 A.M. on February 27, the night of the explosion, command of the 
response to the explosion appeared to go from the FBI to the US Attorney’s Office under 
the direction of the famously competent and most senior assistant US attorney in the 
Manhattan office, Mary Jo White.  White ordered a briefing from all of the investigators 
and was stunned to learn that the FBI previously had been investigating and surveilling 
Rahman and his followers who now were believed to be responsible for the bombing, 
but the FBI had stopped due to the bureaucratic political infighting.  White now ordered 
the FBI and the JTTF to restart its investigation into all of the suspect Islamic extremist 
groups. (Lance, 2003:136)  The investigation then would reemploy the undercover agent 
whom they previously had let go and they would uncover the entire plot of Rahman and 
his followers to bomb several more targets in New York; for these, they all would be 
successfully prosecuted.  The investigators also would discover that Yousef had been the 
mastermind behind the bombing and they would begin a massive international manhunt 
to capture him. (2003:188).  Although the investigations and prosecutions would 
ultimately be successful, the investigators still were plagued by bureaucratic infighting 
within the FBI, and between the Bureau and other agencies (161).  Furthermore, the FBI 
continued to downplay the capabilities of Yousef and the others, calling them mere 
amateurs (143).  Many believe that had the FBI continued the original investigation, 
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which would have required taking the threat from Rahman and his follower seriously as 
well as acting in a more professional and less petty manner, it could have prevented the 
original World Trade Center bombing…and more (158). 
Meanwhile, Clarke called a meeting of the Counterterrorism Security Group of 
the National Security Council, which he chaired.  The representatives from the FBI and 
the CIA presented the basic information that the bombing might be connected to 
Rahman and Yousef, but no analyst or agent from any of the various national security 
agencies in the federal government had any further information, nor had any of them 
heard of these people earlier. (Clarke, 2004: 77-9) 
The response of average citizens to the blast appeared to be mostly concern with 
the safety features of the World Trade Center and the emergency response to the 
explosion; and, there was less interest in the investigation into the bombing and the issue 
of muslim extremism.  There appears to have been little expressed anger or calls for 
revenge against those responsible.  The concern over the safety of the towers focused on 
the lack of emergency escape plans and proper emergency equipment in the buildings, as 
well as the wisdom of building such high towers (Editors,1993a and 1993b; Field, 1993; 
McCutchen, 1993; and, Tamir, 1993).  Some also raised concerns about the 
psychological effects of the bombing on children, while others applauded the efforts of 
rescue workers (Editors, 1993c; and, Menzel and Schafer, 1993).  The remaining 
responses appear to be concerned with ensuring that serious, thorough and 
comprehensive investigations be made into the bombing, as well as thorough 
examinations into muslim extremism cautioning against widespread discrimination of all 
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Muslims (Hoagland, 1993; Editors, 1993d and 1993e; Safire, 1993; Bayoumi, 1993; 
Yaacobi, 1993; and, Narkiss, 1993).   
Since Yousef was now an internationally wanted fugitive, his role in the bombing 
became better known over the next few months of investigation, and agents from the 
Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) at the US State Department became involved in the 
case, issuing a $2million reward for information leading to Yousef’s arrest as well as 
issuing an Interpol Alert on Yousef.  Bureaucratic infighting over the Yousef case also 
occurred at the State Department with senior state department administrators and 
diplomats, led by the infamous Barbara Bodine (who later would become known for 
stimying the investigation of the FBI and NCIS into the bombing of the USS Cole), 
chastising the DSS agents for issuing the reward and trying to capture Yousef because 
she feared these actions might offend muslims and hurt the US image abroad. (Lance, 
2003:214) 
Analysis 
 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the American response to the first World 
Trade Center bombing is the lack of a response based upon what appears to be cognitive 
dissonance on the part of political decisionmakers.  The political decisionmakers in the 
US had not even considered the possibility of a terrorist attack, let alone one by 
foreigners on US soil.  They did not even appear to have a structure to consider and 
formulate a response, as was illustrated when the White House situation room did not 
even know whom to tell about a domestic terrorist attack.   
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In the experiments in the previous chapters, the respondents had a greater 
preference for the use of the military option in response to a domestic terrorist attack; 
but, in this case the official response was a simpler law enforcement response.  The 
reason for this inconsistent response appears to be that most of the political 
decisionmakers with responsibility for responding to this attack simply could not fathom 
that middle eastern terrorists had the competence or the desire to attack the US 
homeland, let alone that there could even be a truck bomb at the World Trade Center.  
Public opinion also was very limited, and there appeared to be no widespread public 
support for any kind of military retaliation but more of an assumption that a normal law 
enforcement investigation would ensue.  Thus, when the explosion did occur the 
response was going to be a basic law enforcement response, regardless of the evidence, 
because of the continuing ignorance on the part of political decisionmakers.  If the FBI 
and other national security agencies had considered the possibility of Islamic terrorists 
attacking the US, and had continued to maintain the collection of information and 
intelligence on these groups regardless of official opinions on the extremists’ 
competence, the question might then be (assuming the FBI had not been able to stop the 
bombing) whether or not the response from the US would have been stronger?  Would 
the US have taken unilateral steps abroad to attack or arrest the Islamic extremists as 
soon as the culprits, with their bases in Afghanistan, had been identified? 
 Also interesting was the role of the attack being a “mere attempt.”  Although the 
terrorists knew their bombing had failed, the US authorities did not, but it did not seem 
to have much of an effect on American decisionmakers because their response was 
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limited, albeit relatively enthusiastic and eager, to a law enforcement response.  If the 
bomb had inflicted the damage Yousef intended and caused the collapse of the towers, 
one could speculate that this might have overcome the cognitive dissonance on the part 
of the Americans.  It might have made decisionmakers realize that they were targets of 
domestic Islamic terrorists and increased the preference for a military response against 
the overseas supporters of the terrorists.   
The Bojinka Plot and the Resulting Arrest of Ramzi Yousef 
 Arriving in Pakistan after the World Trade Center bombing, Yousef, with the 
help of his uncle, Kahlid Sheik Mohammed, eventually made his way to the Philippines.  
Before he went to the Philippines, however, he accepted an assassination contract from 
local radical Islamists in Pakistan to build several bombs targeting, unsuccessfully, the 
regime of then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  When that failed and he was severely 
injured in the process, Yousef then attempted to obtain a sniper rifle to shoot her at a 
speech, but failed to receive the rifle in time.  Yousef, a Sunni Muslim, also launched a 
successful terrorist attack against Shiite Muslims in Iran. (Lance, 2003:189-91) 
Yousef chose to go to the Philippines in August of 1994 because he had been 
there years earlier (asked to help the Islamic Filipino terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf, with 
training in building bombs), giving him knowledge of the geography, and because he 
thought the Philippines a good location from which to launch attacks against the US and 
its interests, particularly US airliners.  The Philippines also had the unique combination 
of assets useful for Yousef’s plans, including a native Islamic terrorist group, “lax” 
security which would lessen his chances of being detected, and a mostly English-
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speaking population with access to US airline carriers.  In reviewing his first failed 
attack upon the World Trade Center, Yousef had become interested in blowing up 
commercial passenger aircraft after watching a story on CNN about the PanAm103 
bombing by two Libyan agents.  He wanted to produce explosives which would be 
undetected by security screeners at an airport, but which still could bring down an 
airliner.  He would call the plan “Bojinka,” or the Serbo-Croatian word (a language he 
had learned from training with his Muslim “brothers” in the former Yugoslavia) for “big 
noise.” (Lance, 2003:199-217)   
 Until November, Yousef, and his partners Abdul Murad, and Wali Shah, were 
searching for a location in which to build Yousef’s bombs.  When the local media 
announced that Pope John Paul II would be visiting Manila in January, Yousef 
immediately declared that he wanted to assassinate the Pope as well as blow up the 
airliners.  Shah then found an apartment at the Dona Josefa Apartment complex on 
President Quirino Boulevard along which the Pope’s motorcade would travel.  As soon 
as they moved into the apartment, Yousef and Murad began building their bombs.  A 
few weeks later, on the first of December, Yousef was ready for the first test of his 
explosives.  He had Shah surreptitiously place a small bomb in a seat at a movie theater 
in Manila later that evening which successfully exploded.  No one was killed, but 
Yousef was thrilled with his success. (Lance, 2003:230-6) 
 A week later on December 11, Yousef boarded a Philippines Airline flight on a 
Boeing 747 from Manila to Cebu city, specifically choosing a flight which would 
continue on to another destination, Narita, Japan, after leaving Cebu.  He easily passed 
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through the security screening with what appeared to be innocuous items normally found 
in a person’s carry-on luggage, including a bottle of contact lens solution.  Once aboard 
the flight to Cebu, Yousef moved around the mostly empty cabin until he sat down in a 
seat he thought the most vulnerable spot on a 747.  Although the flight attendant thought 
Yousef’s behaviour suspicious, she did nothing.  Yousef quickly assembled the bomb 
from the bottle of contact lens solution, which was actually nitroglycerin, cotton balls 
soaked in cellulose (to create gun-cotton), the digital watch he was wearing as the timer, 
and a nine-volt battery, the latter which he had hidden in his shoe to ignite the bomb.  He 
placed the bomb in the pouch underneath his seat which normally held the lifejacket.  
When the flight landed in Cebu, Yousef got off and promptly boarded another flight 
back to Manila.  When the plane, on which Yousef had planted the bomb, was halfway 
to Narita, the bomb exploded killing the young Japanese man sitting in the seat, as well 
as severely damaging the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic lines of the plane.  Miraculously, 
the plane was able to land safely due in no small part to the skill of the pilot.  Yousef had 
made a minor miscalculation in planting the bomb; had he placed it in the seat in front of 
the one he did, the 747 most certainly would have crashed with catastrophic results. 
(Lance, 2003:237; Miller et al., 2002:118) 
 Although the plane was not destroyed as Yousef had hoped, he was extremely 
happy that his bomb had worked.  He and Murad began building more bombs made from 
RDX which they manufactured in their room at the Dona Josefa Apartments.  Yousef’s 
plan was to use his agents, including Shah and Murad, to place the devices on several 
different flights on US carriers on various routes across Asia, setting the timers on the 
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bombs to explode approximately at the same time thereby bringing down all of the 
planes, crippling worldwide air travel, and thus causing damage to the international 
economy from the cessation of international airline flights certain to follow. (Lance, 
2003:255-5)   
 On the night of January 6, however, Yousef and Murad accidentally mixed two 
non-complementary chemicals together in the sink of their apartment which resulted in 
an explosion producing harmless but effusively thick smoke.  As the two fled the room, 
the local fire department arrived.  When the firefighters found no fire they promptly left 
to attend to another fire, but in the meantime, however, the suspicious clerks at the 
apartment had called the police.  Watching from across the street, Yousef sent Murad 
back into the apartment to secure it after they watched the fire department leave, but as 
he reentered the apartment a young policeman arrived and questioned Murad about the 
explosion.  Murad was able to convince him that it had been an innocent accident with 
some firecrackers.  The busy policeman, apparently satisfied, left to attend to another of 
many calls he had to answer that night.  Although confident they had escaped detection, 
Murad and Yousef went to a bar to recover from the night’s excitement and to plan and 
gather the necessary documents and cash for a possible escape. (Lance, 2003:262-6) 
 Once the young policeman arrived back at his station later that evening, however, 
his supervisor, Captain Aida Fariscal, questioned him about the explosion she had sent 
him to investigate.  She became alarmed when he told her it was a harmless accident 
from two “Pakistanis playing with firecrackers.”  Fariscal along with her sergeant and 
the patrolman returned to the apartment.  When she saw the wires, chemicals, and 
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pictures and maps documenting the Pope’s, as well as President Clinton’s, impending 
visits, Fariscal immediately called the bomb squad and had her colleagues evacuate the 
apartment.  At that particular moment, Murad and Yousef arrived back at the apartment.  
Yousef again sent Murad to investigate when he saw the police cars outside.  Murad was 
stopped by Captain Fariscal when the young patrolman pointed him out as the man with 
whom he had spoken with earlier.  When Murad began to sense that his explanation for 
the explosion, which he began to repeat to Fariscal, was not working, he immediately 
took off running but was tackled and handcuffed by the police officers.  Upon witnessing 
this from across the street, Yousef hailed a cab and directed the driver to take him to the 
airport where he caught a flight back to Pakistan. (Lance, 2003: 268-70) 
The Response 
 Almost immediately upon his arrest, Filipino police and intelligence officials 
realized the importance of Murad’s threat, transferring him to a secure detention facility 
run by the Philippine Intelligence Group.  Although, it was never proved, Murad alleges 
that he was subject to severe physical torture for two days, which apparently had no 
effect upon him as he gave up no information.  After most of the senior Philippine 
investigators gave up attempting to obtain any information using torture, they relented 
and allowed a Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza to question Murad.  Mendoza, an experienced 
and competent intelligence specialist and interrogator, was able to get Murad to confess 
to every detail of the plot simply by talking to him and by using basic deception.  Murad 
eventually would tell Mendoza about Yousef and their plot to blow up US airline flights 
transiting Asia, as well as the plot to assassinate the Pope and President Clinton on their 
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future trips to Manila.  Murad also would tell Mendoza about Yousef’s plans to hijack 
US airliners and to crash them into buildings in the US; additionally, he told of Yousef’s 
desire to return to the World Trade Center in New York to destroy it, because he was 
upset that he had failed to do so in the first attempt.  Mendoza would document all of 
this information, and the Philippine Government sent it to all of the relevant US 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. (Lance, 2003:274-7) 
 The information reached Richard Clarke, still the director for counter-terrorism at 
the White House, on the morning of the 8 of January, less than 48 hours after the 
explosion in Yousef and Murad’s apartment in Manila.  Clarke informed the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) of the threat to US airline flights in the Pacific, but the 
FAA would not issue the airlines an order to increase security unless instructed by the 
Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena.  Clarke interrupted a meeting of National 
Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, to inform him of the threat, primarily because of his 
concern over the threat posed by Yousef.  Neither Clarke nor Lake could remember the 
identity of the Secretary of Transportation, however, White House Chief of Staff, Leon 
Panetta, as authorized by the President, simply instructed the FAA to order the change in 
security upon the authority of the President of the US, bypassing the transportation 
secretary who was never located. (Clarke, 2004:93-4)   
The security division of the FAA immediately sent, at approximately 2:00 A.M. 
Eastern Time, warnings about the possible hijacking and/or bombing of the trans-Pacific 
flights on US carriers to the security officers of the airlines which had such flights.  
These officers, in turn, implemented various security measures through their airlines’ 
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operations centers.  US carrier flights already in the air in Asia were ordered to land as 
soon as possible, after which security officials swept the planes looking for explosive 
devices.  Passengers boarding flights from Asia to the US thereafter were not allowed to 
take any liquids on board the aircraft; security screeners at all of the airports searched all 
carry-on luggage at the gates to enforce this measure. (Lance, 2003:283)  There appears 
to have been no significant public response to the averted attack, and no calls for 
increased safety, investigations or military action.13 
 After two months of interrogation in the Philippines by Col. Mendoza, which 
was observed by US FBI agents, Murad was turned over to the FBI in Manila, who then 
brought him back to the US for even further questioning and to eventually stand trial for 
the Bojinka plot (Lance, 2003:280).  For the FBI, there was no new and/or separate 
response to the Bojinka plot.  The agents who had the authority to investigate such a case 
were the members of the JTTF who were already still investigating the first World Trade 
Center bombing under the TRADEBOM case which now included a second follow-on 
case called TERRSTOP investigating all of the other acts of terrorism related to the 
Trade Center attack.  The investigation of Bojinka would be done under the auspices of 
TERRSTOP.  Now under the direction of Assistant US Attorney, Gil Childers, the JTTF 
agents working on TERRSTOP had managed to identify Yousef, Zawahiri, and Osama 
bin Laden as being behind the first Trade Center bombing as well as being involved in 
plotting future attacks against the US. (Miller et al., 2002:137)  As soon as Hermann, the 
agent in charge of the JTTF, heard of the Bojinka plot he immediately assumed that 
                                                 
13 A search of several sources of public opinion at the time of the revelation of the Bojinka plot revealed 
no public response or opinion regarding the attempted attacks. 
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Yousef was behind it.  At that point the US had put out the international advisory and 
reward for information leading to the arrest of Yousef.  Furthermore, the US was 
cooperating with the law enforcement agencies of various countries, most notably 
Yousef’s homeland of Pakistan, to locate and arrest Yousef. (2002:119) 
 Yousef, meanwhile, now back in Pakistan, immediately set to work at 
implementing his Bojinka plot regardless of the failure in Manila.  He approached a 
young Muslim student from South Africa name Istaique Parker who was studying at 
Islamabad University.  Parker, a friend of Yousef’s sister-in-law, was threatened and 
cajoled by Yousef into helping him with his work.  Yousef forced Parker to fly to 
Bangkok with him where they made two bombs which Yousef wanted Parker to check 
separately onto United and Delta Airlines flights bound for the US.  Parker became 
frightened at the moment he was to check the luggage and did not; he latter called 
Yousef to apologize.  Yousef calmly told him not to worry, instructing him to return to 
Pakistan with him where Parker could make up for his hesitation in Bangkok. (Lance, 
2003:284-7) 
 When Parker returned home to his family in Islamabad, he was terrified of 
Yousef whom he realized wanted to kill him.  Parker’s wife helped him decide to 
approach the Americans regarding Yousef, after Parker had seen a “wanted” poster of 
Yousef in a Time magazine article on the flight to Bangkok.  Parker then went to a US 
official in Islamabad the next morning, who in turn contacted the DSS agents at the 
embassy.  DSS agents Jeff Riner and Bill Miller picked up Parker and began questioning 
him.  They contacted the FBI regarding Parker and his connection to Yousef, asking 
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them how they wanted to proceed.  The DSS received no response from the FBI, so the 
director of the DSS instructed his agents to proceed with the case on their own.  Using 
Parker as bait, the DSS agents and two US Drug Enforcement Agency agents along with 
the Pakistani security services tracked down Yousef to an apartment in Islamabad.  At 
9:00am on February 7, the four US agents observed as the Pakistani security agents 
raided the apartment and arrested Yousef.  Prime Minister Bhutto, whom Yousef had 
tried to kill, quickly authorized the extradition of Yousef to the US.  Riner and Miller 
then turned Yousef over to FBI Agent, Brad Garrett, who had just arrived in Pakistan 
working on an unrelated case. (Lance, 2003:288-90) 
 Yousef was then returned to the US where he was successfully prosecuted for the 
first World Trade Center bombing as well as the attempt to blow up the US Airliners in 
his Bojinka plot (Sievert, 2000:65).  As soon as Yousef’s case went to the US Attorney’s 
office, the FBI management considered it closed.  Agents were no longer able to 
continue investigating any other threats, or other persons, who also might have been 
involved with Yousef in plotting terrorism acts against the US.  The FBI has two distinct 
divisions: the national security division that conducted domestic counter-intelligence 
missions against the Soviets during the Cold War and which had many agents who 
wanted to continue to conduct counter-intelligence missions against the Islamic 
extremists, and the larger and more dominant criminal investigation division.  The 
criminal law division had primary responsibility for conducting the investigation and 
prosecution of Yousef and the other Islamic terrorists.  When the criminal division sends 
a case to the US Attorney’s office for prosecution, it closes the case.  The FBI thus did 
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not continue to collect any more information or intelligence on Islamic extremists who 
were threatening acts of terrorism against the US. (Lance, 2003:304-7) 
 The management of the FBI appeared to be primarily concerned with ensuring a 
good public image.  They wanted to ensure the appearance of success, which might 
explain their efforts to prevent more intelligence gathering on the Islamic terrorists; if 
they continued to investigate Yousef and his counterparts, this might suggest that they 
had not been successful in their initial investigation of Yousef. (Lance, 2003:351)  
Furthermore, the FBI managers, to ensure that they got credit for the arrest of Yousef, 
issued the initial press release regarding his arrest and did not mention the names of the 
four agents from the other two agencies who actually made the arrest.  They also 
managed to have the director of the DSS, who authorized his agents to pursue Yousef 
after receiving no response from the FBI, placed under investigation for misconduct as 
retaliation for “usurping” them. (Lance, 2003:288) 
Analysis 
 Consistent with the respondents’ preferences in the experiments, the response to 
Yousef’s attempted attacks on overseas US targets was a multilateral-law enforcement 
response.  Although one could argue that the response was merely a continuation of the 
response to the World Trade Center, the US authorities did respond, separately from the 
TRADEBOM case, to aid and cooperate with the Philippine police when they arrested 
Murad.  The US also conducted the multilateral-law enforcement operation with the 
Pakistanis in locating and arresting Yousef.  The alternative could have been for the US 
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to have used military force to locate and kidnap or kill Yousef in Pakistan with, or 
without (if unilateral), the knowledge or consent of the Pakistanis.   
 Compared with their reaction to the first World Trade Center bombing, the US 
authorities appear to have been much more aware of the threat posed by the attempted 
attacks, even though conducted by the same terrorists, as evidenced by their proactive 
steps to safeguard US air travel in the Pacific and to arrest Yousef abroad, instead of 
simply investigating and collecting evidence regarding the attempted attacks.  According 
to the experiments in the previous chapters, there would be a stronger reaction to the 
attacks at home than abroad, which was not borne out in this case where there appeared 
to be virtually no public response to the attempted attacks.  One could argue, however, 
that the response was still a somewhat restrained law enforcement response given the 
FBI continued to treat the threat as a criminal enterprise and the FAA concerned itself 
with Asia-Pacific flights only.  Could, or should the US have considered a stronger 
multi-lateral law enforcement response than it enacted?  If the US had done so, would 
that have allowed the US to prevent future terrorist attacks? 
Khobar Towers Bombing 
 At 10:00 P.M. on June 25, 1996, a tanker truck filled with 5,000 pounds of 
plastic explosive and fuel to create a 20,000 pound bomb exploded in a parking lot next 
to building 131 of the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Saudi Arabia.  The complex 
housed members of the American, British, French and Saudi military enforcing the UN 
mandated “no-fly” zone over Iraq.  The occupants of building 131 consisted mainly of 
US Air Force personnel, 19 of whom were killed and 372 wounded including Saudi 
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Arabians.  Air Force security personnel on top of the building saw the truck and, 
realizing it was a bomb, sounded the alarm and began evacuating personnel when the 
bomb exploded.  Although they were not able to evacuate all of the personnel, their 
actions saved the lives of most in the building. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001) 
 The investigation into the bombing would soon reveal that those who had carried 
it out were four members of the Saudi Arabian division of the Iranian terrorist group 
Hizballah.  The group was commanded by Ahmed Al-Mughassil who in late-1993 was 
ordered by the Iranian Government to attack American forces in Saudi Arabia.  The 
Iranian government was concerned about the threat to its power in the region posed by 
American forces stationed in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War of 1991.  The Iranians 
believed that terrorist type attacks against the Americans would cause them to leave the 
region.  Al-Mughassil then ordered three of his subordinates to identify and conduct 
surveillance on American interests in Saudi Arabia which they could attack.  These 
targets included stores where Americans shopped, the US Embassy in Riyadh, and the 
Khobar towers. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001) 
 After several months of careful surveillance and planning, Al-Mugassil, in 
coordination with his Iranian superiors, decided that the Khobar Towers was the best 
target to attack.  The plot suffered a setback in March 1996 when the explosives to be 
used in the attack, being driven from the Hizballah base in Lebanon, were discovered in 
the car by Saudi customs officials at the border and were seized; the driver, a member of 
the group, also was arrested.  The other two operatives in the plot subsequently were 
identified and were arrested by the Saudis, but Al-Mugassil evaded detection.  Al-
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Mugassil quickly found replacements for his three subordinates who were arrested and 
found another source for explosives.  By June, Al-Mugassil had purchased a tanker truck 
and began converting it into a truck bomb at an isolated farm outside of Khobar. 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001) 
 On the evening of June 25 Al-Mugassil set out from the farm driving the truck 
and followed by two other cars.  They attempted to drive into the compound which 
housed the Khobar Towers apartment buildings but were turned away by the guards, so 
instead they went to a secondary location which was the public parking lot of a mosque 
next to the apartment complex.  The two were separated only by a chain-link fence and 
some trees.  Al-Mugassil parked the truck as close to the apartment buildings as possible 
and jumped out of the truck into one of the waiting cars which sped away.  Moments 
later the bomb exploded taking off the front half of building 131. (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2001; Freeh, 2005:2) 
 Al-Mughassil and another of the conspirators immediately fled the country using 
fake passports.  The other two conspirators remained but were quickly arrested by the 
Saudi authorities after they quickly realized that the bombing was linked to the 
explosives and the other three members of Hizballah they had seized at the border 
earlier.  The Saudis also began arresting as many members of the group as they could 
find. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001; Freeh, 2005:10) 
The Response 
 News of the explosion was sent to the watch centers of the various national 
security agencies in Washington, and within half an hour of the explosion, the principal 
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decisionmakers had been notified.  Discussions then took place between those principals, 
primarily the President’s National Security and military advisors, the Attorney General, 
and the head of the FBI, as they reviewed all information regarding the attack.  Six hours 
later the President made a speech to the media regarding the attack and indicated that the 
FBI would be sending agents over to Khobar to help assist the Saudis in the investigation 
into the bombing.  The FBI was designated by and had the statutory authority to respond 
to terrorist attacks, one assumes the Air Force criminal investigation service (Office of 
Special Investigations) did not have the resources to conduct the investigation as the Air 
Force/US military were the primary victims.  This apparently was considered a relatively 
limited incident which would be handled as a law enforcement incident by the FBI. 
(Freeh, 2005:4-6) 
 Once the decision had been made that the FBI would be the primary responder to 
the attack, the US then had to contact the Saudis to coordinate their efforts.  While the 
immediate area of the building attacked might have been under American control, the 
housing area itself was under Saudi control.  Saudi Arabia obviously is a sovereign 
country, so the FBI could not simply arrive and take control of the scene, especially 
when there was no agreement with the Saudis to allow it.  This was in spite of the fact 
that a large group of Americans, as part of an organized American military group 
stationed there, had been targeted.  The US would want the FBI to investigate the 
bombing to ensure that the US determined who was responsible for bombing the 
American servicemen and women and what motivated them.  The Director of the FBI, 
Louis Freeh, began the task of personally negotiating with the Saudis to be allowed to 
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enter Saudi Arabia and to be able to work with them on the investigation of the crime 
scene of the bombing.  This was made more complicated by the fact that Saudi Arabia 
was a country which tried to remain isolated and closed to foreign visitors.  Eventually, 
several days later, the Saudis grudgingly allowed the FBI to come and investigate the 
scene.  The Saudis also had to be persuaded to share the information they had on the 
attack which they did gradually. (Freeh, 2005:8-10) 
 In the meantime, the various national security agencies in the US began 
attempting to determine who might have been responsible for the attack.  The Iranians 
had been very good at internal communication security, thus their agents were not 
talking openly between each other regarding the attack; this in turn meant that US spy 
agencies did not pick up any information about the attack.  The FBI and CIA had various 
theories as to who might have conducted the attack, including Osama bin Laden, but 
otherwise there was no concrete proof as to who was responsible. (Freeh, 2005:7)  The 
analysts of the National Security Council at the White House apparently believed 
immediately that, based upon information they had, including the arrest of Hizballah 
agents at the Saudi border weeks previously, that Iran was responsible for the attack.  
Still, they advised the President to conduct a law enforcement response to the attack 
using the FBI. (Clarke, 2004:113) 
 Public opinion in response to the attack was relatively limited, although many 
voiced favor for the US government to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the 
incident as well as to assign more resources towards combating terrorism.  That summer 
was the bombing at the Olympics in Atlanta and the explosion of TWA flight 800.  
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There appears to have been little knowledge of Iran’s involvement and concomitant 
anger towards it. (Rosenthal, 1996; and, Geitman, 1996)  Although there were calls for 
more resources to fight terrorism, there also appeared to be a strongly oriented opinion in 
favour of “passive” and “defensive” counter-terrorism measures.  Many people were 
extremely frustrated that officials had not implemented much stronger defensive 
measures at the Khobar Towers, and they were implemented only after the bombing 
(Shriver, 1996; and, Editor, 1996b).  Still others were concerned that any future increase 
in counter-terrorism measures not infringe upon the civil rights and liberties of people 
(Antalics, 1996; Murray, 1996; and, Baumgarten, 1996).  A fourth set of opinions 
questioned the US relationship with the Saudi Arabian kingdom (which some perceived 
as having allowed the attack because of its “corrupt and oppressive” monarchy) calling 
for a review of US foreign policy in the middle east, including the alteration of its 
relationships with Iraq and Iran such that the US would not have to station troops in 
Saudi Arabia (Editor, 1996a; Freeman, 1996; and, Maynes, 1996). 
 As soon as the 150 FBI agents arrived in Saudi Arabia, they began working with 
the Saudi authorities collecting and analyzing evidence from the scene of the bombing.  
The Saudis, however, would still not allow the Americans complete access to the 
information which, or the two suspects whom, they had in their control.  This would 
require further negotiations with the Saudi monarchy.  Freeh’s Saudi counterparts 
explained to him that only Saudi King Fahed (actually his son, Prince Abdullah, since 
the King essentially had been incapacitated by a stroke) could allow the Americans to 
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talk with the suspects they had in custody; and, according to Saudi custom, only the 
President of the US could ask the King for that permission. (Freeh, 2005:15-20) 
 According to Freeh, he would ask President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and 
National Security Advisor Samuel Berger repeatedly for the next several years to ask the 
Saudis for permission for the FBI to interview the suspects they had in custody for the 
bombing.  Apparently none of them ever did so, even though they promised Freeh that 
they wanted to and would.  Freeh speculates that the reason the administration did not 
ask for the permission from the Saudis was that they were attempting diplomatic 
rapprochement with the new “moderate” Iranian government and, since the Saudis had 
told the US that the Iranians were responsible for the bombing, the Administration did 
not want that fact to be discovered officially if they were to have positive talks with the 
Iranians.  If the US had officially declared the Iranians responsible for the attacks, this 
might have put the Administration under pressure to use military force against the 
Iranians in retaliation for the attack. (2005:17-23)  Richard Clarke, the senior counter-
terrorism analyst on the National Security Council, counters that this was not the case 
and that Freeh was making a political attack on the Administration as a Republican.  
Clarke says that the Clinton Administration did ask the Saudis for permission to 
interview the witnesses. (2004:117) 
 It was not until President George H.W. Bush asked the Saudis, on behalf of 
Freeh, in a meeting with them in September 1998, that the Saudis readily agreed to allow 
the US to interview the suspects.  After interviewing the suspects and conducting three 
more years of investigation, the US Department of Justice was able to indict all of those 
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suspected of being responsible for the bombing the day before the statute of limitations 
on the attack expired on June 21, 2001.  The suspects were named as being agents of the 
Iranian Government in the indictment. (Freeh, 2005:27-33; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2001) 
Analysis 
 Again, consistent with the preferences of the respondents in the experiments, the 
US government responded to this successful attack on US interests abroad with a 
multilateral-law enforcement response.  US decisionmakers were relatively proactive in 
making the decision to have a large number of dedicated US law enforcement officials 
actively involved in the investigation of the bombing instead of simply responding to the 
bombing with the normally assigned personnel as was, one could argue, the instance in 
the first World Trade Center bombing.  It is also interesting to note the apparent lack of 
confidence US officials had in Saudi officials handling the investigation of the bombing, 
because the US demanded to have the lead in the investigation in another country, 
instead of simply waiting for the Saudis to ask for their help as was, one could argue, the 
case with the Bojinka attempt.  The success of the Khobar bombing appears to have 
increased the tempo of the multilateral-legal response, causing the US to desire an 
increased role in the response. 
 Once the evidence began to indicate conclusively that an actual country was 
responsible for the attack (i.e. Iran) in comparison to a terrorist organization with no 
state sponsorship, there appears to have been an aggressive proactive effort on the part of 
the US government leadership to suppress the findings.  One can only speculate, if the 
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information had been openly publicized, whether this would have led to a military 
response against Iran.  Public opinion in response to the attacks appears to have been 
relatively unremarkable, with, perhaps, the most support for more policies of the 
previous nature: multi-lateral law enforcement. 
Alternatively, one might argue, based upon the findings in the previous 
experiments that there is a stronger preference for military force when attacks occur at 
home than abroad, that the information was cognitively minimized by decisionmakers 
because the terrorist attack had occurred abroad, and that no further information was 
needed because no further action, such as a military response, would ever be taken in 
reaction to such an attack. 
9/11 
 Ironically, Ramzi Yousef’s uncle, Kahlid Sheik Mohammed, who mentored and 
funded Yousef arrived at his apartment just after he was arrested.  However, since 
Mohammed had not yet been identified by investigators as being involved in Yousef’s 
plots, he was treated as an innocent bystander and released (Lance, 2003:286).  Although 
his mastermind nephew had been arrested and would be spending the rest of his life in a 
US penitentiary, Mohammed had obtained most of the details of Yousef’s plan to crash 
airplanes into buildings and landmarks in the US.  Mohammed took control of this plan 
and continued to work on developing it into what would become the 9/11 attacks. 
(Lance, 2003:280) 
 In January 1998, Mohammed had finished selecting, with the help of Osama bin 
Laden, the members of al-Qaeda who would carry out the suicide attacks.  These were 
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all men who had trained in al-Qaeda terrorist training camps, some of whom had fought 
against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Mohammed began formally to approach 
them, and, once they agreed, he assigned the al-Qaeda members chosen for the attacks to 
at least four different cells, each of which would hijack one plane. (Lance, 2003:360-9)  
Abdul Murad, who had trained as a pilot, was to have been the leader of the 9/11 attacks; 
but, since he had been arrested in Manila after the Bojinka plot failed, Mohammed 
replaced him with the severe and studious Mohammed Atta.  Atta was studying for his 
PhD in architecture in Hamburg, Germany where Mohammed headquartered one of the 
cells. (Miller et al. 2003:255)  Mohammed would locate other cells inside the US 
including in California, Florida, and Arizona.  The group in Arizona had been taking 
flying lessons there since 1996. (Lance, 2003:401) 
 Approximately June 2000, Atta, the ringleader, arrived in the US and began 
living and taking flying lessons in Florida.  In January of 2001, the other hijackers 
designated as the pilots were in the US taking flying lessons.  All of them were noticed 
by neighbors and flight instructors for their strange behaviour and sometimes unfriendly 
behavior.  When the various flight instructors at the different flying schools voiced their 
concerns to authorities regarding the fact that these students were not performing well, 
not following instructions, and were generally acting suspiciously, their concerns were 
ignored. (Miller et al., 2003:268-71; Lance, 2003: 396-401) 
 By August of 2001, the rest of the hijackers had arrived in the US.  These men 
would serve as “muscle” to subdue the crews and passengers on the planes while the 
trained pilots in their groups would fly the planes.  Each cell of hijackers consisted of 
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about four men to serve as “muscle” and one trained as a pilot.  All of the men who 
would hijack the planes on 9/11 had received legitimate immigration visas either to 
study to be pilots or to visit as tourists.  On August 29, Atta placed a call to a contact, 
Ramzi Binalshibh, in Hamburg who in turn contacted Mohammed to obtain the final 
permission to execute the attacks on September 11, a date which Mohammed had 
obtained from Osama bin Laden. (Lance, 2003:409-412) 
 Atta then ordered each of the cells to begin forming in four different cities on the 
east coast and each was assigned a different target to attack.  The cells had been casing 
and surveilling possible flights they could take and confirming the details of their plans 
(Miller et al., 2003:294-7).  Then, on the morning of the September 11, 2001, the 
approximately four groups (evidence suggests there may have been other groups of 
terrorists who were going to hijack other flights but were unable to do so after all flights 
were grounded) of approximately five men each boarded four different flights on the east 
coast of the US.  Atta and his companions boarded a flight from Portland, Maine to 
Boston’s Logan Airport where they transferred to American Airlines Flight 11 bound for 
Los Angeles scheduled to depart at 7:45 A.M. (US Government Printing Office, 2004:1-
2)  After the flight took off and reached its cruising altitude, Atta and his companions 
overpowered the crew and took control of the airplane.  Atta then piloted the Boeing 767 
towards New York City and crashed it into the North Tower of the World Trade Center 
at 8:46 A.M.  Between the air traffic controllers not being able to communicate with the 
plane and overhearing the hijackers on the plane, along with calls made on board the 
plane from public airplane phones and cell phones from passengers and flight attendants 
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to the American Airlines operations center, the airline and FAA air traffic controllers 
were able to ascertain that the flight had been hijacked. (US Government Printing Office, 
2004:4-7) 
 The second group of hijackers, staying in Boston, arrived at Boston Logan 
airport that morning to take United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston to Los Angeles as 
well.  Their flight departed at 8:00 A.M., and when it reached cruising altitude the five 
men overpowered the crew and took control of the airplane, another Boeing 767, 
changing course for New York City.  Again, as with American 11, passengers and flight 
attendants were able to contact family members and a United Airlines Operations center 
to report the hijacking.  United 175 then crashed into the South Tower of the World 
Trade Center at 9:03am. (US Government Printing Office, 2004:7-8) 
 The third group of hijackers boarded American Airlines Flight 77 at Dulles 
Airport on the outskirts of Washington, DC.  Flight 77 was a Boeing 757 bound for Los 
Angeles as well, and it departed Dulles at approximately 8:20 A.M. (US Government 
Printing Office, 2004:2-4)  Once the plane reached cruising altitude, the five hijackers 
overpowered the crew, took control of the airplane, and headed towards Washington, 
DC.  As with the other two flights, passengers were able to contact family members and 
authorities, using airplane and mobile phones, to describe what was happening on board 
the planes.  At 9:37 A.M., the hijacker piloting Flight 77 dove the plane into the 
Pentagon. (2004:8-10) 
 The fourth and final plane to be hijacked and crashed that day was United 
Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757, which departed Newark Airport in New Jersey at 8:42 
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A.M,, bound for San Francisco.  Similar to the other three flights, the crew of United 93 
was overpowered and the plane overtaken by five hijackers as soon as the plane reached 
cruising altitude.  As with the other three flights, the passengers and flight attendants in 
the back of the plane were able to contact family members and a United Airlines 
operations center using airplane and mobile phones.  The passengers on this plane 
learned through their phone calls about the other planes which had crashed, and decided 
to fight the hijackers.  Based on what air traffic controllers overheard from cockpit 
communications, those passengers had success in overpowering some of the hijackers.  
Unfortunately, United 93 crashed into a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03am.  The evidence 
collected from possessions left behind by the hijackers of United 93 suggests that their 
target had been the White House, and but for the actions of the passengers on the flight, 
the hijackers might have succeeded in crashing into it. (US Government Printing Office, 
2004:10-14) 
The Response 
 Air traffic controllers were probably the first to trigger a military response to the 
hijackings on September 11.  Approximately 20 minutes after departing Boston, 
American Airlines Flight 11 failed to respond to a series of radioed instructions from the 
air traffic center controller in Boston, and the controller alerted his supervisor to a 
possible problem with the plane.  The supervisor in turn told the controller to follow 
procedures for a plane in distress while he contacted American Airlines to see if they 
could contact the plane; they could not.  A few minutes later, Mohammed Atta, who was 
piloting the plane, erred in selecting the correct button on his radio to make an 
 147
announcement to the cabin of the plane, and broadcast a message over the radio to the 
controller telling the passengers to sit down and be quiet, that they had some planes, and 
that they were returning to the airport.  The controller immediately sensed that the plane 
had been hijacked and conveyed this information to his supervisor. (US Government 
Printing Office, 2004:18-20)  
The supervisor then initiated what were supposed to be the standard procedures 
for dealing with a hijacking: contacting the FAA operations center in Herndon, Virginia, 
who would then contact the administrators of the FAA, who in turn would contact the 
National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon for military assistance.  
The NMCC consists of the Secretary of Defense or his designate who is expected to 
consult with the President before authorizing military action.  As had been practiced 
before September 11 for a hijacking in the Northeastern US, the NMCC would contact 
NORAD (the Air Force Air Defense Command) who would then contact continental 
command (CONR) who would then contact the North Eastern Air Defense Sector 
(NEADS) who would scramble two fighter jets on standby.  The two jets would then 
simply observe the hijacked aircraft.  There were a total of 14 fighters on standby in the 
US that day with three pairs in the Northeast.  No previous plans had been developed for 
shooting down aircraft being used as missiles, especially those originating from 
domestic airspace, because the concept apparently had never even been imagined by any 
officials. (US Government Printing Office, 2004:14-8) 
 The senior FAA command structure would never contact the military that day; 
instead there was a complex series of telephone calls between and outside the different 
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levels of the FAA and military.  Shortly after the Boston Center supervisor contacted the 
FAA command, that supervisor took the initiative of calling NEADS directly regarding 
the hijacking and requesting help.  On his own initiative, the commander of NEADS 
scrambled the fighters into the air while confirming with his commander at CONR who 
agreed with this action. (US Government Printing Office, 2004:20) 
By now a New York FAA controller had responsibility for American 11, as well 
as for United 175, which had just reported to the controller about hearing the “strange” 
communication made by Atta from the American flight.  A few minutes later United 175 
stopped following its flight path, but the controller did not immediately notice the 
change because he was preoccupied with American 11.  When the controller did notice 
the erratic behaviour of United 175 and that it was headed towards New York as well, he 
told his supervisor who in turn tried to inform the FAA command center, but they were 
preoccupied with American 11.  At this point in time, the FAA command center had 
established a conference call between it and the four air traffic control centers in the 
Northeast so that their supervisors were all aware of the hijacked flights which were now 
transiting across all four of their airspaces.  (US Government Printing Office, 2004:21-3) 
As reports reached NEADS that American 11 had crashed into the North World 
Trade Center, the two fighters scrambled by NEADS were sent towards New York; but, 
without any other information or instructions, the fighters could only circle above the 
city.  Shortly thereafter, United 175 crashed into the South Tower.  The various 
supervisors at the New York and Boston control centers along with those at the FAA 
command were frantically trying to understand what was going on while commenting to 
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each other that they were going to need help from the military.  The military 
commanders, meanwhile, were discussing what tasks they would need to accomplish and 
what information and orders were needed from the FAA. (US Government Printing 
Office, 2004:23-4) 
 At the same time as this was transpiring, the controller at the Indianapolis traffic 
center lost contact with American 77 out of Dulles because the hijackers on the plane 
also had turned off its transponder which provided critical information to air traffic 
control regarding the plane’s location.  After several failed attempts to find it, the 
controller, unaware of the hijackings of the other flights, issued an alarm that it might 
have crashed and initiated search and rescue procedures.  After several minutes of 
initiating these procedures and after relocating American 77 which was now headed 
towards Washington DC, the controller learned of the hijackings of the other craft and 
suspected this might be the same with American 77.  He alerted his supervisor who 
alerted FAA command.  FAA command alerted NEADS to the third missing aircraft; 
NEADS scrambled another two fighters out of Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.  
Shortly thereafter, American 77 crashed into the Pentagon. (US Government Printing 
Office, 2004:24-7) 
 Just before American 77 crashed into the Pentagon, a controller at Cleveland air 
traffic control lost radio contact with United 93 and, noticing that it had turned towards 
Washington DC, notified his supervisor.  The supervisor in turn, contacted FAA 
command.  When he heard of the fourth plane now possibly hijacked, the supervisor at 
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FAA command ordered all aircraft in the US to land, the first time such an order had 
ever been issued. (US Government Printing Office, 2004:28-30) 
 The senior leadership of the country, including the most senior FAA and national 
security officials, would first hear of the attacks from the television news.  CNN first 
aired the story about a plane [American 11] having crashed into the north tower of the 
world trade center in New York.  The President, on a trip to Florida, was about to visit 
with some elementary school children when his chief of staff and senior political advisor 
told him that a “small” plane had crashed into the world trade center.  Back at the Old 
Executive Office next to the White House in Washington DC, the Vice-President and 
National Security Advisor were both monitoring the crash on televisions in their office.  
Senior national security officials, in response to the crash, automatically started to 
initiate, as dictated by standard operating procedure, a teleconference with the most 
senior people available at the affected agencies: FAA, Department of Defense, etc.  A 
few minutes after that started, seventeen minutes after the first plane hit the world trade 
center, the second plane hit, and most officials seemed to recognize intuitively and 
instantaneously that it was a terrorist attack and began to take actions accordingly. (US 
Government Printing Office, 2004: 35; Clarke, 2004:1-2) 
 The Secret Service (USSS) immediately began to secure the White House, 
moving the Vice-President and other senior political officials to the emergency 
underground bunker14.  The senior national security officials began their conference call 
                                                 
14 On September 11, the White House bunker was a different room from the situation room.  The bunker 
was physically secure, while the situation room was not, but the situation room had the communications 
equipment which the bunker did not. 
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in the situation room with all the affected agencies including the FAA, Department of 
Defense and Department of State.  The call would remain in continuous operation for 
another eight hours.  The call consisted mainly of sharing information and discussing 
necessary actions which would have to be taken, although the officials involved did not 
have the ability to respond directly to the hijacked aircraft because only the FAA control 
centers and NORAD were part of the process at that point.  At the same time the call 
began, American 77 was headed towards Washington.  A supervisor in the Tower at 
Reagan National Airport called the USSS at the White House using a direct emergency 
line with the Service to warn that an aircraft was headed in their direction.  The Secret 
Service evacuated all non-essential personnel from the White House and surrounding 
buildings, shortly after which American 77 crashed into the Pentagon. (US Government 
Printing Office, 2004:35-9; Clarke, 2004:3-8) 
The President had begun to speak with the school children when his chief of staff 
walked into the room and whispered in his ear that the second tower had been struck and 
the country was under attack.  Not wanting to scare the children, or panic the adults 
watching, the President calmly waited a few more minutes and then finished his meeting 
with the children.  The President immediately called the Vice-President and National 
Security Advisor who apprised him of the situation, to which the President replied 
“We’re at war…” (US Government Printing Office, 2004:39) 
 At this point in time, the Vice-President conferred with the President about 
shooting down any other aircraft which had been hijacked, and the President authorized 
it.  There is some confusion as to how this authorization reached the pilots, as normally 
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the order would be passed to the Secretary of Defense who would pass it on to NORAD.  
On September 11, however, military aides with the Vice-President and President passed 
the information directly to NORAD, as well as directly to some of the pilots now on 
patrol over Washington DC via the mobile phones of Secret Service agents.  The 
Secretary of Defense subsequently was informed of the decision by the President 
authorizing the Air Force to shoot down planes. (US Government Printing Office, 2004: 
33-5) 
 Since the Secret Service did not want the President to return to DC because of the 
instability of the situation, the President reluctantly agreed to be flown to Barksdale Air 
Force Base in Louisiana where he taped a short statement to be aired on television 
assuring the American people that he would do all to protect the country and take steps 
to punish those responsible.  He was then flown to the secure bunker at Offutt Air Force 
Base in Omaha.  The President demanded that they return to the White House that 
evening which they did.  When he returned to the White House, the President addressed 
the nation on television and then began a series of meetings with his advisors regarding 
the US response to the attacks. (Clarke, 2004:22-4)  
Throughout that afternoon, the senior national security officials continued to 
assess the situation as well as to prepare for the first full meeting with the President 
scheduled for that evening.  They gathered information and evidence as to who had 
conducted the attack and how they could respond.  All government and military forces 
were placed on a high level of alert.  It was apparent to most, including senior national 
security advisors, the Secretary of State (and his deputy who represented him at most of 
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the afternoon meetings while the Secretary returned from Peru) and the director of the 
CIA, that al Qaeda was responsible given their past history and the recent intelligence 
that they were considering an attack. (Clarke, 2004:24-5) 
 The meeting between the President and most of his cabinet and advisors began at 
approximately 8:30 P.M. that evening, shortly after his televised address to the nation.  
The first order of business regarded steps which had to be taken to ensure the security of 
the domestic US as well as the repair of the infrastructure in New York and the return of 
business and air travel across the nation. (Clarke, 2004:23)  The second order of business 
was the response to those responsible for the attacks.  The President began the meeting 
by declaring that the nation was at war.  When the Secretary of Defense suggested that 
international law only allowed for military action to prevent an imminent attack, the 
President angrily responded that he did not care what the lawyers said, “We’re going to 
kick some ass.” (2004:24)  After his cabinet all agreed that the evidence indicated al-
Qaeda had carried out the attack, the President then authorized the executive branch to 
begin steps to take action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban Government in Afghanistan 
if they did not cooperate in attacking al-Qaeda (which they did not).  The US also sought 
the cooperation of Pakistan (which subsequently they provided) in fighting the Taliban 
because passage over and through Pakistan was necessary to access Afghanistan. (US 
Government Printing Office, 2004:325-7) 
Congress would authorize the use of military force against al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban a few days later while the planning for and execution of the military operations 
against them continued (US Government Printing Office, 2004:327-38).  Law 
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enforcement actions also would be conducted in attempting to identify those responsible 
for the attacks who were still in the US (including Zacarias Moussaoui), as well as those 
who were residing in friendly countries.  Khalid Sheik Mohammed was arrested in 
Pakistan a few months later (US Government Printing Office, 2004:326-8; Miller et al., 
2003:323-5).   
A review of public opinion after the attacks would reveal, as one would expect 
from the experiment results, a significant amount of support for unilateral-military action 
against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; however, it is also important to note that there was a 
significant amount of public opinion which called for a thoughtful and measured 
response to the attacks.  This is consistent with the findings from the experiments that 
the respondents preferred action with the best chance of success.  The majority of public 
opinion appears to have supported significant and comprehensive action by the US 
against the terrorists with unilateral-military action if necessary (Sullivan, 2001; 
Swendiman, 2001; Krames, 2001; Painter, 2001; Richmond, 2001; and, Williams, 
2001)15.  Some were even calling for a more comprehensive and significant military 
response by taking action against other states besides Afghanistan, such as Iraq, which 
were perceived as state sponsors of radical Islamic terrorism (Vandamme, 2001; 
Lechner, 2001; and, Luryi, 2001)16.  Alternatively, there were some who called for no 
use of violence believing it would lead to more violence.  Instead they wanted to provide 
                                                 
15 See also: Limsky, 2001; Bennett, 2001; Editor, 2001a; Cowden, 2001; Tobias, 2001; Rubin, 2001; 
Rosen, 2001; Rotondo, 2001; Bibby, 2001; Sabath, 2001; Skober, 2001; Taubman, 2001; Silverstein, 
2001; Moriarty, 2001; Gastil, 2001; Tremper, 2001; Neuman, 2001; Bertolone, 2001; Eber, 2001; Valliere, 
2001; and, Caplan, 2001 
16 See also: Witonsky, 2001; Tonelson, 2001; Haddad, 2001; Natarajan, 2001; Grossman, 2001; Greene, 
2001; Lincoln, 2001; and, Editor, 2001b. 
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humanitarian aid to the Afghan people (Crain, 2001; Neugeboren, 2001; Betterly, 2001; 
and, Rapp, 2001)17.  Perhaps the most significant and notable portion of public opinion 
was that calling for action against al-Qaeda, albeit for action which was thoughtful and 
considerate, leading to the most successful outcome against the perpetrators, not just the 
indiscriminate use of military force (Sanders, 2001; York, 2001; Wolf, 2001; Shear and 
Reynolds, 2001; Margolese, 2001; Tabor, 2001; Koppel, 2001; Hamilton, 2001)18.   
Analysis 
 The response of decisionmakers on September 11 to use military action in 
response to the attacks is consistent with the preferences of the respondents in the 
experiments to use unilateral-military force in response to a successful domestic terrorist 
attack.  One might argue that it is interesting to note the automatic, almost reflexive 
nature, of many decisionmakers that day to indicate a preference for or to choose 
military force.  While one could say that the sheer size of the attacks that day would 
automatically cause such a response, others could argue that the evidence does not 
suggest many decisionmakers knew immediately after the first two plane crashes that the 
attack was of such significance.  Considering the first World Trade Center bombing, had 
that bombing been successful and had the tower(s) collapsed, would the reaction have 
been as fast and as automatic as it was on September 11?   
                                                 
17 See also: Heilbrunn, 2001; Arnove, 2001; Gruener, 2001; Langmore, 2001; Kaiser, 2001; Pelli and 
Radner, 2001; Shain, 2001; Mintz, 2001; Solotaire, 2001; Klein, 2001; Lester, 2001; Drob, 2001; Galison, 
2001; Rotolo, 2001; and, Warren,. 2001. 
18 See also: Brooks, 2001; Herbert, 2001; Brennan, 2001;  Reiser, 2001; Malone, 2001; Telhami and 
Wippman, 2001; Lewis, 2001; Laingen, 2001; Lasar, 2001; Stanley, 2001; Minow, 2001; Orts, 2001; 
Murphy, 2001; Gates, 2001; Gilbert, 2001; Wilhelm, 2001; Heuvel, 2001; Quigley, 2001; Gahringer, 
2001; Moncada, 2001; Michalak, 2001; Valeriani, 2001; Miller, 2001; Sedlak, 2001; Marshall, 2001; 
Maguire, 2001; Anastaplo, 2001; and, Colman, 2001. 
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Domestically, the air traffic controllers and military personnel “guarding” the 
continental US were automatically, without guidance from superior officials, 
contemplating the use of force, albeit in a very limited manner to shoot down any 
commercial airliners which appeared to be hijacked and threatening people on the 
ground.  In terms of the comprehensive response, it is interesting to note the President’s 
Chief of Staff’s immediate reaction that the country was under attack as well as the 
President’s immediate response that the nation was at war.  The two planes crashing into 
the twin towers of the World Trade Center seems to have immediately signaled a 
successful terrorist attack (the towers had not yet collapsed when these decisions had 
been made) to decisionmakers that day, whereas the first bombing of the World Trade 
Center apparently did not seem successful enough to decisionmakers to warrant more 
than the initial muted response it did.   
It is interesting to note that not all of the decisionmakers automatically or 
necessarily considered military action the most preferable response given the Secretary 
of Defense’s concern about being able to declare war on a country which did not pose an 
imminent threat.  This was also consistent with a significant amount of public opinion 
which called for a careful and thoughtful response to the attacks.  The Secretary’s 
statement might suggest varying levels of perception amongst the various senior US 
political decisionmakers as to the scope and severity of the attacks.  Although the attacks 
had been severe, were they of such size and scope as to warrant the use of military 
force?  Alternatively, was there enough evidence by the evening of the attack to confirm 
who had carried out the attacks and therefore against whom a response would have to be 
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made?  If those responsible were agents of a country, e.g. Iran, would the military 
response be different from that against a stateless terrorist group (as the evidence later 
would confirm were responsible)?   The Secretary’s concern perhaps was focused on the 
probability of success of the military option given that those who (that evening) were 
believed responsible were a stateless terrorist organization, so there were fewer ways to 
attack the terrorists because they had less fixed targets which could be hit by the 
military.  This concern of the Secretary is consistent with the respondents in the third 
experiment, who, regardless of the other factors, were interested in considering the 
probability of success of the response when choosing it.   
Thus, one then could ask if the President was advocating for a military response 
regardless of success, or if he simply was stating that all resources would be used to 
attack the terrorists, regardless of whether they were military or law enforcement?  This 
discussion highlights the necessity, as is noticeable from the respondents in the 
experiment considering the probabilities of success of the options, for decisionmakers to 
understand the various elements of the situation to which they are responding and to 
consider the composition of their responses.   
Comparison of All Four Responses 
 The responses preferred in public opinion forums and chosen by political 
decisionmakers in all four of the historical events chronicled appear to be consistent with 
the responses preferred by the respondents in reaction to the simulated attacks, with one 
exception.  The exception was the response to the first World Trade Center bombing 
which appears to have been a muted law enforcement response, when the experiments 
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would have suggested a stronger military response.  However, this might be explainable 
due to a lack of information, understanding, and comprehension on the part of 
government officials as to the terroristic elements of the event.  At that point in time, 
Islamic terrorist attacks on US soil were unexpected and unimaginable.  US political 
decisionmakers chose a multilateral-law enforcement response to terrorist attacks against 
Americans abroad (Bojinka and Khobar Towers), and a military response to domestic 
terrorist attacks (9/11).  The record of events for September 11 also suggests 
consideration of the appropriateness of the military response on the part of some seniour 
decisionmakers with respect to their success in attacking the terrorists; this was 
examined in the third experiment where the respondents considered the probability of 
success of a response when choosing it.   
 One of the most interesting aspects in reviewing the response of decisionmakers 
to four terrorist events examined here is to review the historical accounts of them made 
by the most senior counter-terrorism analyst at the White House during all four events: 
Richard Clarke.  Clarke describes his immediate response and actions to all four events 
with stunning similarity: he received calls from “watch” personnel monitoring national 
security events, he called the national security advisor, and he had meetings with all 
responsible national security personnel to review and coordinate the response to the 
event.  On September 11, however, while immediate reports of what had happened in 
New York seemed no different that what had happened in the other three events (the 
severity and death tolls could have been the same for all three based upon what little 
information was available within the first thirty minutes), Clarke seems to describe a 
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more frantic and serious reaction on that day.  Compared with the immediate reaction 
within the first thirty minutes to the first World Trade Center bombing, the immediate 
success of the airliners crashing into the buildings on 9/11 seems to have caused a much 
greater response in the minds of decisionmakers that day.  The spectacular and on-going 
television coverage from New York may have been a significant contributing factor.  
One also might wonder what the effect of the previous terrorist attacks had on increasing 
the alertness of decisionmakers to terrorist attacks, making them more susceptible to 
preferring a stronger response to the attacks in a faster manner.  After the first World 
Trade Center bombing the idea of an Islamic terrorist event within the US was no longer 
unimaginable.   
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CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study began with the observation that the US (all levels of government as a 
“whole“) responded to seemingly similar acts of terrorism in two different ways; while 
most acts of terrorism are responded to with law enforcement, some attacks trigger a 
“stronger” military response.  The question then asked is what factors influence whether 
decisionmakers would prefer and seek this military response to terrorism?  A survey of 
the history and the literature on the subject suggested, and this study hypothesized, the 
important factors which would influence this decision including whether the attack was 
successful, the location of the attack, and the socio-cultural similarity to Americans of 
the terrorists.  The literature review also suggested, and this study further postulated, that 
both the terrorist attack and a decision to use military force were emotional events 
(reactions being faster and more dramatic instead of calm, deliberative and “rational”), 
the level of which is influenced by various combinations of the above three elements.  
Testing these hypotheses with three experiments and a case study, yielded findings 
which suggest that terrorism had less of an emotional impact than was hypothesized and 
that the factor of location of the attack (at home or abroad) had significant influence on 
decisionmakers’ preferences to use military force in response.  These results may have 
some interesting implications for the future of research on terrorism and on political 
decisionmaking: they additionally illuminate further problems and issues with the lines 
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of inquiry in this study which need further examination and research before more 
definitive conclusions can be made.   
The Background 
 An examination of the relevant research literatures on the subject of terrorism 
response reveals that no study apparently has been done on how responses are decided 
upon or selected, but instead is focused on describing and measuring counterterrorism 
policies.  As Mueller (2007) and Mosher and Geva (2006) note, acts of terrorism cause 
victims to experience a range of emotions which the cognitive calculus model argues 
should alter their decisionmaking, causing them to prefer more drastic (military) 
responses with less deliberation.  Furthermore, the political leadership of a targeted 
country will not only decide how to respond to the attacks based upon their own 
emotions, but also upon desires of these victimized citizens to whom the politicians are 
accountable.  Thus, even if the politicians are not confident that a more drastic action 
(such as military action) is likely to be the best response, they may choose it to satisfy 
the desires of their constituents. (see page 6) 
 The policy options available to the decisionmakers for responding to acts of 
terrorism can be divided generally into two categories with two sub-categories of 
orientation.  When a terrorist attack (such as a bombing, shooting, kidnapping, hijacking, 
etc.) occurs, law enforcement will automatically respond without waiting for direction 
from a country’s leadership since any event is a breach of peace and criminal activity to 
which they are mandated to respond.  Once senior investigating officials and 
decisionmaking leaders learn more about the details of the attack and who is responsible, 
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assuming in this study the terrorists are foreign based, those officials have to determine 
if military force should be used against the perpetrators.  If the decisionmakers do not 
believe military force is justified, they then must decide if they should use unilateral-
legal policies of attempting to capture and then try the terrorists, or if they should work 
though multilateral/diplomatic channels with the country in which the terrorists are 
located to capture, arrest, try and/or extradite them.  If military force is the preferred 
option, the decisionmakers must decide whether or not to cooperate with the host 
country (or others depending upon the location of the terrorists and relations with the 
territory in which they are located) using multilateral-military force or whether they 
should use the unilateral-military option.  Each of these options has benefits and 
drawbacks which the others do not.  Some scholars argue that the legal and multilateral 
options have better success at defeating terrorism over the “long term,” while others 
argue that unilateral and military options are more effective and efficient at eliminating 
the direct threat of terrorism. (see pages 6-11) 
 Determining the intensity of the emotional reaction, which in turn influences 
which of the above policies is preferred, appears to depend upon qualities of the attack 
itself, the first of which is the success or failure of the attack.  How people prefer to 
respond to criminal activity depends upon the level of success of the crime.  Successful 
criminal activity is punished much more severely than attempted crime.  Legal scholars 
argue there is less culpability when the crime is a mere attempt because, although there 
was the same amount of intent to carry out the crime, the perpetrators did not have 
enough foresight or motivation to ensure their crime would be successful.  This is then 
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borne out in the legislatures and courtrooms when those guilty of attempted crimes are 
punished less severely than those guilty of successful crime.  If terrorism is similar to 
“regular” criminal behaviour, according to this reasoning, attempted terrorism should 
merit less desire amongst decisionmakers to use military and unilateral responses. 
 The second factor of a terrorist attack influencing a decsionmaker’s preferences 
for different responses could be the location of the attack.  The research measuring the 
amount, as well as the historical descriptions of the type, of counterterrorism response in 
relation to the amount of terrorism activity suggests that as terrorism increases in 
proximity to populations, there is an increased amount of counterterrorism policies 
initiated.  Furthermore, psychology studies suggest an increased amount of 
psychological trauma is experienced by victims the closer they are located to dramatic 
events. (see pages 13-4)  Thus, the closer a terrorist attack, the greater is the likelihood 
respondents will prefer unilateral and military responses. 
 The third factor which could influence decisionmakers’ preferences for how to 
respond to a terrorist attack might be the socio-cultural similarity of the alleged 
terrorists.  In the discussions and analyses of terrorism, much is written, especially in the 
general media, about terrorists being from a different ethnicity and religion.  Many 
scholars and authors have written about a perception amongst the general population that 
the Middle Eastern societies and Islamic religion are synonymous with terrorism 
resulting in hate crimes against those of such backgrounds.  Alternatively, other authors 
suggest that some countries have failed to prosecute counterterrorism policies against 
socio-culturally different groups with whom they do not believe they have a grievance.  
 164
Psychology literature notes that people constantly are categorizing others as being 
different or similar (in-group/out-group) and are harbouring negative emotions towards 
those who are different.  Still other research has noticed that countries tend to have less 
conflict with others with whom they share similar socio-cultural backgrounds. (see pages 
14-8)  Thus, one might expect that an attack from socio-culturally different terrorists 
would lead to an increased preference to use unilateral and military responses towards 
those terrorists.  Multilateral and legal responses are deemed as being more successful 
for controlling socio-culturally similar terrorists, who presumably recognize the same 
norms and values upheld by these responses, especially if socio-culturally similar 
terrorists’ home country does not support them and will cooperate in containing them. 
The Model 
 Together, the above elements suggest a model of how decisionmakers would 
prefer to respond to terrorist attacks.  If the attack is successful, it is more likely to elicit 
a preference for the use of military and unilateral responses than an attack which is a 
mere attempt.  If the attack is committed at home, it is more likely to create a preference 
for the use of military and unilateral responses than an attack abroad.  If the attack is 
committed by socio-culturally different terrorists, it will more likely produce a 
preference for military and unilateral responses than an attack by socio-culturally similar 
terrorists.  These three factors (successful attacks, at home, by dissimilar terrorists) elicit 
the preferences for the “more drastic/aggressive” military and unilateral responses by 
triggering stronger emotional responses from the decisionmakers.  The decisionmakers, 
being emotionally influenced by the attacks with specific combinations of these 
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elements, will be less likely to consider and choose their responses to the acts 
deliberately and “rationally,” and thus will prefer the military and unilateral options, 
even if they have a lower probability of success at stopping the terrorism than the legal 
and multilateral options. (see Chapter III) 
The First Experiment 
 Testing this model was done with three experiments and a case study; 
experiments are particularly useful for testing decisionmaking because of one’s ability to 
manipulate the various nuances of decisionmaking for evaluation, while case studies 
allow for the examination of decisionmaking processes during historical events. The first 
experiment evaluated the effects of terrorist attack success and location on the 
preferences of respondents for the use of legal or military responses, either unilateral or 
multilateral.  The subjects in the experiment were split into four groups: the first group 
was given a news story about a successful terrorist attack by socio-culturally different 
terrorists upon Americans abroad, the second group was the same but told of an 
unsuccessful terrorist attack abroad, the third group was told a story of a successful 
attack at home, and the fourth group was told of an unsuccessful terrorist attack at home.  
The four groups then were asked to rank their preferences for each of four policy options 
for responding to the attack: a unilateral-military response, a multilateral-military 
response, a unilateral-legal/law enforcement response, and a multilateral-legal/law 
enforcement response.  The respondents also were asked if they experienced any of a set 
of emotions (anger, fear, etc. as established in the previously mentioned cognitive 
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calculus research) during the experiment to determine the involvement of emotion in the 
listing of their preferences for the four responses. (see Chapters IV and V) 
 The respondents in the first experiment indicated a significant preference for the 
use of all of the options when the attacks occurred at home.  The second important 
finding was that, of all the options, the respondents preferred the use of the legal and 
multilateral options, not the unilateral and military.  In this experiment the physical 
proximity of the threat to people appears to have the greatest impact on people’s 
preferences for a response, which arguably is reasonable given that proximity can 
enhance awareness of the threat.  Surprising, as well, was that the response which was 
preferred was not the efficient and decisive military response to the threat at home, but 
the legal response (the more deliberative and less definitive choice).  Concomitantly, 
however, the respondents who did prefer the military options indicated feelings of anger 
on the emotion-reporting section; but otherwise, there were no statistically significant 
reports of emotion consistent with significant preferences for the deliberative legal 
options.   
Also interesting in the first experiment is that the respondents did not appear to 
distinguish between attempted and successful acts of terrorism which suggests a 
perception that attempted terrorism is just as “bad” as successful terrorism.  This is 
different from the perception of “regular” crime that exhibits less culpability for 
attempted than successful crime.  Thus, the perception of terrorism has less to do with 
acts of terrorism, than it does with the terrorists themselves and their mens rea 
(psychological intent to commit crime). (see Chapter V) 
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The Second Experiment 
 In the second experiment, the respondents were given the exact same conditions 
as in the first experiment but instead those conditions varied according to location and 
according to the socio-cultural similarity of the terrorists, while the success of the attack 
variable was held constant (all of the attacks in all four conditions were successful).  The 
respondents were asked how they would prefer each of the four options (same as from 
the first experiment: military and legal, either unilateral or multilateral) for responding to 
the situation according to their group/condition/assignment (the four conditions in this 
experiment being: an attack by socio-culturally similar terrorists at home, the same but 
abroad, an attack by socio-culturally dissimilar terrorists at home, or the same but 
abroad), with which they were confronted.  The respondents also were asked, as in the 
first experiment, if they experienced a certain set of emotions.  (see Chapters IV and VI) 
 The results in the second experiment were the same as the first regarding the 
location of the attack; when it occurred at home, there was a higher preference to use all 
of the options combined.  Important in the results of this second experiment were the 
significant preferences of the respondents to use the legal and multilateral responses in 
reaction to attacks by socio-culturally similar terrorists.  The results did not indicate any 
significant preference on the part of the respondents for any of the specific responses 
towards the dissimilar terrorists.  One might argue that the most this indicates is 
confusion or lack of confidence on the part of the respondents for how best to respond to 
dissimilar terrorists.  This argument might be more convincing after a close examination 
of the experimental materials: the similar terrorists were described as being from a 
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European country with the “abroad” attacks occurring in Italy.  The respondents might 
have felt comfortable with or more confident in the competence of the Italians or another 
European country in responding to terrorism to the extent they significantly could prefer 
the legal and multilateral options. (see Chapter VI) 
 As in the first experiment, the respondents in the second experiment did not 
report experiencing in significant levels any of the selected emotions.  The respondents 
did, however, express elevated feelings of anger in relation to their selection of the 
multilateral-legal response; this compared to the respondents in the first experiment 
reporting elevated levels of anger in conjunction with their selection of the unilateral-
military option. (see Chapter VI) 
The Third Experiment 
 The premise of this study was that certain elements of a terrorist attack affect, by 
way of influencing their emotional response, the preferences of decisionmakers for 
certain responses to terrorist attacks.  The third experiment set out to examine more 
carefully the role of the three factors (the basic effects of success, location and terrorist 
socio-cultural similarity which were examined and defined in the previous two 
experiments) in affecting the decisionmaking of the respondents as influenced by 
emotion.  The cognitive calculus concept would suggest specifically in this study that if 
the respondents were experiencing emotions in response to the terrorist attack scenarios 
(i.e., the various combinations of success, location and identity of the terrorists in each 
scenario triggering various levels of emotions), then they would be more likely to prefer 
certain options, especially military and unilateral responses, regardless of the options’ 
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effectiveness.  This experiment attempted to examine if the respondents were being 
emotionally influenced by the terrorist attacks in their decisionmaking through the 
attachment of various probabilities of success to the same four policy options as in the 
previous experiments: if the respondents were being emotionally influenced they would 
indicate their preferences for an option regardless of its probability for success.  
Decisionmakers uninfluenced by emotion would consistently choose the option with the 
highest probability of success regardless of how politically efficient or emotionally 
satisfying it might appear. (see Chapter IV) 
 The previous two experiments established four important findings.  These 
included the respondents’ higher preference for all four of the options when the attacks 
occurred at home, a higher preference for the multilateral and legal options in response 
to attacks from socio-cultural similar terrorists, that success of the attack has no affect, 
and that there was a correlation between anger and the preference for the unilateral use 
of military force and multilateral-legal options.  While the previous two experiments 
indicate a link between the various types of terrorist attacks in relation to the types of 
responses preferred (as well as the report of emotions), the third experiment attempted to 
establish and examine a more specific link between hypothesized emotions experienced 
as a result of the varying types of attacks and the specific options chosen, thereby 
illuminating a possible emotional affect terrorism has on the decisionmaking of how to 
respond to it.  (see Chapter VII) 
The third experiment was structured the same as the previous two, except that 
only the condition of attack location was manipulated (being at home and abroad) with 
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all attacks being successful and the terrorists being socio-culturally different.  The two 
groups/conditions according to attack location were then further divided.  The 
respondents were given the four options for responding to the attacks, but the first group 
in each condition was giving a set of options each with a probability of success similar to 
what had happened in history, while the second group was given the options with the 
probabilities reversed (for a total of four groups overall).  The question then was: Would 
the respondents indicate a higher preference for an option with a higher probability of 
success, or would they indicate a preference for options based upon other criteria (for 
example, was one option emotionally more satisfying)?  If the respondents indicated a 
higher preference for the options with a higher probability of success, the cognitive 
calculus would suggest the respondents were rationally considering the options and were 
not being influenced by emotion or vice-versa.  (see Chapters IV and \VII) 
 The third experiment yielded relatively dramatic and significant results which 
indicated the respondents were NOT responding emotionally to the acts of terrorism; in 
other words, the respondents did not appear to be “terrorized by the terrorism.”  The 
most important result was that the respondents had higher preferences for the responses 
to the attack which had higher probabilities of success.  The higher the options’ 
probability of success, the higher the preference rating the respondents gave the option.  
The respondents did not appear to be indicating their preference for an option based 
upon other factors such as emotion, or the option’s perceived efficiency, as had been 
hypothesized.  Secondly, as in the first two experiments, the respondents had higher 
preferences for the more deliberative and complicated multilateral and legal options over 
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the unilateral and military.  Thus, not only did the respondents prefer the responses with 
higher probabilities of success but also they preferred the options which were more 
sophisticated and uncertain.  The respondents appeared to be analyzing the information 
and considering the responses to the attacks in a thoughtful and “rational” manner, and 
not in the emotional or rash process hypothesized. (see Chapter VII) 
 Additionally, as in the first two experiments, the respondents had a higher 
preference for all of the responses when the attacks occurred at home than when abroad.  
Thus, proximity of the attack or threat of attack continued to heighten the awareness and 
desire of the respondents to react to the terrorism.  Also, consistent with the previous two 
experiments as well as the first two findings in this experiment, the respondents did not 
report any significant levels of emotion in reaction to the attack. 
The Case Study 
 While the experiments provided evidence of specific responses to specific 
situations in a structured experimental setting, a case study analysis provides perspective 
on those results in relation to historical events providing an alternate confirmation of the 
experimental findings.  A review of historical international terrorist attacks and 
attempted attacks involving the US, including the reaction and response of Americans 
and their political decisionmakers, reveals results consistent with those from the 
experiments: a preference for multilateral and legal actions.  Four particular cases help 
demonstrate the American response to attempted and successful terrorist attacks at home 
and abroad, all by dissimilar terrorists (there were no acceptable cases of attacks by 
socio-culturally similar terrorists which could be analyzed successfully).  The four cases 
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studied include the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the failed attempt 
to blow up several US Airliners two years later in the “Bojinka” plot, the bombing of the 
Khobar Towers US military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  (see Chapter VIII) 
 The first case studied involved the bombing of the World Trade Center in New 
York City in 1993.  A group of “radical Islamic extremists,” (later revealed to be under 
the auspices of Osama bin Laden) commanded by Ramzi Yousef, built a 1,500 pound 
fertilizer bomb which they placed in a panel van.  They then drove the van to the World 
Trade Center on February 26 and parked it in the underground garage below the Towers.  
They deliberately parked the van in a place where it likely would destroy one of the 
tower’s support beams causing the one tower to crash into the other and thus causing 
both to collapse.  Yousef and the other perpetrators then fled the scene.  Fifteen minutes 
later the bomb exploded, instantly killing six people in the garage area and sending 
suffocating smoke into the towers which caused hundreds more to be injured.  Much to 
the disappointment and frustration of Yousef, the towers did not collapse as intended.  
Several of the conspirators remained in the US to plot more attacks while others, 
including Yousef, fled the country. (see Chapter VIII) 
 The response to the bombing was remarkably “unremarkable.”  The consensus 
among most of the government leadership and the citizenry of the US at the time was 
that there could not be a bombing in the US and that “Middle Eastern” or Islamic 
terrorists would never attack the US mainland.  Thus, for several days after the attack 
many refused to believe it was a bombing but, rather, an industrial accident.  Although 
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some citizens called for a thorough investigation of the incident, for a month after the 
explosion most appeared to be concerned with the safety of the building and the 
emergency response.  The physical response was primarily a law enforcement response, 
with the local police and fire departments responding first.  The FBI became involved 
when the police first on the scene realized it was a bomb.  As officials gradually became 
aware of the magnitude of the attack, the US Attorney’s office took command of the 
case.  Presidential officials at The White House monitored the initial law enforcement 
investigation but never took command of the situation instead letting the FBI and US 
Attorney’s Office so do.  The FBI soon identified the conspirators in the bombing after a 
“lucky break,” arresting all but Yousef who remained in hiding in Pakistan and for 
whom the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service issued a ransom.  The 
conspirators who had been arrested were tried and successfully convicted for the 
bombing.  (see Chapter VIII) 
 The overall response to the World Trade Center bombing seems to have been 
relatively suppressed as most people (whether the average citizen or the President of the 
US) did not realize what had happened nor did they fully comprehend who had 
committed it.  Responsibility for responding to the attack progressed higher from one 
level of law enforcement to the next as officials became more aware of the size and 
scope of the attack; national security officials at the federal level never took command of 
the response once international terrorist involvement became known.  The experimental 
findings from this study (which indicated a higher preference for a response when the 
attack occurred in the US with no distinction for attack success or failure) suggest the 
 174
US would have taken a unilateral and military response against Yousef and his 
followers’ bases in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Egypt.  Interestingly, although the attack 
is labeled as a “mere attempt” by Yousef because the buildings did not collapse, one 
might wonder if the buildings had collapsed in this first attack, would the US’ response 
have been different?  Furthermore, had there been greater awareness amongst all 
Americans (including government officials) of the threat of terrorism posed by the 
radical Islamic terrorists in the US, would the response have been different? (see Chapter 
VIII) 
 The second case studied was the failed attempt to blow up numerous US airliners 
in the Bojinka Plot.  After Yousef left New York and fled to Pakistan, he came up with 
the idea (amongst others, including one to fly planes into the World Trade Center) to 
blow up several airliners at once using timed explosive devices.  He moved to Manila in 
the Philippines with two other subordinates where they began building bombs.  Yousef 
and another successfully tested their bombs in late 1994: one in a movie theater in 
Manila and another on a Philippines Airline flight bound for Japan which killed a 
passenger and nearly brought the plane down.  Yousef and his companions were 
building more bombs when they accidentally set off a harmless, small fire which alerted 
the Philippine police.  Yousef’s accomplices were arrested and extradited to the US, 
while Yousef escaped back to Pakistan, now with greater notoriety and law enforcement 
officials looking for him.  Yousef then attempted to carry out some bombings of US 
airliners in the region, but he was compromised by yet another accomplice who accepted 
the US offer to inform on Yousef.  Yousef was arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the 
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US where he was tried and convicted for the original Trade Center bombing and other 
acts of terrorism.  (see Chapter VIII) 
 The US response to the Bojinka plot was a legal and multilateral response, 
consistent with what the respondents would have preferred in the experiment for an 
attempted attack abroad.  Once US national security and law enforcement officials 
became aware of the attempted attacks, they began working with the Philippine 
authorities in a multilateral-law enforcement investigation.  US law enforcement 
authorities, with the approval of the President, also began increasing security on 
international flights of US airlines upon the orders of senior security and transportation 
officials.  The investigation into and manhunt for Yousef was essentially a continuation 
of the law enforcement response to the World Trade Center bombings, but with the 
sighting of Yousef in Manila, the US agents had more information about him and were 
able to track him to Pakistan.  Once he was located in Pakistan, US officials worked with 
the Pakistanis in a multilateral operation to arrest and extradite Yousef to the US.  The 
legal and multilateral response appears to have been satisfactory under the 
circumstances.  (see Chapter VIII) 
 The third case studied was that of the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia 
on June 26, 1996 in which a tanker truck filled with a 5,000 pound bomb was driven and 
parked next to barracks housing US military personnel where it detonated.  The blast 
killed 19 US service personnel and injured hundreds more including many non-
Americans.  Saudi officials were able to arrest several members of the group who carried 
out the bombing while the leader and another escaped.  Those responsible for the attack 
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were quickly identified as agents of the Iranian Government, whose leaders had 
enthusiastically ordered the attack in an attempt to scare the US out of the region. (see 
Chapter VIII) 
 As news of the attack reached senior US government officials they began to 
organize all of the information they had and to discuss a possible response.  Six hours 
after the attack the President decided that the FBI would handle the response and the 
investigation into the bombing, and he announced the decision to the nation in a press 
conference.  The FBI then had to coordinate a multilateral response with the Saudi 
officials with whom they had very little contact.  It took several days for the FBI to be 
allowed into Saudi Arabia and to be allowed to help with the investigation into the 
bombing.  Some senior US national security officials immediately suspected Iran was 
involved in the attack but barring any credible evidence, the immediate response 
arguably had to be a law enforcement one in order to gather evidence proving who was 
responsible.  Several weeks later, credible evidence of Iran’s responsibility was 
obtained.  (see Chapter VIII) 
 Senior US officials allege, once the evidence of Iran’s involvement was known, 
that this knowledge was suppressed by the President and a majority of his officials 
because they feared it would hurt their efforts to reestablish diplomatic ties with Iran.  
These efforts at suppression were not difficult given the other significant events 
occurring that summer which preoccupied the attention of most Americans: the 
explosion of TWA 800 and the bombings at the Olympics in Atlanta.  Most public 
concern regarding the bombing appears to have been with ensuring a full investigation 
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into the bombing and with “incompetent” government officials allowing lax security at 
the barracks.  Given the decision to proceed with a law enforcement response and given 
the FBI’s limited resources in the Middle East, the response had to be multilateral since 
the help of the Saudis was necessary.  However, had the information of Iran’s 
responsibility for the bombing been more widely publicized, one could only speculate if 
the US might have initiated a military response against Iran for the bombing.  (see 
Chapter VIII) 
 The fourth and final case study was that of the attacks on September 11, 2001 in 
which at least four teams of approximately five men each hijacked 4 planes.  Two of the 
planes were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center causing both of them 
to collapse.  The third plane crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC.  The fourth 
plane, destined to attack the White House, crashed into a field in Pennsylvania when the 
passengers fought back against the terrorists forcing them to crash the plane.  The 
momentous attacks that day would trigger a dramatic response and eventually lead to an 
essentially unilateral-military response by the US against the terrorists and their bases.  
(see Chapter VIII) 
 The response the day of the attack was almost immediately unilateral and 
military at every level of the US government, although there was no uniformly 
coordinated response amongst each sector of the federal government.  As soon as air 
traffic controllers realized several planes were hijacked, they (in addition to the 
unprecedented move of grounding all aircraft) contacted military authorities who then 
began following predetermined procedures and launched military aircraft.  Meanwhile, 
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national security officials and government leaders began taking protective measures 
moving to bunkers and assessing the crisis.  As the day progressed, the President, 
national security personnel, and other government leaders met to review the information 
regarding the attacks to determine who was responsible.  The President’s immediate 
reaction before any formal discussions began, and despite the counsel of some of his 
advisors to carefully deliberate over the information and carefully plan a response, was 
that the country was at war and a military response would be the response to the attacks.  
Most public opinion was supportive of the unilateral-military response, although there 
was a surprisingly significant amount of discussion in public forums counseling a 
cautionary and multilateral approach in responding to the attacks.  The US soon 
thereafter launched well organized attacks, in cooperation with other states, against the 
terrorists and their bases in Afghanistan as well as other places. (see Chapter VIII) 
 The experimental findings that respondents appeared to respond calmly and 
deliberatively in determining their preferences for how to respond to the attacks is also 
notable in the responses to the above four attacks in history, including the 9/11 attacks, 
where there were some calls for a more deliberative and cautious response.  Multilateral-
law enforcement responses were used consistently throughout the first three.  It is 
important to note the possible involvement of misinformation affecting the responses to 
the first World Trade Center and Khobar Towers bombings.  If more information had 
been available to and/or acknowledged by more citizens and officials that the First 
World Trade Center bombing was an act of terrorism by dangerous terrorists, would the 
response have been a military one instead?  The experiments seem to suggest there 
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might have been.  Or was the cognitive dissonance against terrorism occurring in the US 
too strong amongst most Americans that it would take more “learning” and experiencing 
of terrorism before results similar to those found in the experiments could be seen?  If 
the involvement of the Iranians in the Khobar Towers bombing had been more widely 
known, would there have been military response against Iran (although the experiments 
suggest that if this information had been more widely available there still would not have 
been a military attack against Iran)? (see Chapter VIII)  
Implications 
 The findings from this study suggest some interesting questions regarding the 
details of the research and policy reviews used as a basis for the questions for this study.  
While the findings are not interpreted as directly challenging any of the literature used 
for the study’s foundation, the results of this project do raise important questions about 
the interpretations of the findings in those studies.  Academically, the results in this 
study could have implications for 1) the definitions of terrorism upon which other 
studies are based, 2) distinctions of the impact of emotion in the cognitive calculus, 3) 
the issue of psychological reactions to traumatic events, and 4) socio-cultural group 
relations and perceptions.  The results might also have implications for public policy in 
how governments prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism, especially regarding the 
amount and type of information provided to the public regarding terrorism. 
 The first experiment suggested that the respondents perceived no distinction 
between attempted and successful terrorist attacks which could have implications for the 
definitions of terrorism used in many studies on the subject.  Although the goal of the 
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first experiment was designed to capture the degree of the respondents’ reactions to 
varying degrees of terrorist attacks, the lack of a difference between the respondents’ 
reactions to the attempted and successful attacks had the unintended result of suggesting 
that people see terrorism equally at any level of intensity.  These findings also could be 
interpreted as a need for more sophisticated inquiry into to what kinds of acts committed 
by would-be terrorists impact on a society so as to cause “terror.”  In other words, many 
scholars suggest that acts of terrorism consist of acts such as hijackings, kidnappings, 
murders, bombings, assassinations, etc.; however, do the findings of this study also 
suggest that other criminal behaviour, such as property crimes, disorderly conduct and 
other “misdemeanors,” be included in definitions of terrorism because they too have a 
terrorizing impact on a society?  Furthermore, many studies which report rates of 
terrorism (many gauging the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies) rely on a 
definition of terrorism which often defines terrorism as completed acts.  If the results in 
this study suggest a perception that there is no distinction between attempted and 
successful acts of terrorism, then perhaps definitions of terrorism should be modified to 
include also attempted attacks or the threat of terrorism.  Might this change subsequently 
increase the number of cases to be analyzed, thereby altering the interpretation of 
previous findings? 
 This study used the cognitive calculus concept, specifically research suggesting 
emotion alters the speed and intensity of decisionmaking, to suggest that acts of 
terrorism triggered emotional reactions in decisionmakers causing them to prefer the 
more “efficient” and “satisfying” military and unilateral actions.  The experiments in this 
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study, however, had results suggesting that the respondents were deliberate and 
thoughtful in their preferences of responses choosing the legal and multilateral 
responses, as well as those with higher probabilities of success.  Assuming the 
experiments were engineered correctly to produce an authentic reaction amongst the 
respondents towards a terrorist attack (which is, admittedly, a complicated and difficult 
assumption to make) this finding suggests a need to further examine the definitional 
parameters of the intensity of emotional reactions and the quality of subsequent 
decisions made within the context of the cognitive calculus.  Alternatively, providing 
respondents with courses of action in response to acts of terrorism instead of measuring 
their emotional reactions might have altered the report of their emotions.  Again, as 
discussed in the third chapter, the impact of emotion on decision making is difficult to 
measure given the rudimentary understandings of the psychological mechanisms 
involved in decisionmaking and emotion.  One possible reason for the results in these 
experiments was that respondents may have been experiencing the emotions targeted by 
the experiments but the emotions had no effect upon their decisions of preferences for 
the responses.  Alternatively, the manipulated emotions were too weak to extend any 
impact.  Further studies can incorporate more vivid manipulation to generate stronger 
emotions and thus serve as additional tests of this notion.   
 Some psychology literature was used in this study as a basis to suggest that the 
proximity and intensity of a traumatic event (in this case a terrorist attack) increases the 
emotional and psychological reaction of victims.  Thus, the combination of the closer the 
location and the greater the success of a terrorist attack, will cause a stronger emotional 
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reaction amongst the respondents thereby influencing them to choose the military and 
unilateral options.  While the results of the experiments did show a significantly stronger 
reaction amongst the respondents towards attacks at home than abroad as was predicted, 
the preferences were not (again assuming the experiment was engineered correctly to 
produce an authentic emotional reaction) for the military and unilateral responses but 
rather for the legal and multilateral.  Thus, while there was a stronger response to attacks 
at home, the preference for the more deliberative and complicated responses suggests a 
reaction which was based more on a sense of urgency rather than a sense of panic or 
fear; this is further supported by the insignificant levels of self-reporting of these 
emotions.  The result arguably suggests a need for more clarification and definition of 
the forms and/or types of emotional reactions of victims to traumatic events.  This is not 
to argue that there is no psychological or emotional trauma suffered in response to a 
traumatic event, but rather to argue that more needs to be done to understand the nuances 
of various individual reactions so as to better understand one’s response. 
 The third element this study hypothesized would alter a decisionmakers’ 
preference for response to a terrorist attack was the socio-cultural identity of the 
terrorists, based partly on the assertion of some public policy scholars who argue the 
severity of America’s response to terrorists depends upon their race and ethnicity.  
Assuming, again, that the experiments were engineered correctly to produce an authentic 
reaction amongst the respondents, the findings in the second experiment challenge this 
assertion.  The respondents showed no significant difference in their response to socio-
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culturally similar or dissimilar terrorists.  Thus, more examination and clarification is 
needed of the role of socio-cultural identity in one’s response to terrorism. 
 Counter-terrorism policy also might be adjusted in light of the findings obtained 
from this study, particularly in terms of information disseminated by authorities in 
response to an attack.  The experiments suggested (within their limited confines) 
respondents were not as influenced by the success or identity of the terrorists as much as 
they were by the location of the attack which appeared to have the most influence upon 
their sense of urgency to respond.  Thus, in order to provide information to the public or 
other branches of government as to the intensity of the threat, thereby allowing them to 
determine how best to respond (defensive or security awareness measures to prepare for 
future attacks), the experiments suggest that one of the more important elements of 
information to provide regarding an attack is its location and/or proximity.  Additionally, 
the case study analysis of the first World Trade Center bombing where both average 
citizens and many government officials were so surprised by the terrorist attack that their 
cognitive dissonance caused them to ignore it and future terrorist threats, suggests that 
education on future possible attack scenario descriptions and possible threats might 
allow for a more effective response were such an event to occur. 
 Furthermore, although some policymakers might be concerned that releasing 
such information would “scare” or panic the public causing an overly emotional and 
irrational response, the experiments, again, suggest that this might not be the case.  
Making the assumption that the experiments engineered correctly to produce an 
authentic reaction from the respondents, the results of the experiments suggest that the 
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respondents reacted to the terrorist attacks calmly and deliberately, choosing options 
which were believed to have the greatest chance of success, and choosing the more 
deliberate and complicated legal and multilateral responses.  Although this assertion 
deserves more study, one could argue that policymakers should feel more confident in 
providing public/non-sensitive information regarding the threat of terrorism they would 
otherwise not share because of concern it might cause panic amongst the general public. 
 Lastly, the results suggest that those public policy decisionmakers concerned 
about societal cohesion while under the threat of terrorism should not necessarily be 
concerned about implementing dramatic security responses simply to create an 
atmosphere of security.  Instead the experiments indicate a preference amongst the 
respondents for policy which are effective, as well as for multilateral and legal responses 
(which presumably “maintain” the foundations of societal contracts amongst larger 
populations).  Although much more research is needed to examine the nuances and 
boundaries of these findings, they do seem to suggest that the public might be willing to 
sacrifice some semblance of public safety in return for the implementation of a 
competent, comprehensive and lasting counter-terrorism policy. 
Future Research 
 The goal of this study was to develop a sound initial foundation upon which to 
conduct more research on the effects that terrorist act ingredient variation have on 
decisionmaker responses to it; based upon these initial findings, there are several 
potential avenues of future research.  These future lines of research can be grouped into 
three categories including: extending the experiments in this study to include other 
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different groups of subjects, other locations or settings outside of the area of the 
aforementioned groups of subjects, and restructuring the methodology of the 
experiments. 
 This study appears to have established, using consistently similar groups of 
subjects, some validity and reliability of the concept of decisionmaker response to acts 
of terrorism depending upon the variations among the attacks of success, location and 
identity of the terrorists, as well as measuring the emotionally influenced responses and 
decisionmaking of the respondents.  The groups of subjects used in the study consisted 
of undergraduate students who may have had common biases which affected the results.  
Thus, the experiments in this study should be conducted on other distinct groups of 
individuals to determine if the results found here can be extrapolated to others.  Potential 
subjects include those who do not have a college education and subjects in older age 
groups.  A particularly useful group of subjects to whom these experiments could be 
administered would be senior political leaders and/or government decisionmakers.  
These results would be useful because these individuals are the most likely to be 
executing the actual responses to acts of terrorism and it would be important to 
determine if the findings of this study match their decisionmaking, especially when this 
study makes assertions about the decisionmaking of counterterrorism officials. 
 Future research should include groups of subjects outside of the American 
environment.  The case study appeared to suggest that as the American public and 
political leadership became more aware of terrorism and the potential threat of it, that 
their responses became more normalized.  Specifically, on the part of average citizens 
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and government leaders, there appeared to be an “ignorance,” or more specifically 
cognitive dissonance, regarding the threat of terrorism against Americans around the 
time of the first World Trade Center attacks which continually lessened up to and after 
the September 11 attacks (government leaders who had more contact with intelligence 
and information regarding terrorism appeared to lose this faster due to their “learning”).  
Since all of the subjects in this experiment and all other groups of subjects in the US 
have experienced the substantial impact of the September 11 attacks, this event may 
have biased, and will bias, the results by altering the attitudes of respondents towards 
responding to terrorism.  The results obtained in this study might have been different had 
it been conducted prior to September 11, 2001.  Therefore, important insights regarding 
people’s responses to terrorism might be gained by administering these experiments to 
subjects in countries which have not experienced terrorism or large scale terrorist events.  
The design of the experimental materials is intended to be as universal and generalizable 
as possible so that it could be used with other countries.  Regardless of their size, all 
countries have some military or law enforcement capability which could allow them to 
conduct some unilateral-military action against the home of a terrorist in another 
country; the only question then is whether or not that action is practical or feasible.   
One could argue that the model in this project might yield the same results if 
conducted in other countries.  Subjects in countries with higher rates of terrorism than 
the US might have less of an emotional reaction to terrorism as a result of having been 
desensitized to the continuous violence of repeated attacks, resulting in even stronger 
preferences for the deliberative and sophisticated multilateral and legal options.  
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Alternatively, subjects in countries with higher rates of terrorism might have greater 
sensitivity towards terrorism resulting in a stronger emotional response and preference 
for unilateral-military action.   
Additionally, subjects in societies with higher rates of terrorism than the US may 
provide different results depending upon their perceptions of success of the various types 
of counter-terrorism policies used in their own countries’ campaigns against terrorism.  
If their country has had greater success with one type of response over another, the 
respondents probably would indicate a higher preference for that more successful 
response regardless of their emotional reaction. 
Subjects in countries with lower rates of terrorism may show no significant 
preference for any of the responses because they do not have any understanding of 
terrorism and thus do not know how they want to respond.  A finding of this nature, in 
addition to the above discussion about a population “learning” about terrorism and how 
to respond, would require further adjustment to the model used in this project to include 
this concept of “learning” how to respond to terrorism.   
 Future research also might explore respondents’ preferences for sub-categories of 
responses within those tested in this study.  Respondents might have different 
preferences for the military response depending upon who executed it or how it was 
executed.  How the action was to be characterized in the media at a later date might 
affect respondents’ support for the action depending upon its perceived legality.   
 Alternatively, this project could be expanded to examine a wider scope of 
alternative responses to terroristic acts by determining respondents’ preferences for 
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different types of legal responses.  A future study of this nature might study, more 
specifically, preferences of respondents for sanctions (if that study involves an 
examination of nation-state sponsorship of terrorism) versus war crimes tribunals. 
 Finally, the construction of the experiments in this study should be tested in the 
alternate configurations to confirm results consistent with the original findings.  As 
noted in the fourth chapter, an inherent problem (and benefit) with experiments is the 
relatively limited ability to produce sophisticated and comprehensive testing 
environments that obtain widely generalizable results from the subjects; it is difficult to 
infer how others would act in situations different from that used in the experiment.  
Thus, the same assertions made in this study should be tested with multiple variations of 
terrorist attack scenarios (e.g. smaller/larger, urban/rural, different targets) to confirm the 
reliability and validity of the results.   
Furthermore, it is difficult in an experimental setting to create realistic emotional 
reactions in the subjects given the structured and manufactured experimental setting, 
which suggests a continued need for alternative and additional methods to confirm the 
findings of the emotional reactions of the subjects in this study.  Additional studies also 
might find other ways to manipulate the socio-cultural identity of the terrorists in the 
scenarios to confirm the lack of reaction of the respondents to attacks by terrorists of 
different socio-cultural similarity because this is an important policy issue, and the 
findings in this study which are contrary to commonly held assumptions must be 
examined more closely.  Alternatively, one could expand the concepts of this study to 
understand support for responses to terrorist attacks on victims in another country 
 189
different from one’s own, especially depending upon the variation of the socio-cultural 
similarity of the victims.  While this study showed no difference in the respondents’ 
preferences for counter-terrorism policies depending upon the socio-cultural similarity of 
the terrorists who attacked American citizens at home and abroad, the preferences might 
be different depending upon the socio-cultural similarity of the victims.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
DIAGRAM OF SURVEY ONE 
 
 
Principle Investigator reads study/survey announcement.  Appendix B 
↓ 
Respondents read information sheet. Appendix C 
↓ 
Respondents read survey welcome, and click begin button at bottom of page. Appendix D 
↓ 
Respondents read survey instructions, and click begin button at bottom of page. Appendix E 
↓ 
Respondents then 
read story about an 
attempted terrorist 
attack in the US on 
Americans by 
dissimilar terrorists, 
and click the continue 
button at the bottom 
of the screen. 
Appendix F 
↓ 
Respondents then read 
story about an attempted 
terrorist attack in Italy on 
Americans by dissimilar 
terrorists, and click the 
continue button at the 
bottom of the screen. 
Appendix G 
↓ 
Respondents then read 
a story about a terrorist 
attack in the US on 
Americans by 
dissimilar terrorists, 
and click the continue 
button at the bottom of 
the page. Appendix H 
↓ 
Respondents then read 
a story about a 
terrorist attack in Italy 
on Americans by 
dissimilar terrorists, 
and click the continue 
button at the bottom 
of the page. 
Appendix I 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly he or she prefers (on a scale of 0 to 10 for each item 
individually) the 4 possible responses to the attack.  They then click the continue button at the bottom 
of the screen. Appendix J 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly he or she agrees (on a scale of 0 to 10 for each item 
individually) with 13 manipulation validity questions regarding their reaction to the attack.  They then 
click the continue button at the bottom of the screen. Appendix K 
↓ 
Respondents are then presented with a screen informing them that they are finished with the survey.  
They are thanked for their participation.   
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APPENDIX B 
 
SURVEY RECRUITING ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
 
 Hi, my name is Matt Allan.  I’m a PhD candidate here in the Political Science 
Department and I’m conducting a survey on Terrorism as part of my research for my 
dissertation.  I would like to ask you be a part of that survey.  The survey is done by 
looking at some web pages on a computer and should take no more than 20 minutes.  It 
involves you reading a news-story about terrorism and then answering some questions 
about how you think the federal government should respond.   
 
If you would like to be a part of my survey please read this information sheet 
carefully.  After that please follow me to the computer lab in room 2068.  Any 
questions? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
The Legal-Military Dilemma in the Response to International Terrorism 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this form is to provide you (as a prospective research study participant) information that may affect 
your decision as to whether or not to participate in this research. 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study on terrorism.  The purpose of this study is to learn more about 
how we prefer to respond to terrorism.  You were selected to be a possible participant because you are a student in 
this class.   
 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to review hypothetical (fictional) information about an act of 
terrorism. You will be asked to report your preferences with regard to how the US should react in such a case. In 
addition you will be asked to answer questions on how you feel with regard to the news item you will read.  This study 
will take approximately 20 minutes or less. 
 
What are the risks involved in this study? 
The risks associated in this study are minimal, and are not greater than risks ordinarily encountered in daily life. 
 
What are the possible benefits of this study? 
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, the information you provide may help us, as 
a nation, understand how better to respond to terrorism.   
 
Do I have to participate? 
No.  Your participation is voluntary.  You may decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without your current 
or future relations with Texas A&M University being affected.   
 
Who will know about my participation in this research study? 
This study is anonymous. No identifiers linking you to this study will be included in any sort of report that might be 
published. There is NO written material that will indicate that you were part of this study. 
 
Whom do I contact with questions about the research?  
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Matthew Allan (mallan@politics.tamu.edu, or (XXX)XXX-
XXXX) or Dr. Nehemia Geva (e339ng@politics.tamu.edu or (XXX) XXX-XXXX). 
 
Whom do I contact about my rights as a research participant?   
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects’ Protection Program and/or the Institutional Review 
Board at Texas A&M University.  For research-related problems or questions regarding your rights as a research 
participant, you can contact these offices at (979)458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu. 
 
Participation 
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to your satisfaction.  If 
you would like to be in the study, please follow the directions of the person who gave you this sheet. 
 
 212
APPENDIX D 
 
SURVEY WELCOME 
 
 
Welcome and congratulations for being selected to be a part of this survey.  
 
This survey is designed to evaluate your policy preference in reaction to a terrorist attack. 
 
You will be asked to respond to a hypothetical scenario. 
 
Your responses are completely anonymous.  
 
If you have any problems at all please raise your hand and the administrator will come over to 
your station. 
 
You may begin this experiment by clicking on the begin button at the bottom of the screen. 
 
BEGIN 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
Please take your time and read these instructions thoroughly until you understand them well.  Your 
success in this simulation depends on your understanding of these instructions. 
 
Imagine you just sat down at your computer to read the news on a news website (for example: CNN, Fox, 
The Eagle, KBTX, The Chronicle, etc.).  
 
After you click the start button below, you will be shown a news story which you should read. 
 
When you’re finished, click the continue button at the bottom of the screen. 
 
You will then be presented with 4 questions, each appearing on your screen one at a time.  You will be 
asked to rate your preference for each of 4 possible options your government leaders could pursue in 
response to the information you read in the news story.   
 
You will be asked to rate each of the options according to how strongly you would prefer this response be 
chosen (0=not highly prefer, 10=have a strong preference for the response).  After you click on the number 
you want, click on the continue button to proceed to the next screen. 
 
Following these questions you will be presented with additional 13 questions about your experience in this 
survey.   
 
Each screen that presents a question includes also a timer, as we want you to answer the questions 
spontaneously (at the “gut level”).   
 
Press “Begin” when you ready to begin. 
 
BEGIN  
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APPENDIX F 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR DOMESTIC  
 
UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
2Print it | 4E-mail it to a friend 
Attempted Terrorist Attack in Miami  
10:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007  
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
MIAMI, Florida (PI) – Authorities are reporting ten minutes ago an unexploded bomb was discovered in a 
nightclub and restaurant section of the South Beach area of Miami, Florida.   
 
Dade County Emergency officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than 
usual number due to Spring Break. 
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck was parked on Ocean 
Street in a block which contained a multitude of restaurants and clubs. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago by a Dade County Sheriff’s Department public affairs officer states that 
based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, the amount of possible damage, and on 
information from crowd control police already on the scene, the commander of the bomb squad estimated 
that at least 2,000 persons could have been killed. 
 
File photo of South Beach area of Miami. (PI photo/Bill Jones)19 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of Washington Avenue and 4th Street.  One police officer and one security 
guard are unaccounted for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are also under investigation by 
Internal Affairs Division of the Miami Police for possible terrorist ties. 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the attempted bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio 
station, and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation 
for America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
19 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of the South Beach area in Miami, FL consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR OVERSEAS UNSUCCESSFUL 
 
ATTACK BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
6Print it | 8E-mail it to a friend 
Attempted Terrorist Attack in Rome  
3:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007  
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
ROME, Italy (PI) – Authorities are reporting ten minutes ago an unexploded bomb was discovered in the 
Campo del Fiori nightclub and restaurant section of Rome, and area frequented by and popular with 
Americans living in and visiting the city.   
 
Italian Emergency officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than usual 
number due to a large number of Americans visiting for Spring Break. 
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck parked in an alley 
next to the square. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago by an Italian government spokeswoman stated that based on visual 
inspection of the location of the bomb, the amount of possible damage, and on information from crowd 
control police already on the scene, the commander of the bomb squad estimated that at least 2,000 
persons could have been killed. 
 
File photo of Campo del Fiori. (PI photo/Bill Jones)20 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of the square.  One police officer and one security guard are unaccounted 
for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are apparently being investigated by Italian authorities 
for possible terrorist ties. 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the attempted bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio 
station, and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation 
for America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
                                                 
20 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of the Campo del Fiori area of Rome, Italy consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR DOMESTIC SUCCESSFUL 
 
ATTACK BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
1Print it | 1E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Miami  
10:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
MIAMI, Florida (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the nightclub 
and restaurant section of the South Beach area of Miami, Florida.   
 
Emergency management officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than 
usual number due to Spring Break.   
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck which was parked on 
Ocean Street in a block which contained a multitude of restaurants and clubs. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the on-scene Fire Department Commander says he estimates, 
very confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and 
information from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be 
dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of Washington Avenue and 4th Street.  One police officer and one security 
guard are unaccounted for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are also under investigation by 
Internal Affairs Division of the Miami Police for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Ocean Street in the South Beach area of Miami moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)21 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
21 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR OVERSEAS SUCCESSFUL 
 
ATTACK BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
1Print it | 1E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Rome  
3:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
ROME, Italy (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the Campo del Fiori 
nightclub and restaurant section of Rome, an area frequented by and popular with Americans living in 
and visiting the city.   
 
Italian Emergency officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than usual 
number due to a large number of Americans visiting for Spring Break. 
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck parked in an alley 
next to the square. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the most senior Fire Official at the scene says he estimates, very 
confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and information 
from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of the square.  One police officer and one security guard are unaccounted 
for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are apparently being investigated by Italian authorities 
for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Campo del Fiori moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)22 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
Continue  
 
                                                 
22 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX J 
 
EXPERIMENT ONE SURVEY QUESTIONS23 
 
 
What do you think Washington should do? 
 
After considering the previous information about the terrorist attack, please select the level of priority for each of the 4 
possible options: -0=low preference, 10=high preference 
 
You have a limited time to complete this task. 
 
Click on the number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it at any time before 
moving to the next question. 
 
Order a combined military assault upon the base 
camps of the terrorists in Wabbistan using missiles 
launched from US naval ships in the region as well as 
bombing raids by B-2 Stealth Bombers. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order State and Defense Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they take military action to 
destroy the base camps of the terrorists and kill as 
many of them as possible. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order a raid against the terrorist camps by several 
teams of Delta Force operatives supported by US 
Army Rangers and a US Marine FAST Team located 
in the region to capture and forcibly extract the 
terrorists to stand trial here in the US for their attack. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order FBI, Justice and State Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they arrest all the members 
of the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks 
and allow them to be extradited to the US to stand trial 
for the attacks. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
                                                 
23 The questions appeared one per screen. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
ADDITIONAL QUESTION SHEET WITH QUESTIONS 
 
TO CONFIRM MANIPULATION VALIDITY24 
 
 
Please answer these final few questions. 
 
You will have a limited time to answer these questions.   
 
Click on the circle next to the corresponding number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it 
at any time before you click the continue button. 
 
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you say 
was fear?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you say 
was anger? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of you initial reaction to the attack would you say 
was shock?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you say 
was disbelief?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you say 
was sadness?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How likely do you think it is these terrorists will strike again?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How accurate do you think is the information ?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you want more information?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Would a military strike be effective in deterring further 
terrorist attacks?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you think it likely the defensive measures would work? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you think the terrorists deserved the preferred responses?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How similar is the terrorists\group to Americans? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                        Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How many (approximately) casualties were actually reported 
in this event? Type how many in this box 
 
Type how many in this box. 
  
 
 
                                                 
24 The questions appeared one per screen. 
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APPENDIX L 
 
DIAGRAM OF SURVEY TWO 
 
 
Principle Investigator reads study/survey announcement.  Appendix B 
↓ 
Respondents read information sheet. Appendix C 
↓ 
Respondents read survey welcome, and click begin button at bottom of page. Appendix D 
↓ 
Respondents read survey instructions, and click begin button at bottom of page. Appendix E 
↓ 
Respondents then read 
a story about a terrorist 
attack in the US on 
Americans by similar 
terrorists, and click the 
continue button at the 
bottom of the page. 
Appendix M 
↓ 
Respondents then read a 
story about a terrorist 
attack in Italy on 
Americans by similar 
terrorists, and click the 
continue button at the 
bottom of the page. 
Appendix N 
↓ 
Respondents then read a 
story about a terrorist 
attack in the US on 
Americans by dissimilar 
terrorists, and click the 
continue button at the 
bottom of the page. 
Appendix O 
↓ 
Respondents then read 
a story about a terrorist 
attack in Italy on 
Americans by 
dissimilar terrorists, 
and click the continue 
button at the bottom of 
the page. Appendix P 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly he or she prefers (on a scale of 0 to 10 for each item individually) the 
4 possible responses to the attack.  They then click the continue button at the bottom of the screen. Appendix Q 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly he or she agrees (on a scale of 0 to 10 for each item individually) with 
13 manipulation validity questions regarding their reaction to the attack.  They then click the continue button at 
the bottom of the screen. Appendix R 
↓ 
Respondents are then presented with a screen informing them that they are finished with the survey.  They are 
thanked for their participation.   
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APPENDIX M 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR DOMESTIC SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
 
BY SIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
1Print it | 2E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Miami  
10:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
MIAMI, Florida (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the nightclub 
and restaurant section of the South Beach area of Miami, Florida.   
 
Emergency management officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than 
usual number due to Spring Break.   
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck which was parked on 
Ocean Street in a block which contained a multitude of restaurants and clubs. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the on-scene Fire Department Commander says he estimates, 
very confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and 
information from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be 
dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of Washington Avenue and 4th Street.  One police officer and one security 
guard are unaccounted for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are also under investigation by 
Internal Affairs Division of the Miami Police for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Ocean Street in the South Beach area of Miami moments after the attack.   (PI photo/Bill Jones)25 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Radical Irfratny Brotherhood who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Irfratny is a federal democracy.  Irfratny and the US have had very friendly relations 
for the past century, and were allies in the Second World War.  Irfratny is the US’s fifth largest trading 
partner.  40% of the Irfratny population belongs to the Irfratny Protestant Church, 40% of the Irfratny 
population belongs to the Catholic church.  The Justice system of Irfratny is rated as one of the best in 
the world. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
25 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX N 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR OVERSEAS SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
 
BY SIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
2Print it | 2E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Rome  
3:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
ROME, Italy (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the Campo del Fiori 
nightclub and restaurant section of Rome, an area frequented by and popular with Americans living in 
and visiting the city.   
 
Italian Emergency officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than usual 
number due to a large number of Americans visiting for Spring Break. 
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck parked in an alley 
next to the square. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the most senior Fire Official at the scene says he estimates, very 
confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and information 
from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of the square.  One police officer and one security guard are unaccounted 
for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are apparently being investigated by Italian authorities 
for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Campo del Fiori moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)26 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Radical Irfratny Brotherhood who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Irfratny is a federal democracy.  Irfratny and the US have had very friendly relations 
for the past century, and were allies in the Second World War.  Irfratny is the US’s fifth largest trading 
partner.  40% of the Irfratny population belongs to the Irfratny Protestant Church, 40% of the Irfratny 
population belongs to the Catholic church.  The Justice system of Irfratny is rated as one of the best in 
the world. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
26 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX O 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR DOMESTIC SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
 
BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
2Print it | 2E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Miami  
10:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
MIAMI, Florida (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the nightclub 
and restaurant section of the South Beach area of Miami, Florida.   
 
Emergency management officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than 
usual number due to Spring Break.   
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck which was parked on 
Ocean Street in a block which contained a multitude of restaurants and clubs. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the on-scene Fire Department Commander says he estimates, 
very confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and 
information from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be 
dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of Washington Avenue and 4th Street.  One police officer and one security 
guard are unaccounted for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are also under investigation by 
Internal Affairs Division of the Miami Police for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Ocean Street in the South Beach area of Miami moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)27 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
27 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX P 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR OVERSEAS SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
 
BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
3Print it | 3E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Rome  
3:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
ROME, Italy (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the Campo del Fiori 
nightclub and restaurant section of Rome, an area frequented by and popular with Americans living in 
and visiting the city.   
 
Italian Emergency officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than usual 
number due to a large number of Americans visiting for Spring Break. 
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck parked in an alley 
next to the square. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the most senior Fire Official at the scene says he estimates, very 
confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and information 
from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of the square.  One police officer and one security guard are unaccounted 
for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are apparently being investigated by Italian authorities 
for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Campo del Fiori moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)28 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
28 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX Q 
 
EXPERIMENT TWO SURVEY QUESTIONS SHEET29 
 
 
What do you think Washington should do? 
 
After considering the previous information about the terrorist attack, please select the level of priority for each of the 4 
possible options: -0=low preference, 10=high preference 
 
You have a limited time to complete this task. 
 
Click on the number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it at any time before 
moving to the next question. 
 
Order a combined military assault upon the base 
camps of the terrorists in Wabbistan using missiles 
launched from US naval ships in the region as well as 
bombing raids by B-2 Stealth Bombers. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order State and Defense Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they take military action to 
destroy the base camps of the terrorists and kill as 
many of them as possible. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order a raid against the terrorist camps by several 
teams of Delta Force operatives supported by US 
Army Rangers and a US Marine FAST Team located 
in the region to capture and forcibly extract the 
terrorists to stand trial here in the US for their attack. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order FBI, Justice and State Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they arrest all the members 
of the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks 
and allow them to be extradited to the US to stand trial 
for the attacks. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
                                                 
29 The questions appeared one per screen. 
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APPENDIX R 
 
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SHEET WITH QUESTIONS TO 
 
CONFIRM MANIPULATION VALIDITY30 
 
 
Please answer these final few questions. 
 
You will have a limited time to answer these questions.   
 
Click on the circle next to the corresponding number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it 
at any time before you click the continue button. 
 
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was fear?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was anger? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of you initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was shock?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was disbelief?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was sadness?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                       Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How likely do you think it is these terrorists will strike 
again?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How accurate do you think is the information ?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you want more information?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Would a military strike be effective in deterring further 
terrorist attacks?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                       Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you think it likely the defensive measures would work? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you think the terrorists deserved the preferred responses?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How similar is the terrorists\group to Americans? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How many (approximately) casualties were actually reported 
in this event? Type how many in this box 
Type how many in this box. 
  
 
                                                 
30 The questions appeared one per screen. 
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APPENDIX S 
 
DIAGRAM OF SURVEY THREE 
 
 
Principle Investigator reads study/survey announcement.  Appendix B 
↓ 
Respondents read information sheet. Appendix C 
↓ 
Respondents read survey welcome, and click begin button at bottom of page. Appendix D 
↓ 
Respondents read survey instructions, and click begin button at bottom of page. Appendix E 
↓ 
Respondents then read a story about a 
terrorist attack in the US on Americans by 
dissimilar terrorists, and click the continue 
button at the bottom of the page. 
Appendix T 
↓ 
Respondents then read a story about a terrorist 
attack in Italy on Americans by dissimilar 
terrorists, and click the continue button at the 
bottom of the page. Appendix U 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly 
he or she prefers (on a scale of 0 to 10 for 
each item individually) the 4 possible 
responses to the attack.  Each response has 
a probability of success listed.  They then 
click the continue button at the bottom of 
the screen. Appendix V 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly he 
or she prefers (on a scale of 0 to 10 for each 
item individually) the 4 possible responses to 
the attack.  Each response has a probability of 
success listed, all of them being the reverse of 
those in Appendix 20.  They then click the 
continue button at the bottom of the screen. 
Appendix W 
↓ 
Respondents are then asked how strongly he or she agrees (on a scale of 0 to 10 for each 
item individually) with 13 manipulation validity questions regarding their reaction to the 
attack.  They then click the continue button at the bottom of the screen. Appendix X 
↓ 
Respondents are then presented with a screen informing them that they are finished with the 
survey.  They are thanked for their participation.   
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APPENDIX T 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR DOMESTIC SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
 
BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
3Print it | 3E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Miami  
10:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
MIAMI, Florida (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the nightclub 
and restaurant section of the South Beach area of Miami, Florida.   
 
Emergency management officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than 
usual number due to Spring Break.   
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck which was parked on 
Ocean Street in a block which contained a multitude of restaurants and clubs. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the on-scene Fire Department Commander says he estimates, 
very confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and 
information from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be 
dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of Washington Avenue and 4th Street.  One police officer and one security 
guard are unaccounted for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are also under investigation by 
Internal Affairs Division of the Miami Police for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Ocean Street in the South Beach area of Miami moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)31 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
                                                 
31 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX U 
 
EXPERIMENT STORY FOR OVERSEAS SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
 
BY DISSIMILAR TERRORISTS 
 
 
3Print it | 4E-mail it to a friend 
Terrorist Attack in Rome  
3:24 PM CDT on Friday, March 15, 2007 
By Bob Smith 
Press International 
ROME, Italy (PI) – Authorities are reporting that ten minutes ago a bomb exploded in the Campo del Fiori 
nightclub and restaurant section of Rome, an area frequented by and popular with Americans living in 
and visiting the city.   
 
Italian Emergency officials estimate as many as 5,000 people were in the area; the higher than usual 
number due to a large number of Americans visiting for Spring Break. 
 
The bomb is believed to have been in a truck disguised as a city maintenance truck parked in an alley 
next to the square. 
 
A statement made 3 minutes ago from the most senior Fire Official at the scene says he estimates, very 
confidently, based on visual inspection of the location of the bomb, amount of damage and information 
from police officials monitoring the crowds at the time, that at least 2,000 persons must be dead. 
 
Police officers patrolling the area reported finding 2 police officers and 3 nightclub security guards bound 
and shot dead in an alley off of the square.  One police officer and one security guard are unaccounted 
for, but they were not on duty in the area.  Both are apparently being investigated by Italian authorities 
for possible terrorist ties. 
 
Campo del Fiori moments after the attack.  (PI photo/Bill Jones)32 
 
A coded claim of responsibility for the bombing was delivered moments before to a local radio station, 
and is stated to be from the Wabbistan Brotherhood Army who claims to have acted in retaliation for 
America supporting the corrupt government of their country which has been trying to destroy them.  
Authorities have confirmed the coded call-sign of the message as being from that group. 
 
The government of Wabbistan is a kingdom ruled by an old benevolent grandfatherly king.  Wabbistan 
and the US have had very friendly relations for the past century, and were allies in the Second World 
War.  The US is the second largest importer of Wabbistan’s goods.  40% of the Wabbistan population 
belongs to the Islamic Sunni faith, 40% of the Wabbistan population belongs to the Islamic Shiite faith.  
The justice system of Wabbistan is believed to be very strict.  Foreigners who violate it are immediately 
expelled.  Amnesty international has not been able to determine any information about the justice 
system. 
 
Stay tuned for more information to come soon. 
 
Continue  
 
                                                 
32 The actual materials in the experiments presented to the subjects on the DecTracer computer interface allowed for the inclusion of 
a night-time picture of a fire and destruction of a street and building consistent with the above hypothetical news story. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
EXPERIMENT THREE SURVEY QUESTIONS SHEET33 
 
 
What do you think Washington should do? 
 
After considering the previous information about the terrorist attack, please select the level of priority for each of the 4 
possible options: -0=low preference, 10=high preference 
 
You have a limited time to complete this task. 
 
Click on the number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it at any time before 
moving to the next question. 
 
Order a combined military assault upon the base 
camps of the terrorists in Wabbistan using missiles 
launched from US naval ships in the region as well as 
bombing raids by B-2 Stealth Bombers.  This option 
has a 70% chance of stopping the terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                   High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order State and Defense Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they take military action to 
destroy the base camps of the terrorists and kill as 
many of them as possible.  This option has a 35% 
chance of stopping the terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order a raid against the terrorist camps by several 
teams of Delta Force operatives supported by US 
Army Rangers and a US Marine FAST Team located 
in the region to capture and forcibly extract the 
terrorists to stand trial here in the US for their attack.  
This option has a 50% chance of stopping the 
terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order FBI, Justice and State Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they arrest all the members 
of the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks 
and allow them to be extradited to the US to stand trial 
for the attacks.  This option has a 80% chance of 
stopping the terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
                                                 
33 The questions appeared one per screen. 
 231
APPENDIX W 
 
EXPERIMENT THREE SURVEY QUESTIONS SHEET34 
 
 
What do you think Washington should do? 
 
After considering the previous information about the terrorist attack, please select the level of priority for each of the 4 
possible options: -0=low preference, 10=high preference 
 
You have a limited time to complete this task. 
 
Click on the number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it at any time before 
moving to the next question. 
 
Order a combined military assault upon the base 
camps of the terrorists in Wabbistan using missiles 
launched from US naval ships in the region as well as 
bombing raids by B-2 Stealth Bombers.  This option 
has a 50% chance of stopping the terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order State and Defense Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they take military action to 
destroy the base camps of the terrorists and kill as 
many of them as possible.  This option has a 80% 
chance of stopping the terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                   High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order a raid against the terrorist camps by several 
teams of Delta Force operatives supported by US 
Army Rangers and a US Marine FAST Team located 
in the region to capture and forcibly extract the 
terrorists to stand trial here in the US for their attack.  
This option has a 70% chance of stopping the 
terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Order FBI, Justice and State Department officials to 
conduct comprehensive meetings with the Wabbistan 
Government to request that they arrest all the members 
of the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks 
and allow them to be extradited to the US to stand trial 
for the attacks.  This option has a 35% chance of 
stopping the terrorists. 
HOW MUCH DO I PREFER TO DO THIS? 
How much do you prefer to do this? 
Low                                                                                     High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
                                                 
34 The questions appeared one per screen. 
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APPENDIX X 
 
ADDITIONAL QUESTION SHEET WITH QUESTIONS TO 
 
CONFIRM MANIPULAITON VALIDITY35 
 
 
Please answer these final few questions. 
 
You will have a limited time to answer these questions.   
 
Click on the circle next to the corresponding number of your choice, the computer will record your response, and you may change it 
at any time before you click the continue button. 
 
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was fear?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was anger? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of you initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was shock?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was disbelief?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How much of your initial reaction to the attack would you 
say was sadness?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                    Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How likely do you think it is these terrorists will strike 
again?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How accurate do you think is the information ?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you want more information?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Would a military strike be effective in deterring further 
terrorist attacks?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                     Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you think it likely the defensive measures would work? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Do you think the terrorists deserved the preferred 
responses?  
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                      Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How similar is the terrorists\group to Americans? 
Strong No=0, Strong Yes=10 
 
No                                                                                                    Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
How many (approximately) casualties were actually 
reported in this event? Type how many in this box 
Type how many in this box. 
  
 
                                                 
35 The questions appeared one per screen. 
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